Oaklief v. Gilbert, Town of

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 24, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-03379
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Shawn Oaklief, No. CV-25-03379-PHX-DWL (ASB)

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Town of Gilbert, et al.,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion requesting that the Court screen 16 Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (Doc. 3.) For the following 17 reasons, the motion is denied. 18 BACKGROUND 19 On August 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed this action in Maricopa County Superior Court. 20 (Doc. 1-1 at 2.) That same day, Plaintiff’s “application for deferral or waiver of court fees 21 or costs and consent to entry of judgment” was granted in that he was afforded a deferral 22 (not a waiver) for various fees and costs “in this [state] court,” including, inter alia, “filing 23 fees” and “fees for service of process by a sheriff, marshal, constable, or law enforcement 24 agency,” with the condition that “a consent judgment may be entered against [Plaintiff] for 25 all fees or costs that are deferred but remain unpaid 30 calendar days after entry of the final 26 judgment, decree, or order unless [Plaintiff] establish[es] a payment plan and make[s] 27 timely payments” or unless a supplemental application is pending with the state court at 28 that time. (Id. at 15-28.) 1 On August 25, 2025, Deputy R. Delp of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office 2 served process on Defendant. (Id. at 14.) 3 On September 15, 2025, Defendant removed this action to federal court. (Doc. 1.) 4 On September 22, 2025, Defendant filed a “motion to screen complaint and stay 5 deadline to file responsive pleading.” (Doc. 3.) 6 DISCUSSION 7 I. Defendant’s Arguments 8 The motion relies on Winters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2021 WL 778610, *1 9 (D. Ariz. 2021), for the proposition that “[w]hen a party proceeds in forma pauperis, 28 10 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires the Court to screen lawsuits and dismiss them sua sponte if it 11 determines the action or appeal fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” (Doc. 12 3 at 2.) Defendant then asserts that “[s]creening is required even after a removal from state 13 court if the plaintiff requested and the state court granted a deferral of court fees” (id.), 14 citing Mendoza v. Murgia, 2015 WL 11232446, *3 (D. Ariz. 2015). 15 II. Analysis 16 A. Screenings Are Not Required Under § 1915 17 “In an effort to address the large number of prisoner complaints filed in federal 18 court, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA).” Jones v. Bock, 19 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007). “What this country needs, Congress decided, is fewer and better 20 prisoner suits. To that end, Congress enacted a variety of reforms designed to filter out the 21 bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good.” Id. at 203-04 (cleaned up). The PLRA 22 “departed in a fundamental way from the usual procedural ground rules by requiring 23 judicial screening to filter out nonmeritorious claims: Courts are to screen inmate 24 complaints ‘before docketing, if feasible, or, . . . as soon as practicable after docketing,’ 25 and dismiss the complaint if it is ‘frivolous, malicious, . . . fails to state a claim upon which 26 relief may be granted[,] or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 27 such relief.’” Id. at 213 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A). 28 Section 1915A pertains only to prisoners. “[A] court may screen a complaint 1 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A only if, at the time the plaintiff files the complaint, he is 2 incarcerated or detained in any facility because he is accused of, convicted of, sentenced 3 for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of 4 parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dep’t 5 of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). 6 A separate provision of the PLSA is 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Unlike § 1915A, which 7 applies only to prisoners, § 1915 applies to all litigants who proceed in forma pauperis in 8 federal court. Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 9 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). And unlike § 1915A, which 10 explicitly requires the Court to screen complaints, § 1915(e)(2) does not contain an explicit 11 screening requirement. 12 Rather, Section 1915(e)(2) states that the Court “shall dismiss the case at any time 13 if the [C]ourt determines” that Plaintiff is not poor or that the action is frivolous, malicious, 14 fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from monetary 15 relief. Although the words “shall dismiss” include a mandate—the word “shall” normally 16 indicates that the Court is required to do something, Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad 17 Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (“[T]he mandatory ‘shall’ . . . normally creates 18 an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.”)—this mandate is conditioned on the 19 Court making a determination, which it may do “at any time.” There is nothing requiring 20 the Court to review the complaint and make such a determination at any particular 21 time. The absence of any explicit screening requirement in § 1915 is particularly notable, 22 considering the explicit requirement in § 1915A.1 23 Without any screening requirement in § 1915, proactively screening the complaint 24 is discretionary—but if the Court undertakes a screening process and determines that the 25 complaint fails to state a claim, then the Court is required to dismiss the case. Routinely 26 screening non-prisoner IFP complaints appears to be more of a tradition than a 27 1 See, e.g., Smith v. Edwards, 2024 WL 1152274, *1 (M.D. La. 2024) (“screening 28 mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)”) (emphasis added). 1 requirement. Although many district judges (within the District of Arizona and elsewhere) 2 have assumed that proactive screening is “required” under § 1915(e)(2)(B), this assumption 3 tends to be flatly stated without any engagement with the text of the statute to justify such 4 a conclusion.2 5 The Tenth Circuit has considered the issue of whether § 1915 screenings (i.e., 6 reviewing the complaint at the inception of the case to determine whether sua sponte 7 dismissal is appropriate) are required or merely authorized. The Tenth Circuit concluded 8 that § 1915 screenings are not required:

