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O. C. v. W. I. * (AC 48019)
Cradle, C. J., and Westbrook and Eveleigh, Js. **
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment awarding her and the defendant joint legal custody of the parties’ minor child and awarding her primary physical custody of the child subject to visitations with the defendant . The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly awarded the defendant joint legal custody and unsupervised visitations without having ordered him to undergo any psychological or medical evaluations as requested by the plaintiff. Held: The trial court properly awarded the defendant joint legal custody and unsupervised visitations, as, although there was evidence in the record that would have supported an order requiring the defendant to undergo a psychological evaluation had the court ordered it, the court was not required to credit all of the evidence that the plaintiff presented, it acknowledged and considered the defendant’s behavior in reaching its custody decision, and, as was its prerogative as the trier of fact, it did not give the evidence the weight that the plaintiff believed it deserved. This court dismissed as moot that portion of the plaintiff’s appeal claiming that the trial court violated her rights to due process by vacating a certain restraining order issued against the defendant without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, as the restraining order and protection afforded to the plaintiff had expired on its terms and the plaintiff did not meet her burden of demonstrating that there was a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences would occur if this court did not consider her claim.
Argued November 13, 2025—officially released August 25, 2026
Procedural History
Application for custody of the parties’ minor child, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Danbury and tried to the court, Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge trial referee; judgment awarding joint legal custody of the minor child to the
*
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of family violence, we decline to identify the parties or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person ’s identity may be ascertained.
**
The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
parties and primary physical custody of the minor child to the plaintiff, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed.
Campbell D. Barrett, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Opinion
WESTBROOK, J. The plaintiff, O. C., who filed an application seeking sole legal custody and primary physical custody of her minor child, E, appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding her joint legal custody with the defendant, W. I., E’s father, and primary physical custody subject to visitations with the defendant.1 The plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) awarded the defendant joint legal custody and unsupervised visitations without having ordered him to undergo any psychological or medical evaluations as requested by the plaintiff and (2) violated her rights to due process by vacating without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard a restraining order rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant that was not a part of the custody proceedings. We reject the plaintiff’s first claim and conclude that the second claim is moot. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed in part, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The following facts, which were found by the court or are undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the present appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant are the parents of E, who was born in July 2017. The parties were never married. In February 2024, they ended their romantic relationship . The plaintiff shortly thereafter filed an application seeking sole legal and physical custody of E subject to “[r]easonable visitation [with the defendant] as mutually 1 The defendant failed to file an appellee’s brief and, on July 1, 2025, this court issued an order that the appeal would be considered solely on the basis of the plaintiff’s brief and appendix, the record as defined by Practice Book § 60-4, and oral argument by the plaintiff.
agreed upon by the parties.” The court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for E upon agreement of the parties. On March 12, 2024, the plaintiff filed an application for relief from abuse pursuant to General Statutes § 46b- 15 directed against the defendant. Following a hearing, the court, Fox, J., issued a restraining order in accordance with a written agreement between the parties. The restraining order was to remain in effect for one year until March 28, 2025, and required the defendant to stay away from the plaintiff’s home and not to assault, threaten, abuse, harass, follow, interfere with, or stalk her. The order did not extend to E and did not include a full no contact order.
On June 12, 2024, the plaintiff filed a second application for relief from abuse. In addition to the terms already in place as a result of the existing March 2024 restraining order, the plaintiff’s second application sought orders requiring the defendant to have no contact with the plaintiff in any manner and extending all orders to also include E.
