COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA PUBLISHED
Present: Judges Raphael, Lorish and Frucci Argued at Arlington, Virginia
OAK VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL. OPINION BY v. Record No. 1144-24-4 JUDGE STUART A. RAPHAEL JULY 22, 2025 PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY James A. Willett, Judge
Craig J. Blakeley (Alliance Law Group LLC, on briefs), for appellants.
Alan F. Smith, Chief Deputy Attorney (Michelle R. Robl, County Attorney; Curt G. Spear, Jr., Deputy County Attorney, on briefs), for appellee.
Amicus Curiae: GW Acquisition Co., LLC, GW Acquisition Co. I, LLC, and H&H Capital Acquisitions, LLC (Michael E. Tucci; Matthew A. Westover; Mark C. Looney; Stinson LLP; Walsh, Colucci, Lubeley & Walsh, P.C.; Cooley LLP, on brief), for appellee.
Oak Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. and several landowners (collectively, the
“landowners”) sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate an amendment to the comprehensive
plan adopted by the Prince William County Board of Supervisors. The landowners claimed that
the Board violated Code §§ 15.2-2204 and -2229 by failing to “listen to and consider” public
comments received at the marathon, all-night public hearing that immediately preceded the vote
to adopt the amendment. The circuit court sustained the Board’s demurrer. The court found
that, although the landowners alleged sufficient facts to establish standing, they failed to state a
claim for any statutory violation. Finding no error in either ruling, we affirm. BACKGROUND
When reviewing a judgment sustaining a demurrer, “we ‘accept as true all factual
allegations expressly pleaded in the complaint and interpret those allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.’” Taylor v. Aids-Hilfe Koln, e.V., 301 Va. 352, 357 (2022) (quoting
Coward v. Wellmont Health Sys., 295 Va. 351, 358 (2018)). “[W]e draw any reasonable
inferences arising from the express factual allegations of the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor.”
Id. “But we are not bound by the pleader’s conclusions of law that are couched as facts.”
Theologis v. Weiler, 76 Va. App. 596, 600 (2023).
In 1998, the Board designated a “Rural Crescent” area in Prince William County that
consisted of 117,000 acres. Permitted uses included agricultural, open space, forestry, large-lot
residential, small-scale retail centers, and community facilities. In 2016, the Board amended its
zoning ordinance to allow the construction of data centers in “Data Center Opportunity Zone
Overlay Districts.” The Board established one such overlay district in the Rural Crescent.
On July 7, 2022, the Planning Commission released a first public draft of a “Digital
Gateway” amendment to the comprehensive plan. The Planning Commission held a public
hearing on the amendment that began on September 14 and that continued into the next day. By
that date, two developers had already purchased a sizable amount of land within the Rural
Crescent with plans to build data centers. The developers sent the Planning Commission a letter
with their proposed changes to the amendment, stating that they were delaying the processing of
three rezoning applications in anticipation of the amendment’s passage. The public was not told
about the letter until just before the Planning Commission’s vote. The Planning Commission
recommended that the Board approve the amendment with the changes the developers had
suggested.
-2- The Board scheduled a public hearing on the amendment for November 1, 2022, and it
published notice of the public hearing on October 18 and October 25, in accordance with the
requirements set forth in Code § 15.2-2204.1 The public hearing began as scheduled at 7:30 p.m.
on November 1. It continued for more than 14 hours, concluding on November 2 at just before
10:00 a.m. Nearly 240 people presented comment. When the public-comment session ended,
the Board chair refused to let one supervisor question staff about the public comments. Another
supervisor then introduced a resolution, prepared in advance of the public hearing, to adopt the
amendment as proposed. The resolution passed by a vote of 5-2.
Oak Valley and ten individual landowners sued to invalidate the amendment. The circuit
court sustained the Board’s demurrers to the original complaint and to an amended complaint.
