O'Donnell v. Kaye

2015 WI App 7, 859 N.W.2d 441, 359 Wis. 2d 511, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 984
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedDecember 3, 2014
DocketNo. 2013AP2615
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 2015 WI App 7 (O'Donnell v. Kaye) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Donnell v. Kaye, 2015 WI App 7, 859 N.W.2d 441, 359 Wis. 2d 511, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 984 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

BROWN, C.J.

¶ 1. In this case the plaintiff tried to accomplish service by publication and mailing, but when it came to the mailing step, he sent the pleadings to the wrong address. The circuit court concluded that the failure to mail to the defendant's known address was a fundamental defect in the service of process, and we agree. "Close enough" is not good enough when it comes to service of process. Our legislature prescribes strict methods for the service of process before the court will have jurisdiction over the defendant. Where the plaintiff failed to duly perform those requirements, there can be no jurisdiction. Certain minor errors within the pleadings may be technical defects, but failing to complete the physical act of mailing to the defendant's known address is not such an error. When service depends on mailing, mailing to the wrong place is a fundamental failure of the core requirements of personal jurisdiction. We affirm.

Facts

¶ 2. William O'Donnell filed his lawsuit in February 2013 and immediately attempted personal service. Repeated attempts at personal service failed. In late March, O'Donnell resorted to service by publication and mailing, as permitted by Wis. Stat. § 801.11(l)(c) [515]*515(2011-12).1 O'Donnell published the legal notice required by § 801.11(l)(c) and mailed an authenticated copy of the summons and complaint.

¶ 3. Roxanne Kaye filed an answer to the complaint on May 7,2013. In June, she moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction due to insufficient service of process. She asserted that O'Donnell failed to exercise reasonable diligence to personally serve her before serving her by publication and mailing and that O'Donnell failed to properly serve by publication and mailing.2 Kaye asserted that no copy of the pleadings was mailed to her home address and that she obtained a copy of the pleadings by purchasing a photocopy of them at the Waukesha courthouse. She argued that the defects in service were fundamental and deprived the court of jurisdiction.

¶ 4. O'Donnell responded with proof of his repeated attempts at personal service and documentation of service by publication and mailing. Review of O'Donnell's documentation, however, revealed that the pleadings had been mailed to "W138 S7513 Fairfield Avenue" instead of Kaye's correct address, "W136 S7513 Fairfield Drive." In other words, the address to which the pleadings were sent differed from Kaye's in both the street number ("W138" instead of "W136") and in the street name ("Avenue" instead of "Drive"). O'Donnell admitted the typographical error' but argued that there was no prejudice to Kaye.

[516]*516¶ 5. The circuit court found that O'Donnell used "reasonable diligence" in attempting personal service but that his substitute service by publication and mailing was ineffective because he mailed the pleadings to the wrong address. The court stated there was "no discretion" to overlook that mistake. O'Donnell moved to reconsider, arguing that the error was technical, not fundamental, and that Kaye was not prejudiced by it. The court denied the motion, concluding that failure to mail to the "proper last known address" was not a technical defect but a "substantive" one. O'Donnell appeals.

Discussion

¶ 6. There is a threshold issue to dispense with in this case because Kaye argues that O'Donnell failed to exercise "reasonable diligence" in his efforts at personal service before resorting to service by publication and mailing. See Wis. Stat. § 801.11. On appeal, however, we may not disturb the court's factual findings with respect to the plaintiffs "reasonable diligence" unless they are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Welty v. Heggy, 124 Wis. 2d 318, 324, 369 N.W.2d 763 (Ct. App. 1985). We find no error in the circuit court's factual determinations establishing that O'Donnell exercised reasonable diligence in his attempts at personal service, so we affirm the circuit court's decision that service by publication and mailing was permitted.3

[517]*517¶ 7. The real issue is whether O'Donnell successfully accomplished service by publication and mailing. Service by publication and mailing under Wis. Stat. § 801.11(l)(c) requires the following:

If the defendant's post-office address is known .. . there shall be mailed to the defendant, at or immediately prior to the first publication, a copy of the summons and a copy of the complaint. The mailing may be omitted if the post-office address cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence.

Since O'Donnell knew Kaye's address, but did not mail the pleadings to that address, there was a defect in the service. See Burnett v. Hill, 207 Wis. 2d 110, 121, 557 N.W.2d 800 (1997) (concluding that failure to comply with the requirement that an authenticated copy of the pleadings "shall be mailed" in § 801.11(c) was a defect). O'Donnell does not seriously dispute4 that he erred by [518]*518mailing the pleadings to the wrong place, but he argues that his mistake was a mere "technical" defect, not a fundamental one.

¶ 8. It is true that in some cases a mistake that violates the letter of the statutory requirements for service of process (e.g., signing the complaint but not the summons) may be deemed a "technical" defect that does not defeat jurisdiction. Mahoney v. Menard Inc., 2011 WI App 128, ¶ 9, 337 Wis. 2d 170, 805 N.W.2d 728 (discussing Gaddis v. LaCrosse Prods., Inc., 198 Wis. 2d 396, 542 N.W.2d 454 (1996)). While a "fundamental" defect in service precludes the exercise of personal jurisdiction, a "technical" defect does not preclude jurisdiction in the absence of prejudice. Id.

¶ 9. Whether a particular defect is technical or fundamental is a question of law we review de novo. Id., ¶ 6. The burden of establishing that a defect was technical is on the party who committed the error. Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 2012 WI 31, ¶ 26, 339 Wis. 2d 493, 523, 811 N.W.2d 756.

¶ 10. In determining whether an error in the address used during the "mailing" component of service by publication and mailing is a "fundamental" defect, we must look to the purpose of the mailing requirement. Mahoney, 337 Wis. 2d 170, ¶ 6 ("[W]hen a pleading that contains a defect nevertheless comports with the purpose and nature of the statute, the defect is generally technical." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Because the mailing requirement is one of the statuto[519]*519rily mandated components of service by publication and mailing, its purposes are twofold: giving the defendant notice of the lawsuit and establishing the court's authority over the defendant with respect to the dispute. See Johnson, 339 Wis. 2d 493, ¶ 24 (discussing the two purposes of serving a summons).

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2015 WI App 7, 859 N.W.2d 441, 359 Wis. 2d 511, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 984, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/odonnell-v-kaye-wisctapp-2014.