1 2 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT 3 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Dec 20, 2024 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 JONATHAN P. O’DAY, 9 No. 2:24-CV-00347-ACE
10 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
11 MOTION TO DISMISS v.
12 ECF No. 9 13 STATE OF WASHINGTON and JULIE LARSON, 14 15 Defendants.
16 17 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 9.1 18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se; Defendants are represented by Assistant Attorney 19 General Jordyn Jones. This matter was submitted for consideration without oral 20 argument. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against the Washington State Department of 23 Labor and Industries and Assistant Attorney General Julie Larson on October 8, 24
25 1Plaintiff filed no response to Defendant’s dispositive motion. See LCivR 26 7(e) (“The failure to comply with the requirements of LCivR 7(b) or (c) may be 27 deemed consent to the entry of an order adverse to the party who violates these 28 rules.”). 1 2024. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges claims arising from the litigation 2 of a wage theft claim before the Office of Administrative Hearings and an appeal 3 of that order to the state superior court. ECF No. 1 at 4-5. Plaintiff asserts due 4 process violations. Id. Plaintiff seeks an order requiring Defendants to provide 5 certain documentation for presentation to the state superior court judge, prohibiting 6 Defendants from making certain arguments to the superior court, and to permit 7 service of process by mail. ECF No. 1 at 7. An appeal of the administrative 8 determination of Plaintiff’s wage theft claim is currently pending in Spokane 9 County Superior Court. ECF No. 1 at 5. 10 DISCUSSION 11 A. Standard of Review 12 Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 12(b)(1) tests whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims 14 asserted by Plaintiff. A complaint must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) if, 15 considering all allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the action: (1) 16 does not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or does 17 not fall within one of the other enumerated categories of Article III, Section 2, of 18 the Constitution; (2) is not a case or controversy within the meaning of the 19 Constitution; or (3) is not one described by any jurisdictional statute. Baker v. 20 Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962); D.G. Rung Indus., Inc. v. Tinnerman, 626 F.Supp. 21 1062, 1063 (W.D. Wash. 1986). The party asserting jurisdiction (here, Plaintiff) 22 bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Ass’n of Am. Med. 23 Coll. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778-779 (9th Cir. 2000); Kokkonen v. 24 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). 25 B. Analysis 26 1. Younger Abstention 27 Defendants first argue that this Court should not exercise jurisdiction in this 28 case under the Younger abstention doctrine. ECF No. 9 at 4-6. 1 Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts must not 2 interfere with pending state court litigation that implicates “important state 3 interests.” Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. County of Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 881 (9th 4 Cir. 2011). Although Younger itself involved potential interference with a state 5 criminal case by a federal court, the Supreme Court has extended the doctrine to 6 federal cases that would interfere with state civil cases and state administrative 7 proceedings, but “as virtually all cases discussing Younger abstention emphasize,” 8 abstention is the exception, not the rule. San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of 9 Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091-1092 10 (9th Cir. 2008). A federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a 11 case under Younger when: “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) 12 the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an adequate 13 opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the 14 requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing 15 state judicial proceeding.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 16 2018); Logan v. U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 722 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013); San 17 Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court 18 finds that all of the Younger considerations are satisfied here. See infra. 19 The first element, “ongoing state judicial proceedings,” is met. According to 20 the complaint, Plaintiff seeks an order to compel Defendants’ conduct in an 21 ongoing appeal of the administrative decision regarding his wage theft complaint 22 in Spokane County Superior Court. See ECF No. 1 at 5, 7. The state action out of 23 which the instant claims arise remains ongoing. 24 The second element, the importance of the state’s interest, is likewise met. 25 Courts “look to . . . the importance of the general proceedings to the State.” New 26 Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 365 27 (1989). Washington State has an interest in the enforcement of its wage laws. 28 /// 1 The third Younger element, whether there is an adequate opportunity in the 2 state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges, is met. Plaintiff asks this court 3 to compel Defendants to provide certain documentation and prohibit Defendants 4 from asserting certain arguments in its defense. Plaintiff fails to show that the state 5 court is an inadequate forum to address these concerns. 6 The fourth Younger element, that “the requested relief seeks to enjoin or has 7 the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial proceeding,” is also met. 8 The relief Plaintiff seeks would have the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing 9 state court proceedings. 10 Plaintiff filed no response or otherwise provided a ground to reject 11 Defendants’ argument that, under Younger, the Court should abstain from review 12 of Plaintiff’s claims. 13 The Court finds that the interests of equity and comity direct an abstention 14 from adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims because all four Younger factors are 15 satisfied and federal review of Plaintiff’s claims would interfere with a pending 16 state court matter. Dismissal under Younger is appropriate. 17 2. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 18 Defendants additionally assert that this Court should not exercise jurisdiction 19 in this case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. ECF No. 9 at 6-8. 20 Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, federal courts are barred from 21 exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a proceeding in which a party losing in 22 state court seeks what in substance would be an appeal of the state court decision 23 in the federal court. Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041-1042 (9th Cir. 2005).