The landowners filed a second amended complaint, the operative one here. They sought a
declaratory judgment that the Board violated the public-hearing requirements in Code
§§ 15.2-2204 and -2229 because it did not “listen to and consider the comments made at the
public hearing” before adopting the amendment. That failure, claimed the landowners, rendered
the amendment void ab initio. They theorized that because the Board adopted a pre-drafted
amendment right after the all-night hearing, the sleep-deprived supervisors could not have
seriously considered the public comments. The landowners claimed that the public hearing was
thereby rendered a nullity, a procedural “‘check the box’ exercise.”2
The Board demurred to the second amended complaint. It argued that the landowners
lacked standing, that declaratory relief was not available, and that the complaint failed to state a
claim for any statutory violation. The circuit court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the
1 The requirements in Code § 15.2-2204(A) to advertise a public hearing have since been amended. See note 4 infra. 2 The landowners withdrew count two of the second amended complaint at the demurrer hearing. -3- second amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that the landowners had standing
but failed to state a claim for any violation of Code §§ 15.2-2204 or -2229. The court concluded
that the landowners’ “listen to and consider” theory would require the court to read additional
words into the statute. The landowners noted a timely appeal.
ANALYSIS
We review de novo the circuit court’s decision to sustain the Board’s demurrer.
Glazebrook v. Bd. of Supervisors, 266 Va. 550, 554 (2003).
A. The landowners sufficiently alleged standing.
“[T]he standing doctrine asks only whether the claimant truly has ‘a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy.’” Morgan v. Bd. of Supervisors, 302 Va. 46, 59 (2023)
(“Morgan I ”) (quoting McClary v. Jenkins, 299 Va. 216, 221-22 (2020)). “We review de novo
the question of whether . . . factual allegations were sufficient to establish standing.” Anders
Larsen Tr. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 301 Va. 116, 122 (2022) (quoting Platt v. Griffith, 299 Va. 690,
692 (2021)).
A two-part test determines whether nearby landowners have standing to challenge a local
governing body’s land-use decision:
First, the complainant must own or occupy real property within or in close proximity to the property that is the subject of the land use determination, thus establishing that it has a direct, immediate, pecuniary, and substantial interest in the decision.
Second, the complainant must allege facts demonstrating a particularized harm to some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or imposition of a burden or obligation upon the petitioner different from that suffered by the public generally.
Morgan I, 302 Va. at 59 (quoting Anders Larsen, 301 Va. at 121). The harm must “be fairly
traceable to the challenged action,” although the action need not be “the very last step in the
chain of causation.” Id. at 64-65 (quoting Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Va. Dep’t of Env’t Quality
ex rel. State Water Control Bd., 261 Va. 366, 376 (2001)). Allegations “must be something more -4- than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.” Id. at 61 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 509 (1975)).
The amended complaint here alleged facts sufficient to satisfy the proximity prong. In
Morgan I, the Court found sufficient proximity not only for landowners who lived “directly
across the street from the proposed development site” but also for those who lived “1,200 feet”
away. Id. at 52. The Court has also found “sufficiently close proximity” for plaintiffs who lived
up to “2,000 feet” away from the land in controversy. Riverview Farm Assocs. Va. Gen. P’ship
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 259 Va. 419, 422, 427 (2000). In this case, five of the landowners own
and reside on parcels that “abut[]” land where the comprehensive-plan amendment allows data
centers (the “subject area”). Five others own properties less than 2,000 feet away from the
subject area, at distances of 986, 1,370, 1,482, 1,650, and 1,820 feet, respectively. Oak Valley’s
parcel is 1,370 feet away. And although it is uncertain precisely where in the subject area any
eventual data center might be sited, the proximity analysis is concerned only with “proximity to
the property that is the subject of the land use determination.” Morgan I, 302 Va. at 59 (quoting
Anders Larsen, 301 Va. at 121). Because at least 10 of the 11 plaintiffs own property next to or
near the subject area, they meet the proximity requirement.3
Those ten landowners also satisfied the second prong by alleging facts sufficient to show
“a particularized harm to some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or imposition of a
burden or obligation . . . different from that suffered by the public generally.” Id. (quoting
Anders Larsen, 301 Va. at 121). In particular, the second amended complaint plausibly alleged
that the comprehensive-plan amendment had already reduced their property values. It said that
3 Christopher Wall, who owns and resides on property 2,315 feet from the subject area, is the only plaintiff who lives more than 2,000 feet away. We need not decide if that is too far to satisfy the proximity prong, for when “one complainant demonstrates standing for the relief requested, a court need not determine whether the other complainants have standing.” Zinner v. Washington Gas Light Co., ___ Va. App. ___, ___ (July 1, 2025). -5- the then-pending developer applications alone would result in “approximately 33” data centers in
the subject area. A typical data center is “industrial in appearance” and as tall as “a 10-story
high-rise office building.” The “light emanating at night from the security lighting of the 24/7
data centers in this semi-rural/agricultural area will be particularly visible to Plaintiffs.” The
landowners also cited “quantitative analysis and modeling” that data centers will “increase the
noise Plaintiffs currently experience to over 75 decibels,” making it “similar to the constant noise
experienced while standing 50 feet from Interstate-66 (a heavily traveled highway).”
