Odom v. Woodward

11 S.W. 925, 74 Tex. 41, 1889 Tex. LEXIS 889
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedMay 14, 1889
DocketNo. 6181
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 11 S.W. 925 (Odom v. Woodward) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Odom v. Woodward, 11 S.W. 925, 74 Tex. 41, 1889 Tex. LEXIS 889 (Tex. 1889).

Opinion

Henry, Associate Justice.

The defendant in error instituted this suit to try title to a league and labor of land lying in Runnels County, patented to the heirs of Hiram Friley.

Plaintiff claimed title to the whole through Julia Childress as the sole heir of said Hiram Friley.

Defendant claimed under conveyances coming through two children of the said Hiram by a different wife.

The date of Hiram Friley’s emigration to Texas, as well as his death, is uncertain. It may be assumed with some certainty that he was here as early as 1828 and died before 1837.

The certificate by virtue of which the land was located was granted to the heirs of Hiram Friley by an act of the Legislature of this State passed February 7, 1853, upon the petition of Julia Childress, alleging that she was the only heir of the said Hiram.

The defendants introduced through deposition of an aged witness in Mississippi declarations of deceased relations of Hiram Friley to the effect that before coming to Texas he was'married to the mother of the two children under whom defendants claim; that they were his children by her; that the mother and one of the children came with him to Texas and subsequently returned to Mississippi, and that such wife died after her return, leaving surviving her said two children. Just when she died is not stated.

[44]*44Plaintiff introduced evidence that Hiram Friley and the mother of Julia Childress were husband and wife in Texas, and that both died here, leaving her their only child.

The date or place of Friley’s marriage to either woman is not stated. Attached to the petition of Mrs. Childress to the Legislature were four affidavits with regard to Friley’s residence in Texas and his having a wife and one young child. Three of these witnesses do not identify Mrs. Childress as such child; the fourth one does.

The documentary evidence introduced shows that the certificate under which the land was located was granted by the Legislature by a special act to the heirs of Hiram Friley at the petition of Julia Childress, alleging that she was the only heir of Hiram Friley. The decisive question made by the evidence is whether the mother of Julia Childress or the mother of the vendors of the defendants was the wife of Hiram Friley.

Legitimate evidence was introduced by both parties which uncontradicted would ordinarily, standing by itself, be sufficient to sustain the case of each, without being conclusive or entirely satisfactory upon the part of either when disputed by the other. The jury having found for plaintiff on the theory that Mrs. Childress was the sole heir their verdict must stand unless errors that may have influenced that result are shown to have occurred during the trial.

The first four assignments of error insisted upon by appellants relate to the exclusion of evidence contained in depositions of defendant’s witnesses. The «excluded evidence was as sollows: Mrs. E. M. Boyd stated that she knew the land certificate was located by Soloman Friley through letters from him to her husband, and that her husband paid his share of the expense of locating said certificate; that she knew Hiram Friley had a headright claim for a league and labor of land in Texas, which was located about thirty years ago by his son Solomon Friley for the benefit of himself and her husband, Charles W. Boyd, sole heirs of said Hiram Friley; this she knew from general family history and correspondence between her husband and Solomon Friley and from her husband sending money to Solomon Friley to pay his part of the expenses.

Part of this evidence was properly excluded because it showed there was better evidence of the facts to which it related; other parts were ex-excluded because they were statements of the opinions or conclusions of the witness and not a detail of facts; and other parts are inadmissible hearsay testimony.

The facts about the grant and its location are incontro vertibly proved by other evidence in the record.

The payment by the husband and brother of the witness of the expense of locating the certificate does not establish or tend to establish that their mother was the wife of Hiram Friley or that they were his descendants, [45]*45nor do they tend to prove that the mother of Mrs. Childress was not her father’s wife.

The court excluded the evidence of another witness by whom defendant offered to prove he had heard it generally reported that the mother of Mrs. Childress was not the wife -of Hiram Friley. Evidence of the same Avitness Avas offered to prove some things that he had frequently heard Solomon Friley say that his father said about Julia Childress Avith regard to her paternity, not at all affecting that or her legitimacy, and utterly irrelevant and unimportant.

It Avas proposed to prove by another witness that Solomon Friley claimed to have emigrated to Texas from Yazoo County, Mississippi, and also that he claimed a one-third interest in a league and labor of land located by virtue of- his father’s headlight. There is nothing in the case to make the county from which Solomon Friley emigrated to Texas material. If it was material and proof of that fact Avould establish or tend to establish his title to the land the fact could not even then be proved by his own statements to that effect. It is useless to say that his claiming a third interest in this land as being the headlight of his father can not be received as evidence of title in him.

All of the evidence Avas correctly excluded.

The court permitted Julia Childress and another witness to testify that she “obtained the land by a relief bill of the Legislature granted upon her petition to that body.” This evidence was objected to by defendant, and its admission is assigned as error. The same facts were proved by uncontroverted record evidence, and if this testimony was improper it can not be considered as having tended to improperly influence the result. We think, however, it Avas properly admitted, if for no other purpose to identify her as the person who made the petition to the Legislature. While it was not necessary in the absence of a dispute over her identity to do that there Avas no harm in it.

The sixth assignment complains that “the court erred in not submitting in his charge to the jury the right of Solomon Friley to inherit as a child of the half-blood of the community estate of Hiram Friley and wife.” There is nothing in the record for such a charge to properly apply to. If the charge had been proper and the court had omitted it the proper thing for appellant to have done would then have been to request it. If the court gives an improper charge error may be assigned on it. Error can not be assigned on the omission to give even a proper charge. That can be reached only by calling the court’s attention to the omission by requesting a proper charge, which it is presumed will be given when requested, or if it is not the refusal will properly be assigned as error.

The seventh assignment is as follows: “The court erred in section 6 of his charge to the jury wherein he instructs them as follows: 'The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of evi[46]

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
11 S.W. 925, 74 Tex. 41, 1889 Tex. LEXIS 889, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/odom-v-woodward-tex-1889.