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1 2 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT 3 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Dec 20, 2024 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 JONATHAN P. O’DAY, 9 No. 2:24-CV-00347-ACE
10 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
11 MOTION TO DISMISS v.
12 ECF No. 9 13 STATE OF WASHINGTON and JULIE LARSON, 14 15 Defendants.
16 17 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 9.1 18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se; Defendants are represented by Assistant Attorney 19 General Jordyn Jones. This matter was submitted for consideration without oral 20 argument. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against the Washington State Department of 23 Labor and Industries and Assistant Attorney General Julie Larson on October 8, 24
25 1Plaintiff filed no response to Defendant’s dispositive motion. See LCivR 26 7(e) (“The failure to comply with the requirements of LCivR 7(b) or (c) may be 27 deemed consent to the entry of an order adverse to the party who violates these 28 rules.”). 1 2024. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges claims arising from the litigation 2 of a wage theft claim before the Office of Administrative Hearings and an appeal 3 of that order to the state superior court. ECF No. 1 at 4-5. Plaintiff asserts due 4 process violations. Id. Plaintiff seeks an order requiring Defendants to provide 5 certain documentation for presentation to the state superior court judge, prohibiting 6 Defendants from making certain arguments to the superior court, and to permit 7 service of process by mail. ECF No. 1 at 7. An appeal of the administrative 8 determination of Plaintiff’s wage theft claim is currently pending in Spokane 9 County Superior Court. ECF No. 1 at 5. 10 DISCUSSION 11 A. Standard of Review 12 Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 12(b)(1) tests whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims 14 asserted by Plaintiff. A complaint must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) if, 15 considering all allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the action: (1) 16 does not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or does 17 not fall within one of the other enumerated categories of Article III, Section 2, of 18 the Constitution; (2) is not a case or controversy within the meaning of the 19 Constitution; or (3) is not one described by any jurisdictional statute. Baker v. 20 Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962); D.G. Rung Indus., Inc. v. Tinnerman, 626 F.Supp. 21 1062, 1063 (W.D. Wash. 1986). The party asserting jurisdiction (here, Plaintiff) 22 bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Ass’n of Am. Med. 23 Coll. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778-779 (9th Cir. 2000); Kokkonen v. 24 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). 25 B. Analysis 26 1. Younger Abstention 27 Defendants first argue that this Court should not exercise jurisdiction in this 28 case under the Younger abstention doctrine. ECF No. 9 at 4-6. 1 Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts must not 2 interfere with pending state court litigation that implicates “important state 3 interests.” Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. County of Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 881 (9th 4 Cir. 2011). Although Younger itself involved potential interference with a state 5 criminal case by a federal court, the Supreme Court has extended the doctrine to 6 federal cases that would interfere with state civil cases and state administrative 7 proceedings, but “as virtually all cases discussing Younger abstention emphasize,” 8 abstention is the exception, not the rule. San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of 9 Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091-1092 10 (9th Cir. 2008). A federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a 11 case under Younger when: “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) 12 the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an adequate 13 opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the 14 requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing 15 state judicial proceeding.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 16 2018); Logan v. U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 722 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013); San 17 Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court 18 finds that all of the Younger considerations are satisfied here. See infra. 19 The first element, “ongoing state judicial proceedings,” is met. According to 20 the complaint, Plaintiff seeks an order to compel Defendants’ conduct in an 21 ongoing appeal of the administrative decision regarding his wage theft complaint 22 in Spokane County Superior Court. See ECF No. 1 at 5, 7. The state action out of 23 which the instant claims arise remains ongoing. 