After explaining those background facts, the second amended complaint referenced real
estate agents who “are experiencing buyer resistance when considering listings of homes, like
those of Plaintiffs, located in close proximity to the proposed data centers.” The pleading also
alleged that Oak Valley had already experienced two instances in which “a potential buyer chose
another community . . . over Oak Valley because of the proximity of Oak Valley” to the subject
area.
The landowners also plausibly asserted that “any reasonable purchaser of real estate in
close proximity to the Digital Gateway area, such as the residences of the Plaintiffs, necessarily
would take into account the adverse impact of nearby data centers in determining the price he or
she is willing to pay.” And perhaps most significantly, the landowners cited “the opinion of real
estate professionals” that the passage of the comprehensive-plan amendment “by itself,” had
already “caused Plaintiffs an immediate, present diminution in their residential real estate
values.”
Those allegations suffice to establish standing at the demurrer stage. Like the Supreme
Court in Anders Larsen, “[w]e do not hold that a bare allegation of diminished property value, no
matter the context, will suffice to establish standing.” 301 Va. at 122 n.2. But “the allegation[s]
of diminished property values in this case . . . by the immediate neighbors . . . are sufficient to
-6- survive dismissal on the basis of lack of standing.” Id. True, the landowners would be required
to prove their factual allegations at trial. See Seymour v. Roanoke Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 301
Va. 156, 166 n.3 (2022) (“A plaintiff can survive a demurrer with well-pleaded allegations of
standing, but it cannot succeed thereafter without proof of standing.”). At the demurrer stage,
however, the landowners have pleaded enough facts to show standing.
B. Code §§ 15.2-2204 and -2229 do not impose a listen-to-and-consider requirement on local governing bodies.
Though the landowners have cleared the standing hurdle, they stumble on the merits. To
evaluate whether the trial court properly dismissed this case on demurrer, we assume the truth of
the landowners’ central factual allegation: that the members of the Board failed to “listen to and
consider the comments made at the public hearing” before adopting the amendment. 2d Am.
Compl. ¶ 95. Even so, the statutes on which they rely—Code §§ 15.2-2204 and -2229—simply
do not impose a listen-to-and-consider mandate on public bodies. Matters of statutory
interpretation present questions of law that we review de novo. Welsh v. Commonwealth, ___
Va. ___, ___ (Mar. 20, 2025).
Once adopted, a comprehensive plan “control[s] the general or approximate location,
character and extent of each feature shown on the plan.” Code § 15.2-2232(A). “After the
adoption of a comprehensive plan, all amendments to it shall be recommended, and approved
and adopted, respectively, as required by § 15.2-2204.” Code § 15.2-2229. “Code
§§ 15.2-2204(A) and (B) contain certain advertising and written notice requirements applicable
when, inter alia, a governing body intends to adopt a comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, or
amendment thereof.” Norfolk 102, LLC v. City of Norfolk, 285 Va. 340, 356 (2013).
The version of Code § 15.2-2204(A) in effect in November 2022 required a governing
body that proposed amending a comprehensive plan to publish “notice of intention to do so . . .
once a week for two successive weeks in some newspaper published or having general -7- circulation in the locality.”4 The notice must identify “the place or places within the locality
where copies of the proposed plans, ordinances or amendments may be examined.” Id.5 The
notice must “specify the time and place of hearing at which persons affected may appear and
present their views.” Id.
