O'Callaghan v. O'Callaghan

607 A.2d 735, 530 Pa. 176, 1992 Pa. LEXIS 307
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 18, 1992
Docket37 E.D. Appeal Docket 1991
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 607 A.2d 735 (O'Callaghan v. O'Callaghan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Callaghan v. O'Callaghan, 607 A.2d 735, 530 Pa. 176, 1992 Pa. LEXIS 307 (Pa. 1992).

Opinion

OPINION

ZAPPALA, Justice.

The parties to this appeal were married on November 5, 1953. Four children were born of this marriage, all of whom are now adults. Because of severe marital problems, the parties separated on October 1, 1982. 1 A complaint for divorce was filed on August 13,1982. 2 Hearings before the court appointed master were held March 30 through April 1, 1987. At the conclusion of the hearings, the master reeom *178 mended that a divorce be granted and that the wife receive 60% of the marital property. Furthermore, the master denied the wife’s request for alimony.

Both parties then filed exceptions. After reviewing the exceptions, the trial court adopted the recommendations of the master. The wife then appealed to Superior Court which affirmed the granting of the divorce and the distribution of the marital property, but reversed the trial court with respect to the denial of alimony. 389 Pa.Superior Ct. 319, 567 A.2d 308. We then granted husband’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal and now reverse.

The scope of review in assessing the lower court’s disposition of an alimony claim is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Remick v. Remick, 310 Pa.Super. 23, 456 A.2d 163 (1983). Likewise, in evaluating a trial court’s action in distributing marital property, we will not disturb that court’s action unless it has abused its discretion. Bold v. Bold, 524 Pa. 487, 574 A.2d 552 (1990); Hovis v. Hovis, 518 Pa. 137, 541 A.2d 1378 (1988). As we have stated so many times, an abuse of discretion occurs when a trial judge’s judgment is manifestly unreasonable or is the result of prejudice, bias or ill-will. Hainsey v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 529 Pa. 286, 602 A.2d 1300 (1992). Although it is not our responsibility to create the record or evaluate credibility, we must review the existing record to be satisfied that sufficient facts are present to substantiate the lower court’s order. If sufficient evidence is of record to support the trial judge’s action and the trial judge has properly applied existing case law to the facts, then we must affirm.

Evidence offered during the master’s hearings established that since 1969, wife, age 55, worked as a paralegal immigration specialist for George Gershenfeld, her divorce attorney, at a salary of $150.00 a week. 3 In 1971, her weekly salary was $130.00. In addition to her salary, *179 Gershenfeld paid many additional expenses for wife including her weekly food bill, telephone bill, vitamin bill, charge card bill and car insurance bill. The wife also travelled extensively in the 1980’s to the Orient, Europe, South America and the West Coast in furtherance of her specialty. Together with Gershenfeld, wife also set up an import business under the name Bet Tee Oh, Ltd. The wife was very evasive about the workings of this corporation. Since Bet Tee Oh filed no income tax returns, establishing the financial condition of that corporation was quite difficult.

With regard to wife’s health, testimony established that her health has been somewhat declining since 1984 due to rheumatoid arthritis. Wife testified that she was no longer capable of working on a full-time basis because of her health problems. However, wife never applied for social security disability.

Husband, age 58, was a pharmaceutical salesman employed by Hoffman LaRoche for 24 years. He netted $40,000.00 from a yearly gross salary of $56,000.00. In addition, husband’s employer directly reimbursed him for all his automobile expenses. Since separation, husband has paid alimony pendente lite in the form of mortgage, insurance, taxes and utility payments for the marital residence as well as the balance of certain charge cards.

The marital assets of the parties consisted of the following:

(a) Premises 3335 W. Queen Lane, Phila. Pa...$ 80,534.59

(b) 1974 Ford Thunderbird and 1980 Oldsmobile.......................................1,100.00

(c) Household Furnishings.......................3,500.00

(d) Germantown Savings.........................1,115.00

(e) Girard Accounts # 6-145-965 and 099-846-2220 ....................................... 958.85

7-045-495

(f) Bet Tee Oh, Ltd.............................5,000.00

(g) Hoffman La Roche Credit Union Account #56180 ...................................7,469.13

(h) Curtis Wright Stock.........................9,000.00

(i) Provident National Bank Acct. #56180 .......5,976.12

(j) Clean-Rite, Inc. Investment Return...........4,400.00

(k) Germantown Savings Acct. # 1-334439........5,093.00

*180 (i) Defendant’s Hoffman, La Roche Pension Plan..................................... 79,455.28

$213,601.97

Record 47a.

Based upon these assets, the master recommended and the trial court awarded a 60% share of marital property to wife with husband receiving 40%. As such, wife received $128,161.18 in assets, in cash and in kind, while husband received $85,440.79. Furthermore, the wife’s request for alimony was denied.

In reversing the trial court’s denial of wife’s alimony claim, the Superior Court held that the trial court did not adequately take into consideration wife’s medical condition. Unlike the Superior Court, the master did not base her determination solely on wife’s medical condition. Instead, the master based her recommendation on several factors.

First, the master was of the opinion that the -wife’s testimony regarding inability to work was not credible. In fact, the master believed that someone with the wife’s experience could earn far more than the $7,800.00 she claimed she earned in 1986. Furthermore, since 1982, the wife had received the economic benefit of receiving alimony pendente lite from her husband. Finally, a 60/40 division of marital property was deemed appropriate due in part to the “physical problems now which have manifested after the separation and which certainly will prove debilitating as the years go on, although (wife) has been working with it and has been taking trips out of the country, in spite of debilitating arthritis.” Masters Report at p. 14.

After considering all of the factors set forth in Section 401(d) of the Divorce Code, 23 P.S. § 401(d) 4 , including wife’s physical condition, the master recommended a 60/40 division of marital property. Thereafter, in adopting the *181

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Bluebook (online)
607 A.2d 735, 530 Pa. 176, 1992 Pa. LEXIS 307, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ocallaghan-v-ocallaghan-pa-1992.