Filed 7/18/25 Oasis Independent Medical Associates v. Lopez CA4/2
See concurring opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
OASIS INDEPENDENT MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC., E082871, E083728 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. CVPS2304878) v. OPINION JOB LOPEZ et al.,
Defendants and Appellants. _____________________________
JOB LOPEZ, et al.,
Cross-complainants and Appellants,
vs.
OASIS INDEPENDENT MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.,
Cross-defendants and Respondents.
1 APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Manuel Bustamante,
Judge. Affirmed.
Kelly, Trotter & Franzen and David P. Pruett for Defendants, Cross-
complainants and Appellants.
Doll Amir & Eley, Michael M. Amir and Paul M. Torres for Plaintiffs, Cross-
defendants and Respondents.
This opinion addresses two appeals from one lower court case. In both appeals,
the appellants are Job Lopez (Lopez), CoachellaMed, Francisco Cordova, M.D., and
Carlos Lopez, M.D. The first appeal (Court of Appeal case No. E082871) concerns the
trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction against Lopez. The respondent in the first
appeal is Oasis Independent Medical Associates, Inc.
The second appeal (Court of Appeal case No. E083728) addresses the trial
court’s partial grant of an anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) against a
cross-complaint that was brought by Lopez, CoachellaMed, Francisco Cordova, M.D.,
and Carlos Lopez, M.D. In the second appeal, the respondents are Oasis, Desert Oasis
Healthcare, and Heritage Provider Network. We address the appeals in turn.
I. FIRST APPEAL (E082871)
Oasis Independent Medical Associates, Inc. (Oasis) sued Lopez, CoachellaMed,
Francisco Cordova, M.D., and Carlos Lopez, M.D., for unfair competition (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200)1, breach of contract, and other causes of action. At the request of Oasis,
1 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Business and Professions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 the trial court issued a preliminary injunction restraining Lopez “from providing any
false and/or misleading information to . . . Oasis’s members regarding their care” and
“from making unsolicited communications to . . . Oasis Medicare Advantage members.”
Lopez contends that, for a variety of reasons, the trial court erred in issuing the
preliminary injunction. We affirm.
FACTS
A. ALLEGED WRONGFUL ACTS
The following facts are taken from Oasis’s memorandum in support of its ex
parte application for a preliminary injunction. Independent physician associations (IPA)
contract with HMOs “to provide . . . health care services to the HMO’s members.”
“The IPA then contracts ‘downstream’ with numerous physicians to actually provide the
medical care to the IPA’s enrollees.” “Physicians may further contract ‘downstream’
with other providers.” “Oasis is an IPA which contracts with [physicians] and other
providers . . . to provide care to . . . Oasis enrollees.” Albert Anderson, M.D.
(Anderson), had a contract to treat Oasis’s members. Lopez was a nurse practitioner
who entered into a partnership with Anderson. Due to that partnership, Lopez also
treated Oasis’s members.
After years of Lopez and Anderson working together with no major issues,
Lopez mass mailed a letter to Anderson’s Oasis patients claiming that if they followed
Lopez to a different practice “with a new primary care doctor (instead of Dr. Anderson),
the ‘patients will never lose any benefits or services’ and that the patients ‘will continue
enjoying [their] benefits exactly as before.’ ” Oasis alleged the foregoing claim by
3 Lopez was false because “Oasis has many programs, services (e.g., medication
management, cardiac, and pulmonary clinics) and specialists (e.g., oncologists,
cardiologists, etc.) who will not be available with [Lopez’s new practice].” Oasis
further alleged that Lopez’s “agents, including insurance brokers, are cold calling . . .
Oasis enrollees assigned to Dr. Anderson, and pushing the same false narrative
described above.” The allegations about Oasis’s services being unique to Oasis and
unavailable to patients who leave Oasis are supported by the declaration of Melissa
Diaz, Oasis’s marketing manager.
