Oaks v. City of Rochester

173 A.D. 569, 160 N.Y.S. 417

This text of 173 A.D. 569 (Oaks v. City of Rochester) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oaks v. City of Rochester, 173 A.D. 569, 160 N.Y.S. 417 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1916).

Opinion

De Angelis, J.:

The action was brought, among other objects, to compel the specific performance of a contract entered into by and between the board of education of the city of Rochester on behalf of the city and the plaintiff whereby the board . of education purchased from the plaintiff a lot for school purposes, by accepting an option for such purchase given by the plaintiff to such board, and to declare certain proceedings for the condemnation of the lot including a right of way over a ten-foot strip thereof immediately south of school No. 10 on the west side of Chat-ham street and extending seventy-three feet in depth, to be legal, and a certain resolution of the common council rejecting the report of the commissioners in the condemnation proceedings and providing for the appointment of other commissioners to be illegal.

The answer sets up the defense that the proceedings for condemnation were void, because at the threshold thereof the resolution of the school board invoking the machinery of the common council and law department of the city to condemn the lands in question was not passed at a regular meeting of the school board or by a majority of its members, and because a resolution of the school board regularly and legally passed later and before the condemnation proceedings were begun, was the only action of the school board that would justify condemnation proceedings in the premises.

The sole question for determination on this appeal is whether or not the trial court was right in. determining that the condemnation proceedings were void as to this plaintiff.

The city of Rochester is a municipal corporation existing under a charter contained in chapter 755 of the Laws of 1907 and its amendments. Sections 444 and 446 of the act were amended by chapter 384 of the Laws of 1911. There are five commissioners of schools constituting the board of education. (Charter, §§ 14, 381.) The school board has power to purchase land and build school houses. (§ 383, subd. 4.) In case the [571]*571board needs lands for school purposes and cannot agree with the owner or owners thereof to purchase the same, it can by request require the common council and the law department of the city to acquire title thereto by condemnation proceedings. (§ 90. See, also §§ 88, 89.)

On the 13th day of May, 1913, the common council received from the secretary of the board of education the report, of which the following is a copy:

“May 13, 1913.
To the Honorable, the Common Council of the City of Rochester:
The Board of Education respectfully reports to your honorable body that it is unable to purchase the following real estate deemed necessary by it for school purposes, namely, all that tract or parcel of land situated on the west side of Chatham Street, in the City of Rochester, Monroe County, New York, immediately adjoining number 10 school on the north and being 33 feet front on Chatham Street and 165 feet deep.
“Also, all that tract or parcel of land situated on the west side of Chatham Street adjoining number 10 school on the south and being 35 feet front on Chatham Street and 73 feet deep. The Board of Education, therefore, requests that condemnation proceedings be instituted to acquire the same.
“ Respectfully yours,
“BOARD OF EDUCATION,
“By J. S. Mullah.”

Thereafter, and on the same day, the common council adopted and enacted an ordinance directing the corporation counsel to institute condemnation proceedings agreeably to the request, which ordinance was to take effect immediately.

The report of the school board was regular in form in all respects and authenticated by the secretary in the usual manner. It appeared on the trial, however, that the report of the school board was not adopted at a regular meeting of the board, but was only authorized, so far as any authority existed for it, by two members of the board, the president and another. J. Sankey Mullan, the secretary of the board, testified that there was at a committee meeting of the board on the 9th day of May, [572]*5721913, a discussion regarding the purchase of the Oaks property; that Mr. Adler, one of the members of the board, was authorized to go ahead with the condemnation proceedings if $4,500 would not be accepted to purchase the property; that on the 13th day of May, 1913, Adler came into the office of the school board and stated that the Oaks people would not accept the $4,500; that he had in. his possession the resolution, a copy of which the witness had in his hand; that to the best of witness’ recollection Mr. Duffy, the president of the board, was the only other member in the office; that they consulted together and • he was uncertain whether they called up any of the other members or not, he would not be positive, but there was no meeting of the board, committee meeting, or any other meeting on that day; that Mr. Adler stated that the common council met that night and it was necessary to get this before them on the thirteenth, and that was why the copy was sent over but no formal meeting of the board had; that on the seventeenth Adler reported to the board in a committee meeting that the Oaks property could be purchased at the $4,500 and that it was not necessary to go ahead with the condemnation proceedings; in other words, it was not necessary to ratify the resolution at a board meeting and it never was ratified.

On the 12th day of June, 1913, the plaintiff executed and delivered to the board of education an option by which she undertook to sell and convey to the board the property in question for $4,500. The option was to be accepted within thirty days from its date and the sale to be completed within thirty days after the acceptance. The option contained this provision:

In the event that it becomes impossible for me to acquire a satisfactory title to that portion of said premises immediately adjoining said school and being ten (10) feet in width and seventy-three (73) feet in depth,—heretofore reserved for use as an alley,—I hereby agree that said alley-way may be condemned by the City of Rochester, and that the expense of condemnation proceedings and such award as may be granted by the Commissioners appointed in said proceedings, shall be deducted from the aforesaid purchase price, to the end that the net cost to the City for a satisfactory title to the whole of said premises shall be $4,500.00. In the event that condemnation proceedings are [573]*573instituted to acquire said ten-foot strip, the limitation of thirty days shall not apply until after such condemnation proceedings are finally determined.”

On the 16th day of June, 1913, the board of education accepted the option and thereby the parties became obligated by the terms thereof.

On the 7th day of July, 1913, the-school board passed a resolution of which the following is a copy:

“Whereas, The Board of Education deems the real estate hereinafter described as necessary for school purposes and has been unable to purchase said real estate at a price which it deems reasonable, he it Resolved, That the Common Council be requested to take steps necessary to acquire said property by condemnation proceedings. The property so referred to is described as follows: Being a ten-foot strip immediately south of Eugene Field School No.

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Bluebook (online)
173 A.D. 569, 160 N.Y.S. 417, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oaks-v-city-of-rochester-nyappdiv-1916.