Code § 15.2-2204 provides a limited right of action if the governing body fails to comply
with the advertisement and notice requirements. “Every action contesting a decision of a locality
based on a failure to advertise or give notice . . . shall be filed within 30 days of such decision
with the circuit court having jurisdiction of the land affected by the decision.” Code
§ 15.2-2204(E). “If the notice published by the Board did not meet the requirements of Code
§ 15.2-2204, the Board acted outside the authority granted by the General Assembly and the
amendments are void ab initio.” Glazebrook, 266 Va. at 554. Still, Code § 15.2-2204(B)
provides that if a party has received actual notice of the hearing or participated in it, the party
cannot challenge the failure “to receive the written notice required by this section.” See Norfolk
102, 285 Va. at 356 (finding plaintiffs’ claims under Code § 15.2-2204 waived because they
“had actual notice and actively participated”); Lilly v. Caroline Cnty., 259 Va. 291, 297 (2000)
(finding notice claims waived because plaintiffs “were present and participated”).
Although the landowners do not contend that the Board failed to comply with any of the
notice requirements in Code § 15.2-2204, they posit that additional requirements lurk in the
4 The amendments since 2022 have imposed increasingly detailed requirements for the timing of the required notice. See 2023 Va. Acts chs. 506, 507; 2024 Va. Acts chs. 225, 242; 2025 Va. Acts ch. 52. Code § 15.2-2204(A) now requires that “the first notice appear[] no more than 28 days before and the second notice . . . no less than five days before the date of the meeting referenced in the notice.” 2025 Va. Acts ch. 52. 5 The 2023 amendments deleted the requirement that the notice include “a descriptive summary of the proposed action.” 2023 Va. Acts chs. 506, 507. See Rebh v. Cnty. Bd. of Arlington Cnty., 80 Va. App. 754, 765-70 & n.4 (2024) (invalidating ordinance for failing to comply with descriptive-summary requirement), abrogated in part on other grounds and appeal dismissed, ___ Va. ___ (Nov. 27, 2024). -8- statute beyond those relating to proper notice. They argue that the requirement to conduct a
public hearing implicitly requires the members of a public body to actually “listen to and
consider” the comments of the citizens who testify at the public hearing. The landowners say
that the members of the Board could not possibly have listened to and considered the more than
14 hours of public comment by 240 citizens because the Board voted to adopt the pre-prepared
resolution as soon as the public hearing ended.
But the trial court was correct that Code § 15.2-2204 does not impose a listen-to-and-
consider requirement. Such a requirement cannot be found in the text of the statute, cannot be
squared with controlling precedent, and would be impractical to administer.
Start with the text of Code § 15.2-2204. The statute addresses at length the requirements
to advertise a public hearing relating to a comprehensive plan, an ordinance, or amendments to a
comprehensive plan or ordinance. The statute says nothing about how the governing body
should conduct the public hearing, let alone that a vote by the public body is void ab initio if the
public body fails to listen to and consider public comments. The absence of any such
requirement is corroborated by subsection (E). As noted above, that subsection provides a
limited, 30-day right to contest the governing body’s “failure to advertise or give notice as may
be required by this chapter.” Code § 15.2-2204(E) (emphasis added). If the legislature had
intended the statute to also impose a listen-to-and-consider mandate, it would not have written
subsection E that narrowly.
Background precedent further shows why the General Assembly would have said so
expressly had it intended to impose such a requirement. The Supreme Court held more than 40
years ago that “[t]he Constitution does not grant to members of the public generally a right to be
heard by public bodies making decisions of policy.” Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight,
465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984). “Not least among the reasons for refusing to recognize such a right is
-9- the impossibility of its judicial definition and enforcement.” Id. at 285. “Government makes so
many policy decisions affecting so many people that it would likely grind to a halt were
policymaking constrained by constitutional requirements on whose voices must be heard.” Id.
“Absent statutory restrictions, the State must be free to consult or not to consult whomever it
pleases.” Id. Given the well-established baseline that citizens “have no constitutional right to
force the government to listen to their views,” id. at 283, the General Assembly surely would
have said so explicitly if it had wanted to impose a listen-to-and-consider mandate.