One of Oasis’s former patients declared, “Recently, a woman called me,
unsolicited, and told me that she was calling on behalf of . . . Lopez. The woman told
me that I needed to change my primary care doctor and that such a change would not
impact my ability to continue seeing the other doctors in . . . Oasis’[s] network of
doctors. I reluctantly agreed to switch my provider. After thinking about it, however, I
called the person back and told her that I did not want to change my primary care doctor
from Dr. Anderson and that I wanted to stay with . . . Oasis. The person responded that
I could not change back.”
In Oasis’s complaint it alleges that it sent Lopez a cease-and-desist letter on July
27, 2023. Oasis further alleged that Lopez’s wrongful acts occurred “within the past
several months.” Oasis’s complaint was filed on October 6, 2023, so we infer the
alleged wrongful acts occurred in the summer and fall of 2023. Brian Hodgkins, M.D.,
executive vice president of Oasis’s clinical operations, discovered that, within the 45
days prior to his November 2023 declaration, 80 of Anderson’s patients left his care.
4 B. EX PARTE APPLICATION
Oasis applied ex parte for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction. Oasis asserted it was likely to prevail on its cause of action for unfair
competition (§ 17200). Oasis asserted Lopez violated “Health & Safety Code § 1360[,
which] prevents the use of ‘any advertising or solicitation which is untrue or
misleading.’ ” Oasis contended that Lopez was “deceiving unsuspecting patients” into
“switch[ing] health care plans and providers.” Oasis contended its patients would suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction were not issued because their health care would be
disrupted.
C. OPPOSITION
In opposing the ex parte application, Lopez asserted that Oasis failed to
demonstrate any irreparable harm because monetary relief could cure any damage
suffered by Oasis.
D. REPLY
In Oasis’s reply it highlighted Lopez’s failure to refute that he mass-mailed
letters containing false information to Oasis’s members and that members lost access to
their doctors. As to irreparable harm, Oasis asserted that it “showed [Lopez’s] wrongful
conduct is causing irreparable harm to Oasis members.”
E. RULING
The trial court granted the preliminary injunction restraining Lopez from
(1) “providing any false and/or misleading information to . . . Oasis’[s] . . . members
regarding their care,” (2) advising Oasis’s members “that a change in primary care
5 doctors or change in affiliations from . . . Oasis will have no impact on the members’
health care, including but not limited to continued access to specialists”; and
(3) “making unsolicited communications to . . . Oasis Medicare Advantage members
(i.e., cold-calling, letters to patients, home visits).”
The trial court’s ruling was primarily based upon its conclusion that Oasis was
likely to prevail on its cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing arising from a contract between Oasis and Lopez. The contract
required that, as to health maintenance organization (HMO) patients, Lopez would
exclusively work with Oasis’s members. The trial court did not expressly address the
element of irreparable harm.
As to Oasis’s cause of action for unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts
(§ 17200), the trial court wrote, “Oasis argues, among other things, that NP Lopez’s
conduct violates his contractual duties under the Exclusivity Agreement, as well as
several federal and state laws precluding such types of solicitation conduct. Again,
there is no evidence that any of the other Defendants, other than NP Lopez, engaged in
any unlawful solicitation. Thus, . . . Oasis fails to show a probability of prevailing on
the merits on this cause of action as to Dr. Lopez, Dr. C[o]rdova and CoachellaMed.”
DISCUSSION
A. FALSE STATEMENTS
Lopez contends the trial court did not make a finding that Lopez made false
statements. Lopez is mistaken. The trial court’s explanation of its ruling reads, “Again,
there is no evidence that any of the other Defendants, other than NP Lopez, engaged in
6 any unlawful solicitation.” (Italics added.) That sentence reflects a finding that Oasis is
likely to prevail on its claim that Lopez engaged in an unlawful business practice (§
17200) by sending Oasis’s members untrue or misleading solicitations (Health & Saf.
Code, § 1360).
In Lopez’s appellant’s reply brief, he asserts that substantial evidence does not
support the finding that he made false claims to Oasis’s members. We do not analyze
“issues raised for the first time in a reply brief, in the absence of a showing of good
cause why such issues were not raised in the opening brief.” (Scott v. CIBA Vision
Corp. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 307, 322.) Lopez does not address the topic of good
cause. Consequently, we do not analyze the substantial evidence issue.