9 Ms. Green focuses on the change in language to the statute in 1996 as evidence that the district court has an obligation to screen cases for merit 10 under § 1915(e)(2) before granting a motion to proceed IFP. Prior to 1996, § 1915(d) provided: “The court ... may dismiss the case if the allegation of 11 poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1994) (emphasis added). Subsection (d) was changed to 12 (e) and now provides: “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time 13 if the court determines that ... (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 14 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). Ms. Green argues that the 15 express change in language from “may” to “shall” imposes a screening requirement on magistrate judges when reviewing motions to proceed IFP. 16 Moreover, in order for § 1915(e)(2) to have any meaning, she contends, screening must be done sua sponte, prior to service of summons. 17 Though screening might be a good practice and more efficient, we find that 18 nothing in this language requires an assigned magistrate judge to screen a case for merit or to make a recommendation for dismissal to the district court 19 before granting IFP status. As the district court noted, the language of § 1915(e)(2) does not impose a duty to screen or review before service of 20 summons. Instead, it requires a court to dismiss a case filed by an IFP litigant at any time the court determines that the action or appeal is frivolous or fails 21 to state a claim on which relief may be granted. There is simply nothing in the language of the statute indicating that such a dismissal must occur before 22 grant of a motion to proceed IFP. Even the screening requirement of § 1915A(a), which applies only to prisoner complaints against government 23 2 The Court found one Ninth Circuit case that states, while providing a procedural 24 background of the case, that “Magistrate Judge Lynch granted Glick’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and conducted a preliminary screening of Glick’s complaint as required 25 by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).” Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). However, whether § 1915(e)(2) “requires” or merely “authorizes” preliminary 26 screening of non-prisoner IFP complaints was not at issue in that case, and dicta without any analysis is not binding. United States v. McAdory, 935 F.3d 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2019) 27 (“Well-reasoned dicta is the law of the circuit, but we are not bound by a prior panel’s comments made casually and without analysis, uttered in passing without due 28 consideration of the alternatives, or done as a prelude to another legal issue that commands the panel’s full attention.”) (cleaned up). 1 officials, is not that strict. There are good reasons for flexibility. Dismissing a complaint without benefit of an adversarial presentation is often an 2 uncertain and time-consuming task, and the district court should make the call as to if and when it is appropriate. 3 4 Buchheit v. Green, 705 F.3d 1157, 1160-61 (10th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). 5 Although § 1915 screenings are discretionary, the Court routinely screens 6 complaints in IFP cases before authorizing service to spare defendants the bother and 7 expense of reviewing and responding to clearly baseless complaints (as well as to spare the 8 government the cost of serving complaints that are plainly deficient). See, e.g., Neitzke v. 9 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) (“[A] litigant whose filing fees and court costs are 10 assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from 11 filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits. To prevent such abusive or captious 12 litigation, [§ 1915(e)(2)] authorizes federal courts to dismiss a claim filed in forma 13 pauperis [on various grounds]. Dismissals on these grounds are often made sua sponte 14 prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience 15 and expense of answering such complaints.”) (cleaned up). 16 Nevertheless, as stated by the Tenth Circuit, “[d]ismissing a complaint without 17 benefit of an adversarial presentation is often an uncertain and time-consuming task, and 18 the district court should make the call as to if and when it is appropriate.” Buchheit, 705 19 F.3d at 1161. As such, deciding whether to screen a complaint—that is, deciding whether 20 to review a complaint and devote judicial resources to making a determination as to 21 whether the complaint states a claim—is an exercise of discretion. 22 B. Screening A Removed Complaint Under § 1915 23 Contrary to Defendant’s assertion that “[s]creening is required even after a removal 24 from state court if the plaintiff requested and the state court granted a deferral of court fees” 25 (Doc. 3 at 2), Mendoza does not state or imply that screening pursuant to § 1915 is 26 “required” in any circumstance—indeed, Judge Jorgenson stated, in a case where the 27 plaintiff had been “given in forma pauperis status by the Santa Cruz Superior Court,” that 28 the Court “may” screen the complaint pursuant to § 1915(e). 2015 WL 11232446 at *3. 1 It is questionable whether § 1915(e) authorizes screening when the plaintiff initiated || the action in state court and achieved some sort of financial relief in state court, but then || the defendant removed the action to federal court and paid the filing fee upon removal. 4|| Furthermore, here, especially in light of the state court order’s specificity in noting that its 5 || deferral applied only to fees in that particular court, it does not appear that Plaintiff is truly 6 || proceeding “in forma pauperis” in this court—and because the filing fee is already paid and service is already effected, it appears unlikely that Plaintiff will need to file an 8 || application to so proceed in this federal action. But at any rate, the Court need not grapple || with whether § 1915(e) authorizes screening in such a scenario because even if it does, the || Court, in its discretion, declines to screen the complaint under the circumstances. 11 || Defendant has already been served and has already had time and occasion to review the 12 || complaint. At this point, any challenge to the complaint’s sufficiency is better brought by 13} Defendant, such that the Court can make its determination with the benefit of adversarial briefing. 15 Accordingly, 16 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for § 1915 screening (Doc. 3) is denied. 17 Dated this 24th day of September, 2025. 18 19 Lom ee” 20 f CC —— Dominic W. Lanza 71 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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