The landowners’ theory also cannot be squared with our own recent decisions
interpreting Code § 15.2-2204 in Morgan v. Board of Supervisors, 83 Va. App. 720 (2025)
(“Morgan II ”), and Drewry v. Board of Supervisors, 84 Va. App. 479 (2025). In Morgan II,6 the
trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the governing body violated Code § 15.2-2204 by
following COVID-19 rules that limited in-person attendance at the public hearing to ten people.
83 Va. App. at 738. We affirmed, rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that Code § 15.2-2204(A)
created a “statutory right to ‘meaningfully participate’ and present their views to the Board.” Id.
at 732. We reasoned that “Code § 15.2-2204(A) does not contain the phrase ‘meaningful
participation.’ Instead, Code § 15.2-2204(A) is entirely focused on notice and what is required
for adequate notice such that ‘persons affected may appear and present their views.’” Id. at 739
(emphasis added). Morgan II compels the same conclusion here: the right to make the governing
body “listen to and consider” public comments made at the public hearing is not found in Code
6 After the Supreme Court found in Morgan I that the landowners had standing to challenge the rezoning decision by the board of supervisors, the trial court sustained the board’s demurrer. We affirmed that ruling in Morgan II. 83 Va. App. at 725. Although Morgan II was published after the briefing here was completed, we invited the parties to file supplemental briefs to discuss its application. - 10 - § 15.2-2204(A). And that is because the statute “is entirely focused” on ensuring proper notice.7
Id.
The landowners’ position is also at odds with Drewry, which interpreted the private right
of action in Code § 15.2-2204(E) to be limited to enforcing the claimant’s own notice rights.8
84 Va. App. at 490, 492. Drewry was a member of the board of supervisors who voted against a
conditional-use permit for a methane-gas-conditioning facility to be built near land on which he
operated his own “agritourism business.” Id. at 485, 490. He argued that the board’s vote to
approve the permit was void ab initio under Code § 15.2-2204 because the board failed to give
notice to others in the manner required by the statute. Id. at 487. We affirmed the trial court’s
decision sustaining the board’s demurrer. We noted that Code § 15.2-2204(B) provides that “[a]
party’s actual notice of, or active participation in, the proceedings . . . shall waive the right of
that party to challenge the validity of the proceeding due to failure of the party to receive the
written notice required by this section.” Id. at 490 (quoting Code § 15.2-2204(B)). We
explained that “Code § 15.2-2204 does not create a private right of action independent of a
violation of the claimant’s own notice rights.” Id. at 492. Just as in Drewry, the landowners here
do not seek to vindicate their own notice rights but to read into the statute a substantive right that
cannot be found in the text.
7 We disagree with the landowners that the entirely-focused-on-notice statement in Morgan II was “dicta and an impermissible advisory opinion.” Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 1. That statement was the “ratio decedendi” of the decision. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 475, 481-82 (2022) (“The interpanel-accord doctrine ‘applies not merely to the literal holding of the case, but also to its ratio decidendi—the essential rationale in the case that determines the judgment.’” (quoting Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Reed, 40 Va. App. 69, 73-74 (2003))). The statement explained why the rights protected by Code § 15.2-2204 were notice rights and did not include the right to meaningfully participate in the public hearing. 8 Because Drewry was also decided after briefing was complete, we notified counsel to be prepared at oral argument to discuss it. - 11 - The landowners’ novel legal theory also misconceives the nature of the legislative
process, treating a legislative body as if it were a jury that must deliberate and consider only the
evidence before it and nothing else. Our courts have never imposed that restriction on legislative
bodies. Unlike jurors who are expected to approach deliberations in the jury room with an open
mind and to consider only the evidence before them, legislators are allowed to come to a public
hearing with a preconceived belief in the right answer. Legislators may know facts not
mentioned at the public hearing. And they may or may not change their mind based on what
they hear at the public hearing, assuming they choose to listen. But whether they actually listen
does not invalidate their legislative acts.