B. STOLEN INFORMATION
Lopez contends the trial court did not make a finding that he stole patient
information. Although we agree, that is not a basis for reversal. The preliminary
injunction restrains Lopez from “providing any false and/or misleading information to .
. . Oasis’s members regarding their care.” The focus of the order is on deceptive
marketing, not stolen information. The lack of a finding on a topic not pertinent to the
order fails to show that the order is erroneous.
C. COMMUNICATING WITH PATIENTS
Lopez contends the preliminary injunction prevents him from “communicating
with patients regarding their health care, ‘including, but not limited to communications
regarding treatment options, alternative plans, or other coverage arrangements.’ ”
Contrary to Lopez’s position, he is not so broadly restrained. The injunction prohibits
7 Lopez “from providing any false and/or misleading information to . . . Oasis’s members
regarding their care” and from unsolicited marketing communications. The injunction
does not bar Lopez from speaking honestly with patients regarding their health when
contacted by the patients.
D. EXCLUSIVITY AGREEMENT
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lopez had a partnership with Anderson, who had a contract with Oasis. In
Anderson’s contract, he agreed to limit his HMO patients to Oasis’s members. “Oasis
did not wish to leave a ‘loophole’ in its exclusivity arrangement with Dr. Anderson.”
Therefore, in 2006, Lopez and Oasis entered into an exclusivity agreement in which
Lopez agreed that, as to HMO patients, Lopez would exclusively work with Oasis’s
members. The exclusivity agreement applies “for the full term of [the exclusivity]
Agreement and any renewal period.” The exclusivity agreement originally had a 15-
year term, which would have ended in 2021. In 2017, Oasis and Lopez agreed to extend
the exclusivity agreement into 2025.
In Lopez’s declaration, he declared that Oasis terminated its relationship with
him on August 27, 2023. On September 25, 2023, Anderson sent a letter to patients that
reads in relevant part, “Although, Job Lopez has decided to leave my practice.”
In Oasis’s November 2023 ex parte application for a restraining order, it alleged
that the exclusivity “agreement remains valid and ongoing,” because it was designed to
last the full term of the exclusivity agreement—not merely the term of Lopez’s
partnership with Anderson. Oasis relied on the exclusivity agreement in asserting that
8 Lopez should be restrained from competing with Oasis. Oasis argued, “Indeed, the
requested injunction merely would require Mr. Lopez and Defendants to continue
honoring the Exclusivity Agreement and the laws concerning solicitation.”
In opposing the request for a preliminary injunction, Lopez asserted that Oasis’s
act of seeking to enforce the exclusivity agreement was an improper posttermination
restraint on employment, violative of section 16600.
The trial court concluded that section 16600 “prohibits employee noncompetition
agreements. There is no evidence that . . . Oasis and . . . Lopez had any employer-
employee relationship, such that this section is applicable.” In the trial court’s ruling, it
found that Oasis had a likelihood of prevailing on its cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which was based upon the exclusivity
agreement.
2. APPLICATION OF SECTION 16600
Lopez contends that the trial court erred in concluding that section 16600 did not
apply in this case.
Section 16600, subdivision (a), provides: “Except as provided in this chapter,
every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession,
trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.” (Italics added.) The statute’s plain
language provides that it applies to “every contract” restraining “anyone” from working
in their lawful profession. (See Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 73, 83 [“ ‘If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning
controls.’ ”].) The trial court erred in concluding that the statute only applies to
9 employment contracts. (See Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1130,
1159 (Ixchel) [section 16600 applies “to contractual restraints on business operations
and commercial dealings”]; Dayton Time Lock Service, Inc. v. Silent Watchman Corp.
(1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7 [applying section 16600 in the franchisee-franchisor
context].)
