Ocean S. S. Co. v. Allen

36 F. Supp. 851
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedJanuary 30, 1941
DocketNo. 76
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 36 F. Supp. 851 (Ocean S. S. Co. v. Allen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ocean S. S. Co. v. Allen, 36 F. Supp. 851 (M.D. Ga. 1941).

Opinion

DEA VER, District Judge.

Ocean Steamship Company of Savannah (hereinafter called the Steamship Company) brought its complaint against Marion Allen, Collector of Internal Revenue, District of Georgia (hereinafter called defendant), to recover $17,981.46 taxes paid January 17, 1940, besides interest from that date at the rate of 6% per annum. The taxes' were paid under the Carriers Taxing Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 435, 45 U.S.C.A. § 261 et seq., 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 1500 et seq., which is the companion Act to the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 307, 45 U.S.C.A. § 228a et seq. which provides old age benefits for retired employees. The case involves the application and construction of Section 1(a) of the Carriers Taxing Act of 1937, which is codified in Internal Revenue Code as Section 1532(a), 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 1532(a), the material part of which reads as follows:

“The term ‘employer’ means any carrier (as defined in subsection (h) of this section), and any company which is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by one or more such carriers or under common control therewith, and which operates any equipment or facility or performs any service (except trucking service, casual service, and the casual operation of equipment or facilities) in connection with the transportation of passengers or property by railroad, or the receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration or icing, storage, or handling of property transported by railroad ' * * *.

“The term ‘employer’ shall also include railroad associations, traffic associations, tariff bureaus, demurrage bureaus, weighing and inspection bureaus, collection agencies and other associations, bureaus, agencies, or organizations controlled and main[852]*852tained wholly or principally by two or more employers as hereinbefore defined and engaged in the performance of services in connection with or incidental to railroad transportation.”

(Sec. l(i) of the Carriers Taxing Act, I.R.C. Sec. 1532(h), 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev. Code, § 1532(h). The term “carrier” is defined as follows: “The term ‘carrier’ means an express company, sleeping-car company, or carrier by railroad, subject to part I of the Interstate Commerce Act.”

The case was tried before the Judge without a jury.

The suit is at common law for money had and received.

The Commissioner of the Department of Labor of the State of Georgia filed a motion for leave to intervene in this case, under the provisions of Rule 24 (b) (2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 28 U.S. C.A. following section 723c, which motion was resisted by the defendant. The Commissioner administers the Georgia Unemployment Compensation Act, Acts 1937, p. 806. The Steamship Company has heretofore been paying unemployment taxes under the Georgia Act and under Title IX of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 639, Sec. 1600, I.R.C., 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 1600, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq. Under the scheme of these two last mentioned acts the Steamship Company gets a credit on the Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax of 90% for payments of pay roll contributions under the State Unemployment Compensation Act. Congress passed on June 25, 1938, the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 52 Stat. 1094, U.S.C.A. Title 45, Sec. 351 et seq., which supersedes Title IX of the Social Security Act and all State Unemployment Compensation Acts for the class of employees within the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. The definition of the -term “employer” under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act is precisely the same as the definition of “employer” under the Carriers Taxing Act of 1937 quoted above, so that if the Steamship Company falls under the Carriers Taxing Act of 1937 and its companion Act, the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, it would fall under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, and the State of Georgia would be deprived of the contributions of the Steamship Company under the Georgia Unemployment Act. The contention of the movant is that the questions of law and fact which arise in this case are common to such as would arise under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act.

I have concluded to overrule the motion to intervene for the following reasons : The Railroad Unemployment . Insurance Act is administered both as to the taxes imposed by that Act and as to the distribution of the taxes raised thereunder by the Railroad Retirement Board, whereas under the federal railroad pension laws the tax is administered by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under fhe Carriers Taxing Act of 1937, and the pensions are disbursed by the Railroad Retirement Board under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937. As the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the defendant in this case are not concerned with the administration of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, and neither the Railroad Retirement Board nor the Social Security Board is a defendant in this case, I do not see how any judgment I might render in reference to the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act would be binding on any one. If the motion to intervene were granted, there is no judgment I could render in favor of the intervenor. If a judgment is rendered in this case for the plaintiff, the movant would have just as much advantage of it if he is not a party to the case as he would get if he were a party. The movant has been permitted to file a brief in the case as amicus curiae,’ and has had all of the practical advantages he could get if his motion to intervene had been allowed. The motion to intervene is accordingly disallowed.

Findings of Fact

1. The Steamship Company made a return under protest January 17, 1940, to the defendant, of the employers’ tax and the employees’ tax under the Carriers Taxing Act of 1937 for the period January 1, 1937, to April 1, 1937. The return' was made for the sum of $17,981.46, and this amount paid by the Steamship Company to the defendant under protest and under duress on January 17, 1940. A claim for refund of the tax paid with interest was duly made, and the claim was disallowed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue May 20, 1940.

2. The tax on the employees of the Steamship Company was paid by the Steamship Company, was not deducted from their compensation and has not been reimbursed the Steamship Company.

[853]*8533. The Steamship Company has heretofore made returns for itself and its employees under Title VIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq., the last return made by the Steamship Company being for the period ended June 30, 1939.

4. The defendant is Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Georgia and resides in this judicial district.

5. Ocean Steamship Company of Savannah is a corporation created by the Legislature of the State of Georgia August 26, 1872, as a navigation company; and the principal office of the corporation is in Savannah, Georgia.

6. The Steamship Company pursues the business of a common carrier by water of both freight and passengers, and operates a fleet of steamships between Savannah, Ga., and Boston, Mass., via New York.

7. The capital stock of the Steamship Company is 20,000 shares of the par value of $100 per share. All of the capital stock was formerly owned by Central Railroad & Banking Company of Georgia.

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Bluebook (online)
36 F. Supp. 851, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ocean-s-s-co-v-allen-gamd-1941.