For “in the exercise of its legislative discretion, a legislative body is presumed to have
been cognizant at the time it acted of all existing facts and circumstances bearing upon the public
policies and private rights relating to their action.” Indus. Dev. Auth. v. La France Cleaners
Laundry Corp., 216 Va. 277, 282 (1975). We “uphold a legislative action if, in the face of
evidence of unreasonableness, . . . ‘evidence of reasonableness is sufficient to make the question
fairly debatable.’” Id. at 281 (quoting City of Richmond v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, 511 (1975)).
And in evaluating reasonableness, we “look not to what a legislative body was told or to what it
knew when it acted, but to what it could have known at that time.” Id. at 282. That is why
courts “may consider evidence of reasonableness in the pleadings, exhibits, and admissions—
even if it was not before the Board in the legislative record.” Hartley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 80
Va. App. 1, 19 (2024). In other words, “[i]t is not our place to judge the quality of the care and
deliberation that went into this or any other law.” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 516 (2015)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). “A law enacted by voice vote with no deliberation whatever is fully as
binding upon us as one enacted after years of study, months of committee hearings, and weeks of
debate.” Id.
- 12 - Finally, the landowners’ legal theory lacks any limiting principle and would jeopardize
legislative immunity. The landowners insist that a listen-to-and-consider mandate inheres in the
very notion of a public-hearing requirement. Under that theory, however, every statute requiring
a public hearing would impose such a requirement unless the legislature explicitly negated it.
And just as a constitutional listen-to-and-consider mandate would be impossible to define
or enforce, Knight, 465 U.S. at 285, so would a statutory mandate. Consider just two problems.
First, allowing such lawsuits would undermine “common law legislative immunity,” which
shields members of local governing bodies from inquiry into their legislative conduct or motives.
Bd. of Supervisors v. Davenport & Co., 285 Va. 580, 588-89 (2013). To be sure, local legislators
cannot be compelled to testify about “matters of legislative conduct, whether or not they are
testifying to defend themselves.” Id. at 588 (quoting Schlitz v. Virginia, 854 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.
1988)). But legislators may choose to waive that protection. Id. at 589-90 (holding that the
board of supervisors waived its legislative immunity by suing its financial advisor for fraud). If
citizens could bring failure-to-listen-to-or-consider lawsuits to invalidate local ordinances, local
legislators would be pressured to waive their legislative immunity to defend the integrity of their
vote. That inherent pressure to testify would undermine the purpose of legislative immunity and
expose lawmakers to the burdens of litigation. See Edwards v. Vesilind, 292 Va. 510, 527 (2016)
(“[S]ubjecting legislators to ‘[d]iscovery procedures can prove just as intrusive’ as naming
legislators as parties to a lawsuit.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1995))).
Second, consider the ramifications of accepting the landowners’ theory that a prima facie
failure-to-listen-to-and-consider claim is established simply by showing that a board voted on a
measure immediately following a 14-hour public hearing. How could public bodies negate that
inference? Would it be enough to take a recess before voting? Could board members recite in
- 13 - the adopted motion that they really did listen to and consider public comments? Could such a
recital nevertheless be challenged as untrue? The practical difficulties administering a listen-to-
and-consider mandate would be endless.
For all these reasons, the landowners have not persuaded us that the General Assembly
empowered citizens to invalidate governmental action through lawsuits claiming that elected
officials failed to listen to or consider citizen comment at public hearings. Our democratic
institutions rely on elections to oust legislators who prove inattentive to public concerns. As the
Supreme Court put it in Knight, “[d]isagreement with public policy and disapproval of officials’
responsiveness . . . is to be registered principally at the polls.” 465 U.S. at 286. For “[i]t is
inherent in the republican form of government that high officials may choose—in their own
wisdom and at their own peril—to listen to some of their constituents and not to others.” Id. at
300 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
CONCLUSION
In short, the landowners alleged sufficient facts to establish their standing at the demurrer
stage, but they failed to state a claim that the Board violated Code §§ 15.2-2204 or -2229 by
voting on the comprehensive-plan amendment without having listened to or considered public
comment. So the trial court correctly sustained the Board’s demurrer.
Affirmed.
- 14 -