Odgers v. Office of the Director of Regulation

10 Am. Tribal Law 121
CourtMohegan Gaming Disputes Trial Court
DecidedJuly 23, 2010
DocketNo. GDTC-AA-08-133-TBW
StatusPublished

This text of 10 Am. Tribal Law 121 (Odgers v. Office of the Director of Regulation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mohegan Gaming Disputes Trial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Odgers v. Office of the Director of Regulation, 10 Am. Tribal Law 121 (Mo. 2010).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

WILSON, J.

This is the Plaintiffs second appeal from a final decision of the Defendant, Office of the Director of Regulation (ODR) revoking his gaming license. On his first appeal, Odgers v. ODR, 4 G.D.R. 10 (2009), this Court sustained Plaintiffs appeal and remanded the ease to the Defendant agency for further proceedings. In this case, as in the first appeal, the revocation of the Plaintiffs license was based upon a violation of the Mohegan Sun Casino’s drug-free policy. In the first appeal, this Court sustained the appeal “because the faet of an arrest alone cannot be grounds for a revocation of a license; because the notice did not allege a violation of a drug-free policy; and because there was no evidence in the record of the drug free policy ...” 1

On remand the Defendant issued a new notice of hearing. The notice indicated that “the subject of the hearing will be an issue of suitability for employment by the Mohegan Sun Casino based on violation of your employer’s Zero Drug Tolerance Policy. The Zero Drug Tolerance Policy is set forth in the employee handbook on pages 26, 27 subsection 12, Possession of a Controlled Substance is conduct which violates company (sic) policies and procedures and results in disciplinary action up to and including termination.” (Transcript p. 2). The drug-free policy was entered into the record in this case as Exhibit 4.

The notice of the remand hearing was not based on the arrest alone and the [123]*123notice did allege a violation of the drug-free policy. Therefore, the first two reasons for the remand in the previous case are not present here and the Plaintiff has raised no issues regarding them on this second appeal.

The third reason for remand in the previous case was that there was no evidence in the record of the drug-free policy. On the remand hearing, the Defendant introduced into the record Exhibit 4 which is an excerpt from the Employee Handbook entitled “Personal Conduct Policy.” The Defendant contends that this is the “drug-free policy.” The .Plaintiff contests this and argues that there is no “Zero-Drug Tolerance Policy”, that the Defendant did not violate such policy (indeed could not because there was no such policy), and that there are insufficient grounds for revocation of his license.

After the remand hearing the material and relevant findings of fact made by the Defendant included that the Notice of Hearing alleged that the Plaintiff violated the employer’s policy concerning illegal drugs; that the zero-drug tolerance policy is set forth in the Employee Handbook at pages 26 and 27 subsection (12) (Exhibit 4); that the Plaintiff signed for the Employee Handbook; and that the Plaintiff acknowledged that marijuana is a controlled substance and knew that it was illegal.

The Defendant summarized (or in some cases paraphrased) the applicable law (to be fully stated hereafter) and rendered the following conclusion in again revoking the Plaintiffs license:

“1. The Appellant violated the Personal Conduct Policy when he was arrested in 2008 for Possession of Marijuana. The policy, also known as a drug free policy or zero tolerance policy, is provided to each prospective employee during their orientation. The employee acknowledges the receipt of this policy which is found in the Employee handbook. Furthermore, the appellant testified that he didn’t have to know' that this policy existed, to know that possession of marijuana was illegal. The Director is granted the authority to issue and revoke licenses for the gaming operation. Although the Appellant received a diversionary program for his possession charges, the Director is concerned—and it is within the scope of his authority—to determine the suitability of an individual to retain his license in light of his admitted illegal use and possession of marijuana. This Hearing Office concurs with the MTGC, and finds that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the appellant does not meet the Commission standards of expectations or suitability for continued licensing to work at Mohegan Sun.”

On this appeal the Plaintiff contends that there is no “zero drug tolerance policy” and that the Plaintiff’s conduct did not provide grounds for the revocation of his license. The plaintiff argues that the decision of Judge Eagan in Izbicki v. ODR, GDTC-AA-08-138-FOE (November 17, 2009) and (May 19, 2010) support sustaining the appeal. This court agrees and therefore the Plaintiffs appeal is sustained.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review and the applicable law was set forth in the previous decision, and will not be repeated here. See also Izbicki v. ODR, 4 G.D.R. 20 (2009), and subsequent decisions therein on November 17, 2009 and May 19, 2010.

STANDARD FOR REVOCATION OF LICENSE

Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (the IGRA), 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., [124]*124the Mohegan Tribe of Indians is required to provide, inter alia, an “adequate system which ... includes ...

(II) a standard whereby any person whose prior activities, criminal record, if any, or reputation, habits and associations pose a threat to the public interest or to the effective regulation of gaming, or create or enhance the dangers of unsuitable, unfair, or illegal practices and methods and activities in the conduct of gaming shall not be eligible for employment; ...”

See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(F)(ii)(II).

Under subsection (c)(2):

“(2) If, after the issuance of a gaming license by an Indian Tribe, reliable information is received from the Commission indicating that a primary management official or key employee does not meet the standard established under subsection (b)(2)(F)(ii)(II) of this section, the Indian tribe shall suspend such license and, after notice and hearing, may revoke such license.”

Pursuant to the IGRA, and in conformity with it, the Mohegan Tribe and the State of Connecticut entered into a “Tribal-State Compact” upon which the Defendant rests his decision to revoke the Plaintiffs license. The relevant section of the Compact reflects (but does not precisely follow) the IGRA:

“Sec. 5, (e) Action by State gaming agency. The State gaming agency shall, as soon as is practicable after receipt of a completed license application, either grant or deny the license. The State gaming agency may deny a gaming employee license to any application who:
(1) has been determined to be a person whose prior activities, criminal record, if any, or reputation, habits and associations pose a threat to the effective regulation of gaming or create or enhance the chances of unfair or illegal practices, methods, and activities in the conduct of the gaming activities permitted hereunder; provided, however, that the State shall not apply standards for approval of licenses pursuant to this section more rigorously than those actually applied in the approval of employee licenses in gaming enterprises operated or regulated exclusively by the State;” ...
“Sec. 5, (g) Revocation or suspension of license.

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Related

Findings
25 U.S.C. § 2701
Tribal gaming ordinances
25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(F)(ii)(II)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
10 Am. Tribal Law 121, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/odgers-v-office-of-the-director-of-regulation-mohegangct-2010.