Oakley Fertilizer, Inc. v. Savage Services Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. North Carolina
DecidedSeptember 19, 2024
Docket7:22-cv-00158
StatusUnknown

This text of Oakley Fertilizer, Inc. v. Savage Services Corporation (Oakley Fertilizer, Inc. v. Savage Services Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oakley Fertilizer, Inc. v. Savage Services Corporation, (E.D.N.C. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA SOUTHERN DIVISION No. 7:22-CV-158-BO ) OAKLEY FERTILIZER, INC., ) Plaintiff, ) ) V. ) ORDER ) SAVAGE SERVICES CORPORATION, _ ) and CAROLINA MARINE TERMINAL, _ ) LLC, ) Defendants. ) )

This cause comes before the Court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment [DE 41] and plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment [DE 48] pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has responded, defendants have replied, and a hearing on the motion was held before the undersigned on March 7, 2024, in Elizabeth City, North Carolina. In this posture, the motion is ripe for ruling. For the reasons that follow, defendants’ motion is granted and plaintiff's motion is denied. BACKGROUND On August 18, 2018, Oakley Fertilizer (“Oakley” or “plaintiff’) and Carolina Marine Terminal (““CMT” or “defendant’’) entered into the Potash Agreement. The Potash Agreement covered the unloading, storage, and stevedoring of potash through a shipping terminal in Wilmington, North Carolina (the ‘“‘Facility”). The Potash Agreement was to run for a term of five years, terminating on March 21, 2024. Under the terms of the Potash Agreement, Oakley was required to pay a set amount for each short ton of potash brought through the Facility. Oakley committed to bringing a minimum of 50,000 short tons through the Facility per year, and to paying the difference between 50,000

short tons and the actual throughput if actual throughput fell short of the minjmum. CMT promised to discharge 9,600 short tons of potash per weather working day. If CMT failed to meet that guaranteed discharge rate, then CMT would be obligated to pay Oakley the actual pro-rata demurrage, up to a maximum of $25,000 per weather working day. Oakley missed the minimum throughput during the first year of the Potash Agreement and incurred a charge of $282,138.70. On November 30, 2020, plaintiff's territory manager Dan DeMartis contacted CMT’s Facility Manager Randy Bennett to ask about importing and storing a new kind of fertilizer known as diammonium phosphate (DAP). Mr. DeMartis asked if the discharge rate would remain 9,600 short tons per day. Mr. Bennett responded, using his decades of experience to estimate a discharge rate of 7,200 short tons per day due to the unique properties of DAP, which is less dense than potash and tends to clump in humid air. On May 1, 2021, Mr. DeMartis contacted Mr. Bennett to ask if CMT could unload the vessel “Pauline,” a ship filled with DAP arriving in July. Mr. Bennett answered in the affirmative, but stated that it “might require an amendment” to the Potash Agreement, to which Mr. DeMartis agreed. [DE 45, Appx. 202, 203] Unloading the Pauline was difficult and slow because of the unique properties of DAP, and Oakley billed CMT for demurrage in the amount of $62,227.78. CMT responded with videos and photos of the unloading process, showing how DAP clumped up in humid air and interfered with the discharging process. During negotiations, plaintiff agreed that it would recalculate the demurrage based on the 7,200 short ton discharge rate, and split the remaining difference because of how difficult the material was to work with. On October 21, 2021, Mr. DeMartis contacted Mr. Bennett again about another shipment of DAP arriving in January, but did not provide the name of the ship. Meanwhile, another client

of CMT, Koch, informed CMT that they would have a shipment of urea arriving in the same time frame. DAP and urea are incompatible fertilizer products, and must be stored separately from each other. Equipment used to move the fertilizer must be thoroughly cleaned between uses. As it happened, Oakley’s shipment of DAP and Koch’s shipment of urea arrived on the same ship, the “Nord Bearing.” The Nord Bearing arrived on February 12, 2022. Following the unloading, Oakley sent a bill for demurrage in the amount of $68,666.67, revised to $67,133.33. The amount was calculated using the potash unloading rate of 9,600 short tons per day and a daily cap of $32,000. CMT refused to pay this bill, stating “we do not have an agreement for DAP we have one for potash.” [DE 44, Appx. 146] Plaintiff took the position that the Potash Agreement covered any bulk fertilizer, except for urea. The parties failed to reach a resolution during negotiation or mediation. The present suit was filed the day after the last of the DAP had left the Facility. ANALYSIS I Scope of the Potash Agreement A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If that burden has been met, the non-moving party must then come forward and establish the specific material facts in dispute to survive summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial, a trial court views the evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in

support of the nonmoving party’s position is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, and a fact is material] if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Speculative or conclusory allegations will not suffice. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). This case has been brought in diversity, and North Carolina state law applies. For a breach of contract claim to succeed, the plaintiff must be able to show “(1) the existence of a valid contract and (2) breach of the terms of that contract.” Poor v. Hill, 530 S.E.2d 838, 848 (2000). For a valid contract to exist, the minds of the parties must meet and agree to the same proposition, with the same meaning. Elks v. N. State Life Ins. Co., 75 S.E. 808, 810 (1912). “If the language of a contract is ambiguous, interpretation is a question of fact, not one of law.” Dockery v. Quality Plastic Custom Molding, Inc., 547 S.E.2d 850, 852 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). Ambiguity exists when the language of the contract is reasonably susceptible to either of the interpretations asserted by the parties. Glover v.

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Scott v. Harris
550 U.S. 372 (Supreme Court, 2007)
George F. Thompson v. Potomac Electric Power Company
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Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Charles Judd
718 F.3d 308 (Fourth Circuit, 2013)
Poor v. Hill
530 S.E.2d 838 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2000)
Dockery v. Quality Plastic Custom Molding, Inc.
547 S.E.2d 850 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2001)
Glover v. First Union National Bank of North Carolina
428 S.E.2d 206 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1993)
Vestal v. Vestal
271 S.E.2d 306 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1980)
Craig v. Kessing
253 S.E.2d 264 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1979)
Elks v. . Insurance Co
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Bluebook (online)
Oakley Fertilizer, Inc. v. Savage Services Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oakley-fertilizer-inc-v-savage-services-corporation-nced-2024.