Oden Meyers v. Meink

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 11, 2026
• Docket: 24-4974
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 11 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WANDA J. ODEN MEYERS, No. 24-4974 D.C. No. 2:21-cv-08546-MRA- Plaintiff - Appellant, MAR v.

TROY E. MEINK, Secretary of the Air MEMORANDUM* Force,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Monica Ramirez Almadani, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 22, 2026**

Before: LEE, DESAI, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Wanda J. Oden Meyers appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in her employment discrimination action alleging violations of Title VII,

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Desire,

LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Oden Meyers’s

disparate treatment and retaliation claims because Oden Meyers failed to raise a

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ legitimate, non-

discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for reassigning duties to her, placing her

on a performance improvement plan, and recommending termination were

pretextual. See Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1094-95 (9th

Cir. 2005) (explaining that after the employer shows a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to show that the reason was pretextual, and that when the plaintiff relies

on circumstantial evidence to show pretext, the evidence must be “specific and

substantial to defeat the employer’s motion for summary judgment” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Oden Meyer’s

hostile work environment claims because Oden Meyers failed to raise a triable

dispute as to whether she was subjected to severe or pervasive verbal or physical

conduct on the basis of race or disability that was sufficient to create an abusive

working environment. See Mattioda v. Nelson, 98 F.4th 1164, 1174-76 (9th Cir.

2024) (setting forth requirements of hostile work environment claim under the

2 24-4974 Rehabilitation Act); Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prods., 847 F.3d 678, 686-87

(9th Cir. 2017) (setting forth requirements of hostile work environment claim

under Title VII).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-4974