Odell Parham v. United States

339 F.2d 741
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedDecember 7, 1964
Docket18443_1
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 339 F.2d 741 (Odell Parham v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Odell Parham v. United States, 339 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1964).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant contends that the use of the word “presumed” in the course of the trial judge’s instructions on proof of intent rendered the charge reversibly erroneous. We think the charge was clearly valid, since the judge correctly told the jurors they could deduce or infer intent from the facts and circumstances shown in the evidence. The “presumed” was in an additional clause and obviously was used to indicate deduction or inference from basic facts. However it appears from the cases that over the years “presumption” has acquired connotation;? which embody the idea of a binding rule of law. In view of what the Supreme Court had to say about the word in Mor-rissette v. United States, 1 we think trial judges would be well advised to omit the word from their instructions on intent, *742 thus avoiding the possibility of unintentional confusion.

We find no error in this or in other allegedly erroneous rulings, and the judgment of the District Court will be

Affirmed.

1

. 342 U.S. 246, 256, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952).

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Bluebook (online)
339 F.2d 741, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/odell-parham-v-united-states-cadc-1964.