3. PREJUDICE
a. Contention
Lopez contends the order granting the preliminary injunction must be reversed
because the trial court “ ‘applie[d] the wrong legal standard[]’ ” when it erroneously
concluded that Business and Professions Code section 16600 was inapplicable. The
order will be reversed only if the error was prejudicial. To establish prejudice, Lopez
must demonstrate “that a different result would have been probable if such error . . . had
not occurred.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)
b. False and Misleading Statements
Hypothetically, if Lopez were correct that the exclusivity agreement was void
under section 16600, then the error would be harmless as to the portion of the injunction
barring him from making false or misleading statements. The trial court found that
Oasis was likely to prevail on its claim that Lopez engaged in an unlawful business
practice (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) by giving Oasis’s members untrue or misleading
marketing materials (Health & Saf. Code, § 1360). The foregoing finding supports the
portion of the order restraining Lopez “from providing any false and/or misleading
information to . . . Oasis’s members regarding their care.” Thus, that portion of the
10 order would remain in place, even if the exclusivity agreement were void because, that
part of the order is based upon a violation of Health and Safety Code section 1360.
Consequently, as to that portion of the preliminary injunction, the error is harmless.
c. Solicitations in General
Lopez contends the portion of the preliminary injunction prohibiting him “from
‘making unsolicited communications to . . . Oasis Medicare Advantage members (i.e.,
cold-calling, letters to patients, home visits),’ ” is invalid if the exclusivity agreement is
void.
Under section 16600, subdivision (a), every contract that restrains a person from
engaging in their lawful profession is void. However, not every contract limiting one’s
work is void per se. The section 16600 void per se rule applies “strictly in the context
of noncompetition agreements following the termination of employment or the sale of
interest in a business.” (Ixchel, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1159.) In other contexts, such as
“contractual restraints on business operations and commercial dealings” a
reasonableness standard is applied to determine whether the contract is void. (Ibid; see
also Samuelian v. Life Generations Healthcare, LLC (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 331, 350-
351.)
Lopez asserts the section 16600 void per se rule applies because the exclusivity
agreement is a posttermination noncompete provision. Lopez fails to explain what type
of relationship was terminated, e.g., an employment relationship or a joint ownership in
a business. In our review of the record, there is nothing obvious indicating that Lopez
was employed by Oasis or that Oasis and Lopez jointly owned a business. Due to
11 Lopez’s failure to identify what type of relationship was terminated, we conclude Lopez
has forfeited the issue of whether the exclusivity agreement is void per se under section
16600. (Mahram v. The Kroger Co. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 303, 310.) Because Lopez
forfeited the issue of whether the exclusivity agreement is void per se, he has not
demonstrated that a different result would have been probable absent the error.
E. CONCLUSION
We have not been presented with an argument demonstrating that the trial court
prejudicially erred in granting the preliminary injunction. Accordingly, we will affirm
the order.
II. SECOND APPEAL (E083728)
Lopez, CoachellaMed, Francisco Cordova, M.D., and Carlos Lopez, M.D.
(collectively, Lopez Associates) cross-complained against Oasis, Desert Oasis
Healthcare, and Heritage Provider Network (collectively, Oasis Network). The trial
court granted, in part, Oasis Network’s anti-SLAPP motion. (Code Civ Proc., §
425.16.) Lopez Associates contend the trial court erred by partially granting the anti-
SLAPP motion. We affirm.
In their first amended cross-complaint (FACC), Lopez Associates sought a
judicial declaration that the exclusivity agreement was void under section 16600. In
their second cause of action, Lopez Associates alleged that Oasis’s lawsuit, which
included a claim for breach of the exclusivity agreement, constituted unfair competition
(§ 17200) because the exclusivity agreement is an improper restraint on Lopez
12 practicing his profession. The following is a quote from Lopez Associates’ second
cause of action: “[Oasis’s] . . . filing of an action in court to attempt to enforce
restraints of trade, so as to suppress competitive employment in California, violate
California’s unfair competition law and public policy against restraints of trade,
Sections 16600 and 17200.”