In her affidavit in support of the second application, the plaintiff averred in relevant part that, since the parties had broken off their romantic relationship, “[the defendant’s] mental health has rapidly declined.” She explained that she had brought the underlying custody action and sought the restraining order in March 2024 “so that [the defendant] would stay away from my house as he was accusing me of being a demonic Satan worshiper that was sacrificially killing animals and that I opened a demonic portal in my home. He believed the way I planted my trees and plants opened up this portal.” She averred that she recently learned that the defendant had “told his [sixteen] year old daughter, Madison, on June 9, 2024, that he is going to Israel next week and that he is going to jail for the rest of his life for what he’s about to do to me. This makes me fear for my immediate and present physical safety. Since June 9, 2024, the defendant has sent numerous emails to myself and my attorney expressing his belief that I have something to do with the drowning of a man in 2013 in Candlewood Lake. I have never heard of this individual or anyone else he refers to in said emails. He even filed for emergency custody yesterday claiming that I am being investigated by the [Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)]. In one of his emails to us yesterday he claims a ‘special agent’ reached out to him but he cannot provide the agent’s name but he copied the FBI email address on said emails. Upon further review by my counsel, the email he provided for the FBI contact is not a valid FBI email address . . . .” The plaintiff further recounted that the defendant had stated in a recently filed memorandum that he had discovered “a note/coloring page that had a code in it. The code was a death threat sent from [the plaintiff].” The defendant indicated that he knew this “because [he] was a former intel op and had some [National Security Agency (NSA)] training in linguistics.” The plaintiff averred that she had “known [the defendant] since 2015 and he is not a former intel op nor has he trained with the NSA and I did not send a death threat code in my daughter’s artwork.” Finally, the plaintiff stated in her affidavit that, “[p]rior to breaking up with [the defendant], he told me he is an angel that is on a divine mission. He is obsessed with the numbers ‘333’ as he believes this is his angel number. Given [the defendant’s] erratic and bizarre behaviors, threats to me, and delusions in the past week, I do not believe that he is mentally stable to care for our [six] year old daughter and poses a direct psychological and physical danger to her. I believe that he is potentially on drugs and suffering from a serious mental illness. As a result, I filed an emergency custody application along with this application and I fear he will retaliate once he finds out. Furthermore, given his behaviors, threats, and mental instability, I fear I am in immediate and present physical danger.”2 2 Prior to the plaintiff filing her second application for relief from abuse, the defendant, on May 20, 2024, had filed an affidavit in the custody action, in which he averred that, “contrary to claims made against me, I would like to go on record to state that I do not believe [the plaintiff] to be a low level demon, or Satan worshipper. I do not believe she is using string or sticks or rocks or any other items claimed to cast spells. I do not believe her chicken coup is a ‘portal.’ I do not ever intend
The court, Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge trial referee, granted the second application ex parte and issued the requested restraining order with an expiration date of June 25, 2024. The court’s ex parte orders also included an award of temporary custody of E to the plaintiff with a notation that the defendant may later be awarded visitation rights in the ongoing custody action. The court, Figueroa Laskos, J., began a contested hearing on the second application on June 25, 2024. The court had to continue the hearing a number of times, and, as a result, also extended the expiration date of the ex parte civil restraining order several times. The last such extension was to September 16, 2024.
Judge Winslow conducted a trial on the custody application over three days, beginning on August 14, 2024, and concluding on August 27, 2024. One week prior to the start of the trial, the plaintiff submitted proposed orders. In addition to seeking orders awarding her sole legal custody and primary physical custody of E, the plaintiff proposed that the defendant not be granted visitations with E until there were no civil or criminal protective orders in place with respect to E, and until he underwent a psychological evaluation and engaged in individual psychotherapy.3 At the beginning of the trial, the parties acknowledged and discussed with thecourt the fact that multiple civil and criminal protective orders existed against the defendant in favor of the plaintiff and E.4 to harm her chickens or any other animals ever. Thank you. I hope [the plaintiff’s] team can now lay these allegations to rest, as they have no place in our family custody case.”
3 On the last day of trial, the GAL also filed proposed orders with the court. The GAL recommended that the plaintiff be awarded sole legal custody and that, due to the existing criminal protective order, the defendant should not have visitation or contact with E until the criminal protective order was terminated or modified. The GAL also proposed that the court require the defendant to undergo drug testing and a psychological evaluation prior to seeking any postjudgment modification of the court’s custody and visitation orders.
