O'Connell v. Mayor of Lynn

766 N.E.2d 886, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 583, 2002 Mass. App. LEXIS 557
CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedApril 25, 2002
DocketNo. 00-P-127
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 766 N.E.2d 886 (O'Connell v. Mayor of Lynn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Connell v. Mayor of Lynn, 766 N.E.2d 886, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 583, 2002 Mass. App. LEXIS 557 (Mass. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

Kantrowitz, J.

Terrence O’Connell, the plaintiff, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant, the mayor of the city of Lynn. The issue at hand concerns the status of O’Connell’s appointment and reappointment as administrator of the public medical institution (administrator) of the city of Lynn in light of the mayor’s failure to comply with the appointment procedures established by the Lynn city charter. We affirm.

Background. The provisions of Section 3-9 of the Lynn city charter require the mayor to submit the name of a proposed appointee for the administrator position to the Lynn city council for confirmation. The city council then must refer the candidate to a standing committee, which in turn must investigate the candidate and make a report and recommendation to the full [584]*584•city council. Absent further city council action, an appointment becomes effective thirty days after submission of the name by the mayor. An appointment is for a three-year term. Under Section 6-5 of the charter, an appointee who is reappointed to the position after a full term then serves indefinitely, and may be terminated only under the removal procedures specified elsewhere in the charter.1

On February 22, 1995, the mayor sent a letter to the personnel director for the city of Lynn, advising the director that he had “appointed” O’Connell to the position of administrator with an effective date of February 12, 1995. It is undisputed that the mayor failed to comply with the provisions of Section 3-9 of the city charter in that he did not submit O’Connell’s name to the city council for confirmation of the appointment. No confirmation proceedings were held by the council.

When O’Connell had served in this capacity for three years, no action was taken by the mayor or the city council regarding O’Connell’s dismissal or “reappointment” to the position. On November 19, 1998, the mayor issued O’Connell a letter informing him that the mayor had “chosen not to re-appoint” O’Connell and terminating him, effective December 19, 1998.

O’Connell sought injunctive relief in Superior Court to prohibit the mayor from terminating him or otherwise interfering with his employment, and declaratory relief as to his employment status. His request for preliminary injunctive relief was denied, and his termination went into effect on December 19 as scheduled. On cross motions for summary judgment, a judge denied O’Connell’s motion and allowed the mayor’s, ruling that O’Connell had not been properly appointed and confirmed and, as such, had no claim to continued employment with the city. A judgment entered declaring that O’Connell “has [585]*585no right to ‘reappointment’ under the Lynn City Charter, since he was never confirmed by the City Council in the first instance.”

O’Connell claims that, although his name was never submitted by the mayor and the city council did not confirm his appointment expressly, he was “de facto” appointed. He argues that he served in the position for three years with the knowledge and acquiescence of the city council, and that his alleged appearances before the council were the equivalent of what is required for confirmation under Section 3-9 of the charter.2 Further, he asserts, as no action was taken at the end of his tenure, he was “de facto” reappointed and under Section 6-5 cannot be terminated except under the removal provisions of the charter, see Section 6-6, which were not followed here.

Both parties cite Town Council of Agawam v. Town Manager of Agawam, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 100 (1985), as bearing heavily on the issue. O’Connell claims Agawam stands for the proposition that a municipal charter may provide for an employee appointment process that does not involve town council approval, and still be deemed consistent with G. L. c. 39, § 1.3 This is a correct statement about Agawam, but does not resolve the present issue. The Lynn city charter clearly sets out the manner [586]*586in which appointments may be confirmed, which, unlike the charter in Agawam,4 expressly involves city council approval. Agawam indicates that municipal charters are to be followed where the provisions are unambiguous. See id. at 104-106. Here, they are. The Lynn city charter unambiguously set out the method for confirmation, which was not followed.

Because O’Connell was never properly appointed under the city charter, he is not entitled to assert its reappointment and removal provisions. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant mayor was correctly granted.5

Judgment affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
766 N.E.2d 886, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 583, 2002 Mass. App. LEXIS 557, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oconnell-v-mayor-of-lynn-massappct-2002.