O'Connell v. Central Bank

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Oregon

O'Connell v. Central Bank

78 F. 535, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2485

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Oregon

DecidedFebruary 9, 1897

DocketNo. 2,177

StatusPublished

This text of 78 F. 535 (O'Connell v. Central Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

O'Connell v. Central Bank, 78 F. 535, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2485 (circtdor 1897).

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Opinion

BELLINGER, District Judge.

This is a suit to set aside a mortgage made by the Oakland Box & Barrel Manufacturing Company to the bank. It is claimed and appears that the mortgage in question was upon all the property of the Oakland Box & Barrel Manufacturing Company, and that the Oakland Box ’& Barrel Manufacturing Company was insolvent at the time the mortgage was made, and I have no doubt but that the bank knew of this condition. Nevertheless, it is the law of this circuit that such a mortgage is not within the provision of the statute (section 3173, Hill’s Ann. Laws Or.) which provides that “no general assignment of property by an insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency, for tbe benefit of creditors, shall be valid unless it be made for the benefit of all [536]*536Ms creditors in proportion to the amount of their respective claims.” In the case of Beall v. Cowan, 21 C. C. A. 267, 75 Fed. 139, the circuit court of appeals for this circuit, following the decisions of the supreme court of the state of Oregon, held, in effect, that the court would regard the form of the instrument, and, if it be not in form an assignment, it is not within the act quoted. The doctrine of this decision, and of the decisions of the supreme court upon which it is founded, is that the statute “was not intended to prevent an insolvent debtor from preferring one creditor to another, and was' not intended to apply to any and all instruments or means by which an insolvent might divest himself of his property, and thereby pay or secure certain creditors to the exclusion of others, but was intended to apply to the subject-matter of the statute, which was the voluntary distribution of an insolvent’s estate through an as-signee, and substantially in the method contemplated in the statute, — a proceeding by which the insolvent surrendered his estate to another for the benefit of his creditors, and under which the assignee distributed the estate, and in which the transfer became effective without the assent of the creditors, and the insolvent lost all dominion over his property.” Following these decisions, I must hold that the mortgage in this case is not within the statutory definition of a general assignment. It is therefore ordered that the bill of complaint herein be dismissed.

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BELLINGER, District Judge.

This is a suit to set aside a mortgage made by the Oakland Box & Barrel Manufacturing Company to the bank. It is claimed and appears that the mortgage in question was upon all the property of the Oakland Box & Barrel Manufacturing Company, and that the Oakland Box ’& Barrel Manufacturing Company was insolvent at the time the mortgage was made, and I have no doubt but that the bank knew of this condition. Nevertheless, it is the law of this circuit that such a mortgage is not within the provision of the statute (section 3173, Hill’s Ann. Laws Or.) which provides that “no general assignment of property by an insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency, for tbe benefit of creditors, shall be valid unless it be made for the benefit of all [536]*536Ms creditors in proportion to the amount of their respective claims.” In the case of Beall v. Cowan, 21 C. C. A. 267, 75 Fed. 139, the circuit court of appeals for this circuit, following the decisions of the supreme court of the state of Oregon, held, in effect, that the court would regard the form of the instrument, and, if it be not in form an assignment, it is not within the act quoted. The doctrine of this decision, and of the decisions of the supreme court upon which it is founded, is that the statute “was not intended to prevent an insolvent debtor from preferring one creditor to another, and was' not intended to apply to any and all instruments or means by which an insolvent might divest himself of his property, and thereby pay or secure certain creditors to the exclusion of others, but was intended to apply to the subject-matter of the statute, which was the voluntary distribution of an insolvent’s estate through an as-signee, and substantially in the method contemplated in the statute, — a proceeding by which the insolvent surrendered his estate to another for the benefit of his creditors, and under which the assignee distributed the estate, and in which the transfer became effective without the assent of the creditors, and the insolvent lost all dominion over his property.” Following these decisions, I must hold that the mortgage in this case is not within the statutory definition of a general assignment. It is therefore ordered that the bill of complaint herein be dismissed.

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Bluebook (online)

78 F. 535, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2485, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oconnell-v-central-bank-circtdor-1897.

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