4 The following colloquy occurred regarding the status of relevant protective orders:
“[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, there are three preliminary matters that we wanted to address with the court before we start taking
Following the close of evidence on August 27, 2024, the court made the following statements: “When the evidence is closed, I generally wish to make a decision as quickly testimony as they may affect the testimony here today. The first is that Judge Stango issued a criminal protective order on July 12, 2024, in docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX, which is a full stay away no contact order that covers [the plaintiff], as well as their minor child, preventing any contact by [the defendant] with them. And that is in effect until further order of the court.
“There are additionally . . . three other protective orders in place for my client on the criminal cases of docket CR-XX-XXXXXXX, CR-XX-XXXXXXX, CR-XX-XXXXXXX that prohibits any contact by [the defendant] with [the plaintiff]. So, we wanted to alert the court of those protective orders in the criminal court.
“There is additionally one more protective order through the family court, which Judge Figueroa Laskos has entered in this case, which prohibits [the defendant] from having contact with [the plaintiff] and the minor child, and the docket number associated with that matter is DBD-FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S.
“The Court: What’s the date on that? “[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: That was issued on August 6, 2024, and is in effect until September 16, 2024, once we continue the final hearing of that temporary restraining order before Judge Figueroa Laskos.
“The Court: I’m sorry. September 16? “[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: 2024. Your Honor, we started this hearing for the temporary restraining order.
“The Court: I’m a little puzzled because there’s a restraining order in effect on a separate docket number in which Judge Fox issued a restraining order in March of this year. “[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. “The Court: Nobody filed a modification request as to that restraining order, but, rather, somebody filed a new restraining order?
“[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. We filed a new restraining order. The March 28, 2024 [order] was a residential stay away that the parties had settled on, and when we filed our request for an additional protective order that was a full stay away no contact, we filed that on [June 12, 2024], which is the—
“The Court: And it was not filed as a modification of a previous restraining order. “[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: It was— “The Court: So, now there are two restraining orders outstanding— “[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. “The Court: —that duplicate each other except one is more strict than the other?
“[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: That is correct, Your Honor.
***
“The Court: Well, I’m looking at a full no contact restraining order as to both [the plaintiff] and the minor child . . . issued by Judge Figueroa as possible. Because I had put aside the morning for this case, I have a little bit of time, frankly, to work on that decision and deliver it to you, probably this morning.
“Now, what I want to say is this, there are a number of restraining order applications out there. I don’t know how many hearings are scheduled. I would suggest that all parties consider withdrawing your outstanding restraining order applications. Not only to limit the amount of time that you have to come to court, and the fact that you are unlikely to prevail in any of those restraining order applications based on the evidence I’ve heard.
“There’s absolutely nothing that supports a claim that either of you represents a danger to the other and I suspect that any levelheaded judge would come to the same conclusion. I certainly have come to that conclusion, and therefore, at this time, I’m vacating the order that I entered ex parte on June 12, 2024. Now, in vacating that order, however, that case is not done with because subsequent to my entering that order, Judge Figueroa Laskos is the one who began the hearing, I believe, on that Laskos . . . on August 6, 2024. How can that be continued to September 16?
“[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, there was a competency evaluation that was ordered by the— “The Court: You don’t understand my question. Since a restraining order can’t be continued ex parte, was a hearing conducted on this?
“[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, we’re in the middle of a hearing.
“The Court: Oh, you started a hearing. “[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Yes, we started a hearing back on [June 25, 2024]. . . . During the lunch break, [the defendant] was arrested. So, we had continued it to, I believe, July 9th. At that time, Judge Figueroa Laskos—we had recalled the witness that was currently on the stand, which was the guardian ad litem, Rebecca Goodrich. We started taking a few minutes of testimony. At which time, we took a break. Judge Figueroa Laskos came back to the bench and indicated she was alerted by the criminal court clerk that Judge Stango had issued a competency evaluation on July 5th in the criminal court for [the defendant], and that she was going to continue the case until later in the week for us to be heard on the competency issue on July 12th. We came back on July 12th, and [the defendant] and myself both consented to continuing the matter until after the competency evaluation had been completed, and, therefore, it was put over until after the evaluation is complete.”
particular restraining order application and the hearing was not concluded. I think it was something like August 6th when she started hearing that case, or maybe it was earlier than that. Come to think of it, it . . . probably was earlier than that, and then it was continued thereafter. I think there was an incident in which [the defendant] was arrested.
