OBDULIO IRIZARRY, JR. v. STATE OF FLORIDA

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMarch 18, 2024
Docket24-0027
StatusPublished

This text of OBDULIO IRIZARRY, JR. v. STATE OF FLORIDA (OBDULIO IRIZARRY, JR. v. STATE OF FLORIDA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
OBDULIO IRIZARRY, JR. v. STATE OF FLORIDA, (Fla. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________

Case No. 6D24-27 Lower Tribunal Nos. 2020-CF-011987-O and 2021-MM-002061-A-O _____________________________

OBDULIO IRIZARRY, JR.,

Petitioner,

v. STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent. _____________________________

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to the Circuit Court for Orange County.

March 18, 2024

MIZE, J.

Petitioner, Obdulio Irizarry (“Defendant”), filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus asserting that he is being illegally detained because the trial court improperly

denied his motion for reinstatement of bond. We find no error in the trial court’s

denial of Defendant’s motion for reinstatement of bond and, therefore, deny the

petition. Background

In the proceedings below (the “First Case”), Defendant was charged with: (1)

two counts of sexual battery upon a child under twelve; (2) three counts of sexual

activity with a child twelve to eighteen years of age (with familial/custodial

authority); (3) one count of sexual battery on a child twelve to eighteen years of age

(with familial/custodial authority); (4) two counts of lewd or lascivious conduct; and

(5) two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation. Defendant was released on bond

pending his trial.

While out on bond in the First Case, Defendant was arrested for the offense

of domestic battery, which initiated a second case (the “Second Case”) against

Defendant. In the First Case, the trial court revoked Defendant’s bond pursuant to

section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, after finding probable cause to believe that

Defendant had committed the new offense of domestic battery while on pretrial

release.

After Defendant’s bond was revoked in the First Case, the State filed a “no

information” in the Second Case, thereby declining to prosecute the charge of

domestic battery and terminating the Second Case. Defendant then filed a motion

in the First Case to reinstate his bond based on the fact that he was no longer subject

to the charge of domestic battery that served as the basis to revoke his bond.

2 The trial court held a bond hearing. At the hearing, the State asserted that it

did not prosecute the Second Case because the victim was uncooperative and, as a

result, the State did not believe that it could obtain a conviction. The State argued,

however, that there was sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that

Defendant committed the crime of domestic battery such that revocation of the bond

in the First Case was appropriate. The trial court heard evidence and made a finding

that probable cause existed to believe that Defendant committed the new offense of

domestic battery while on pretrial release in the First Case. Having made that

finding, the trial court denied the motion to reinstate bond.

Analysis

“A petition for writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate vehicle for challenging

an order denying pretrial release.” Preston v. Gee, 133 So. 3d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2014); see also Greenwood v. State, 51 So. 3d 1278, 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011);

Rosa v. State, 21 So. 3d 115, 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131 provides that “[u]nless charged with

a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt

is evident or the presumption is great, every person charged with a crime…shall be

entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions.”1 However, section 903.0471,

1 While some of the charges against Defendant are punishable by life imprisonment, the trial court never denied Defendant bond on the ground that the proof of guilt was evident or the presumption was great. 3 Florida Statutes, provides that “a court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial

release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that

the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.” The Florida

Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Parker v. State, 843

So. 2d 871, 880 (Fla. 2003).

In his petition, Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s factual finding

that there was probable cause to believe that Defendant committed the new crime of

domestic battery. Rather, Defendant argues that the State declining to prosecute the

new crime that served as the basis to revoke his bond required the trial court to

reinstate his bond.

Defendant is wrong. Section 903.0471 allows a trial court to revoke a

defendant’s pretrial release “if the court finds probable cause to believe that the

defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.” The statute contains

no requirement that the State prosecute the new crime. Because the trial judge found

probable cause to believe that Defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial

release, the trial judge acted within his discretion by revoking Defendant’s bond.2

2 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion to reinstate bond. Since it is not before us, we do not decide whether the trial court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion under these circumstances. Compare Baehren v. State, 962 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (remanding for evidentiary hearing), with Perry v. State, 842 So. 2d 301, 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding no evidentiary hearing required), and Simeus v. Rambosk, 100 So. 3d 2, 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (same). 4 Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is

denied.

PETITION DENIED.

TRAVER, C.J., and GANNAM, J., concur.

Lisa M. Figueroa, of the Florida Defense Team, Kissimmee, for Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Whitney Brown Hartless, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED

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Related

Baehren v. State
962 So. 2d 417 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2007)
Rosa v. State
21 So. 3d 115 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2009)
Parker v. State
843 So. 2d 871 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2003)
Perry v. State
842 So. 2d 301 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2003)
Greenwood v. State
51 So. 3d 1278 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2011)
Simeus v. Rambosk
100 So. 3d 2 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2011)
Preston v. Gee
133 So. 3d 1218 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2014)

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OBDULIO IRIZARRY, JR. v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/obdulio-irizarry-jr-v-state-of-florida-fladistctapp-2024.