In partially granting the anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court struck: (1) the
entirety of Lopez Associates’ second cause of action; (2) in the fourth cause of action,
paragraph 73, the portion reading, “ ‘and attempted enforcement of Exclusivity
Contracts with NP Lopez’ ”; (3) paragraph 24, which reads, “ ‘Those threats have
included threats of entangling competitors in litigation, with cease and desist letters,
including threats of injunctions, to deter competitors from contracting with health care
providers who were induced to sign cross-defendants’ Exclusivity Contract’ ”; and
(4) the portion of paragraph 1 reading, “ ‘including threats of litigation and
commencement of litigation by those cross-complainants in an effort to achieve
restraints of health care providers’ professions, trades, and business by virtue of cross-
defendants’ Exclusivity Contracts.’ ”
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To resolve an anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court engages in a two-step inquiry.
First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the
challenged cause of action arises from a protected activity. [Citation.] The moving
party has the burden of showing that the challenged cause of action arises from a
13 protected activity. [Citation.] Second, if the moving party has carried that burden, the
court must decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on the challenged cause of action. [Citation.] ‘The trial court’s rulings on
both issues are reviewed de novo.’ ” (City of Oxnard v. Starr (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
313, 320.)
B. PROTECTED ACTIVITY
A protected activity is one arising from an act in furtherance of a person’s “right
of petition or free speech.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) That includes
“any written or oral statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding” or
“under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.” (Id. at subds. (e)(1) & (2).)
The portions of the FACC stricken by the trial court all pertain to Oasis’s actions
in bringing its complaint against Lopez Associates. Oasis’s complaint constitutes a
writing before a judicial proceeding that is also under consideration by a judicial body.
Therefore, the stricken portions of the FACC pertain to the protected activity of Oasis
suing Lopez Associates.
Lopez Associates contend the exclusivity agreement is void per se under section
16600, as a posttermination noncompete agreement, and suing to enforce a void
agreement is not a protected activity. The section 16600 void per se rule applies
“strictly in the context of noncompetition agreements following the termination of
employment or the sale of interest in a business.” (Ixchel, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1159.)
Lopez Associates fail to explain what type of relationship with Oasis was terminated,
e.g., an employment relationship or an interest in a jointly held business. Due to Lopez
14 Associates’ failure to provide the necessary arguments, we conclude they have forfeited
the issue of whether the exclusivity agreement is void per se under section 16600.
(Mahram v. The Kroger Co., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 310.) As a result, we reject
their assertion that Oasis’s complaint does not constitute a protected activity.
C. PROBABILITY OF PREVAILING
Lopez Associates, as the cross-complainants, bore the burden of proving a
probability of prevailing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) In the second cause
of action, Lopez Associates alleged that Oasis’s initiation of litigation to enforce the
exclusivity agreement was an “unfair business practice[] under Sections 16600 and
17200.” Because the unfair business practice claim (§ 17200) is based upon section
16600, Lopez Associates must demonstrate a probability of establishing that the
exclusivity agreement is either (1) void per se or (2) void under the reasonableness
standard. (Samuelian v. Life Generations Healthcare, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp.
350-351.) Lopez Associates rely on the void per se rule but fail to explain what type of
relationship between Oasis and Lopez was terminated. As a result, they have failed to
establish a probability of prevailing on their claim that Oasis engaged in an unfair
business practice (§ 17200).
D. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in partially granting the anti-SLAPP motion.
15 DISPOSITION
The order granting the preliminary injunction is affirmed. The order partially
granting the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. In both appeals, respondents are awarded
their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER Acting P. J.
I concur:
CODRINGTON J.
16 [Oasis Independent Medical Associates, Inc. v. Lopez, E082871; Lopez v. Oasis Independent Medical Associates, Inc., E083728]
MENETREZ, J., Concurring.
The preliminary injunction prohibits only false or misleading communications and
unsolicited marketing communications. Appellants’ arguments concerning Business and
Professions Code section 16600 do not show that prohibiting those communications was
an abuse of discretion.
The special motion to strike was granted only as to allegations concerning
respondents’ litigation or prelitigation conduct. That conduct is protected activity under
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 and is covered by the litigation privilege. (Dove
Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 784; Rubin v.
Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1194-1195.) Appellants’ arguments concerning Business
and Professions Code section 16600 again fail to show error, because even meritless
litigation is protected activity and is covered by the litigation privilege.
I therefore concur in the judgment.
MENETREZ J.