“But, in any case, that hearing got delayed until, I think, September 16 . . . . [Judge Figueroa Laskos] did continue the carve out of the visitation. So, on the civil side there’s nothing that bars that visitation from continuing . Now . . . and before I get to the criminal side, was there consent on both sides to the continuation of the ex parte order? . . .
“Under the law an ex parte order can only be continued for one week without the consent of both parties. I want to know whether both parties consented to the continuation of the ex parte order until September 16, yes, or no?”
The parties indicated to the court that they did not recall consenting, and the court responded that consent could not be assumed. The court continued: “I think it would be prudent for [the plaintiff] to withdraw her—I don’t want Judge Figueroa Laskos coming back here on September 16 and discovering that she doesn’t have to come, I mean, this is not making any sense. At the same time, [the defendant] shoots himself in the foot if he’s trying to block or bar access to his child when she’s in the care of [the plaintiff] and trying to pursue restraining orders against her. Both sides, this is silly, you have testified before me in this trial, each of you has testified that you recognize that the other party has been a competent parent, a loving parent, a capable parent of this child. Everything went to smithereens in the last year or so as you battled with each other over your child. And in that context, you’ve both been casting a lot of mud, and a lot of that mud may be justified. I mean people have not behaved well on either side towards each other, but it’s time to put that aside and stop torturing your child with these court appearances. So, anyway, I’m going to step aside. I’m going to return at 11:30 with a decision, and in the meantime, our clerk has a number of withdrawal forms. I would hope that you would heed what I say. We’ll recess.”
When the hearing resumed, the court inquired of counsel whether the plaintiff had made any decisions regarding the existing civil restraining order and pending application. Counsel indicated that the plaintiff was willing to withdraw the application that remained pending but would like the one year residential stay away and limited restraining order that had entered on March 28, 2024, by agreement of the parties to remain in effect. The court then indicated: “In that case, I’m going to have to take more time, I’m going to change my decision.” Counsel for the plaintiff responded: “Your Honor, I will withdraw both,” and requested time to execute the necessary forms. The court took another recess, indicating that it needed to review proposed orders that it had just received from the GAL and that it would recess for approximately ten minutes.
When the court returned, it stated on the record that it was opening and vacating the March 28, 2024 restraining order “by mutual request of the parties.” Neither party voiced any objection to that ruling at that time. The court next stated that it had a written a memorandum of decision resolving the custody matter, that it had “not changed [its] mind from what [it] decided to do at the close of evidence basically,” and that it wished to orally make a record of some of the relevant facts underlying its decision. The court stated in relevant part: “[T]he relationship of the parties was a good one for some long period of time when it came to caring for the child. . . . And neither raised any complaints or concerns about the other in the early years of [E’s] life, concerning her well-being while in the care of the other party. Indeed, even today, neither party has really raised concerns about the health, welfare, and safety of the child while in the care of the other party. . . . That having been said, I have indicated in the decision that I think that the tensions between the parties and their disrespect and distrust of each other have taken a toll on the minor child herself. Her distress has been noted by the school and others who’ve come in contact with her. I think she’s distressed about several things, but among them the fact that, at the present time, she has no access to her father whatsoever , something to which she’s been accustomed [to] on a daily basis throughout her life until quite recently. And I think that the tensions, again, between parents, have had a notable effect on the child and it’s inevitable in situations where a child has been accustomed to seeing parents daily and having good contact with both parents. When that comes to an end, she is in a grieving period about that, but also having to adjust, which is difficult for a child at the age of seven. . . .
“Now, the orders of the court are essentially as follows, always we unseal financial documents at the time of judgment. The parties will have joint legal custody and be involved in major decisions, but after consultation. Mind you, all of this is [subject] to the criminal protective orders at this time, but upon consultation, the parties will either reach an agreement or they won’t, and they make best efforts to reach agreement. If they can’t, then the plaintiff is going to be the final decision maker. There is an exception, and that has to do with the religious upbringing of the child. It’s my view that the parties do not absolutely share religious beliefs, and, therefore, the parties will operate independently, essentially. That whoever the child is with may make arrangements for the child’s religious upbringing or education while in the care of the individual parent. As noted in this judgment, [the defendant] has unconventional religious beliefs. He proselytizes those beliefs, that is, he works to persuade others of his beliefs, and I do not read, however, into his unconventional religious persuasion, any threats or tendency towards violence. He does believe that certain people are good, certain people are evil, certain people are both. That does not constitute a threat as far as I can tell.”
