Odeyale v. Chadwick

Opinion

1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3

4 Bolanle Christina Odeyale, Case No. 2:25-cv-00104-CDS-EJY

5 Petitioner Dismissal Order

6 v.

7 Hollie Chadwick, et al., [ECF Nos. 16, 20]

8 Respondents

10 Petitioner Bolanle Christina Odeyale, an immigration detainee, filed a counseled petition 11 for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“petition”), seeking (1) release from 12 custody unless she is promptly provided with a new bond hearing, and (2) a declaration that the 13 Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of bond—and the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) 14 affirmance thereof—was an abuse of discretion. ECF No. 1. The IJ denied the petitioner’s “request 15 for a change in custody status” because she had not met her burden of providing that she was not 16 a “[d]anger to the community.” ECF No. 1-13; see also ECF No. 1-16. The BIA affirmed “without 17 opinion.” ECF No. 1-18. 18 Before the Court is respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition as moot given that the 19 petitioner was released from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody on 20 January 20, 2025. ECF No. 16. Petitioner filed a response, explaining that she did not oppose 21 dismissal of the petition as moot so long as the denial of bond decision by the IJ and affirmation by 22 the BIA would not have lasting consequences. ECF No. 19. To avoid any lasting consequences, the 23 petitioner filed a motion for the Court to vacate the IJ and BIA decisions under United States v. 24 Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). ECF No. 20. However, as an alternative, the petitioner 25 requested that any dismissal order make clear that she would be entitled to a new, independent 26 evaluation by a future IJ of her flight risk and dangerousness as required by due process if she were 1 to have a future bond hearing following any re-detainment. ECF No. 20. In response, respondents 2 opposed vacatur of the IJ and BIA decisions under Munsingwear, but they maintained that “it would 3 be highly speculative to assume that a future IJ would not make an independent evaluation of the 4 petitioner’s flight risk or dangerousness as required by due process.” ECF Nos. 21, 23-1. 5 If a case becomes moot before it can be fully litigated on appeal, the party who did not 6 prevail below may be entitled to vacatur of the appealed decision. See Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 39 7 (“The established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system 8 which has become moot while on its way here or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or 9 vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.”); see also U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. 10 Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 23 (1994) (explaining that Munsingwear provides for vacatur of 11 “judgments whose review is . . . ‘prevented through happenstance’—that is to say, where a 12 controversy presented for review has ‘become moot due to circumstances unattributable to any of 13 the parties’”). Vacatur is an equitable and discretionary remedy. See U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25. 14 Vacatur “is commonly utilized . . . to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from 15 spawning any legal consequences” and ensures that “the rights of all parties are preserved” to fully 16 litigate the issues in a future case. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40–41. Munsingwear applies to cases like 17 the one here where the petitioner seeks review of an administrative order. See A.L. Mechling Barge 18 Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 329 (1961) (“We think the principle enunciated in Munsingwear 19 at least equally applicable to unreviewed administrative orders.”). 20 I decline to exercise my discretion to vacate the IJ and BIA decisions under Munsingwear. 21 The respondents have affirmatively represented that an IJ would be expected to make a new, 22 independent evaluation at a bond redetermination hearing if the petitioner were to be re- 23 detained. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“The Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due 24 process of law in deportation proceedings.”). Thus, given that the IJ and BIA decisions are not 25 likely to spawn any future legal consequences, the principles of equity do not necessitate vacatur 26 of the IJ’s previous bond determination. Indeed, given that flight risk and dangerousness are fluid 1 |lissues, it is safe to assume that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause would require the government to reconsider the petitioner’s flight risk and dangerousness to justify any denial of 3 ||bond following any re-detention in the future.! 4 Conclusion 5 It is therefore ordered that the respondents’ motion to dismiss [ECF No. 16] is granted. 6|| The petition for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [ECF No. 1] is dismissed as 7||moot. 8 It is further ordered that the motion for vacatur [ECF No. 20] is denied. 9 It is further ordered that a Certificate of Appealability is denied given that reasonable 10||jurists would not find dismissal of the petition as moot or the denial of vacatur to be debatable or wrong. 12 The Clerk of the Court kindly instructed to enter judgment and to close this case. 1B Dated: May 7, 2025 / ) { 14 LZ 15 CristingD. Silva United States District Judge 16 iy 17 18 19 20 21 22 acknowledge the petitioner's concern that this case is like the Abrego Garcia case, where the 24 || government used the IJ’s bond hearing finding of dangerousness in other capacities. ECF No. 24 at 6. However, given that the petitioner has never acquiesced to the dangerousness finding and instead has 25 || strenuously challenged the IJ’s bond hearing findings to this Court, the concerns here are not the same as the concerns presented in the Abrego Garcia case where the bond proceedings were not challenged in 26 || federal court. Also, given the unprecedented nature of the Abrego Garcia case, it is unlikely that the petitioner would face similar issues.