Obregon v. Napier

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 18, 2025
• Docket: 24-350
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 18 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIO ARMANDO OBREGON, No. 24-350 D.C. No. 4:22-cv-00074-RCC Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

MARK NAPIER; LAURA CONOVER; CHRIS NANOS; BRISENO, Unknown; REYNOLDS, Unknown,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 12, 2025**

Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Arizona state prisoner Mario Armando Obregon appeals pro se from the

district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations arising

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). from his pretrial detention. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We

affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Obregon

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies or raise a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See

Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642-44 (2016) (explaining that an inmate must

exhaust such administrative remedies as are available before bringing suit and

describing limited circumstances under which administrative remedies are

effectively unavailable); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (stating that

proper exhaustion requires “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so

properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)” (emphasis,

citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Obregon’s motion

to set aside the judgment because Obregon failed to set forth any basis for relief.

See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-

63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for a motion under

Fed. R. Civ P. 59(e)).

2 24-350 We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-350