24 The second element, the importance of the state’s interest, is likewise met. 25 Courts “look to . . . the importance of the general proceedings to the State.” New 26 Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 365 27 (1989). Washington State has an interest in the enforcement of its wage laws. 28 /// 1 The third Younger element, whether there is an adequate opportunity in the 2 state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges, is met. Plaintiff asks this court 3 to compel Defendants to provide certain documentation and prohibit Defendants 4 from asserting certain arguments in its defense. Plaintiff fails to show that the state 5 court is an inadequate forum to address these concerns. 6 The fourth Younger element, that “the requested relief seeks to enjoin or has 7 the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial proceeding,” is also met. 8 The relief Plaintiff seeks would have the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing 9 state court proceedings. 10 Plaintiff filed no response or otherwise provided a ground to reject 11 Defendants’ argument that, under Younger, the Court should abstain from review 12 of Plaintiff’s claims. 13 The Court finds that the interests of equity and comity direct an abstention 14 from adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims because all four Younger factors are 15 satisfied and federal review of Plaintiff’s claims would interfere with a pending 16 state court matter. Dismissal under Younger is appropriate. 17 2. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 18 Defendants additionally assert that this Court should not exercise jurisdiction 19 in this case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. ECF No. 9 at 6-8. 20 Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, federal courts are barred from 21 exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a proceeding in which a party losing in 22 state court seeks what in substance would be an appeal of the state court decision 23 in the federal court. Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041-1042 (9th Cir. 2005). 24 Congress vested “the United States Supreme Court, not the lower federal courts, 25 with appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 26 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “applies only in 27 ‘limited circumstances’” and only to “‘cases [1] brought by state-court losers [2] 28 complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered before the 1 district court proceedings commenced and [4] inviting district court review and 2 rejection of those judgments.’” Brown v. Duringer Law Grp. PLC, 86 F.4th 1251, 3 1253-1254 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 4 544 U.S. 280, 284, 291 (2005)). 5 Although Plaintiff does not characterize this action as an appeal of a state 6 court decision, Defendants contend that this action is essentially the de facto 7 equivalent. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is a 8 forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal 9 district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, 10 and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.”). Defendants assert Plaintiff did 11 not prevail in the state administrative hearing regarding his wage loss claims or in 12 his appeal to the Director of the Washington State Department of Labor and 13 Industries. ECF No. 9 at 7 citing ECF No. 1 at 4-5. Plaintiff then brought an 14 appeal in Spokane County Superior Court to address his dissatisfaction with those 15 results2 and now seeks an order from this Court to compel Defendants’ actions 16 within that pending superior court case with the aim of overturning the 17 administrative hearing and appeal decisions. Id. 18 Because Plaintiff’s alleged injuries flow directly from the state 19 administrative proceedings, the Court finds the present suit is a forbidden de facto 20 appeal from a state court decision. ECF No. 9 at 8. Accordingly, the Court lacks 21 jurisdiction over this action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as well. 22 /// 23 /// 24
25 2The fact an appeal was taken within the state court does not preclude the 26 application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Doe & Associates Law Offices v. 27 Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The purpose of the doctrine is 28 to protect state judgments from collateral federal attack.”). 1]/ C. Conclusion 2 For the reasons discussed above, dismissal of this action is appropriate under 3|| Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 4 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 5 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED. 6 2. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to file this 8 || Order, provide copies to Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants, and CLOSE THE 9|| FILE. 10 DATED December 20, 2024.
12 _ Clagwrler © Glade C, aed ALEXANDER C. EKSTROM —_ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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ORDER ...- 6