The court next indicated that physical custody of E would be primarily with the plaintiff subject to a visitation schedule with the defendant, details of which the court then set forth on the record. After summarizing other portions of its custody ruling, the court clarified as follows: “As I said earlier, all of these orders regarding access, decision making, everything else around the child are subject to the current criminal protective orders. Therefore, none of this can be implemented at this point and time. Even the . . . contacts weekly by [the plaintiff] to [the defendant] are not required with regard to information providing and so forth because the court does not want to provoke any need for [the defendant] to inquire or respond. I do not consider this to be a happy circumstance, and I don’t think it’s in the best interest of the child, as obviously, I wouldn’t issue this decision if I thought that were in the best interest of the child.”
After providing a summation of related financial orders and releasing the GAL from further service in this matter, the court ordered that any remaining pending motions in this matter were denied. Upon completing its oral ruling, the court asked the parties if they had any questions. There was some confusion at this point over the status of the various existing and pending restraining orders. The court clarified that it had opened and vacated the March 28, 2024 order as well as her own June 12, 2024 ex parte order. As for the ongoing contested proceedings before Judge Figueroa Laskos on the plaintiff’s second application for relief from abuse, the court instructed the parties that they had a hearing on that matter at 2 p.m. The court then concluded the hearing. Later that day, the court issued its memorandum of decision resolving the custody matter. The plaintiff filed a withdrawal of her second application for relief from abuse, which Judge Figueroa Laskos accepted. This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly awarded the defendant joint legal custody and unsupervised visitations. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court should have granted her request for an order requiring the defendant to undergo a psychological or medical evaluation because he had exhibited behavioral changes, was abusive, held extreme and unconventional religious beliefs, and believed he was immune from civil and criminal court action, all of which should have raised concerns about his ability to care for E. We are unconvinced that the court was required to order the defendant to undergo any evaluation or that the court abused its discretion by failing to do so on this record.
Courts overseeing family relations matters, including proceedings to determine the custody and visitation of children; see General Statutes § 46b-1; are authorized by statute to order psychological and other medical evaluations of a parent. In making any order with respect to custody or visitation, the court must ensure that its orders “serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests ”; General Statutes § 46b-56; and “[a] court-ordered psychological evaluation of a parent will often be necessary to determine the best interest of the child.” Janik v. Janik, 61 Conn. App. 175, 182, 763 A.2d 65 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 940, 768 A.2d 949 (2001). This is because such an evaluation can provide valuable insight into a parent’s relative ability to parent and the current state of the relationship between the parent and the child. Id. “[W]hether to order such an evaluation [however] is entirely within the court’s discretion.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Accordingly, in reviewing a claim that the court failed to order a psychological evaluation of a parent, we apply an abuse of discretion standard of review. In so doing, we are cognizant that “[a] mere difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify the intervention of this court. Nothing short of a conviction that the action of the trial court is one which discloses a clear abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lane v. Lane, 64 Conn. App. 255, 257, 779 A.2d 859 (2001). “In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . [T]he question is not whether any one of us, had we been sitting as the trial judge, would have exercised our discretion differently. . . . Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Null v. Jacobs, 165 Conn. App. 339, 347, 139 A.3d 709 (2016).
We cannot conclude on the basis of the existing record that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by not ordering a psychological evaluation of the defendant before awarding him joint legal custody and unsupervised visitations with E. In support of her claim to the contrary , the plaintiff directs our attention to evidence that she presented at trial as well as to excerpts from pleadings that she believes demonstrate the defendant’s alarming and unusual religious beliefs and his failure to recognize the authority of the courts and other civil authorities. The court, however, did not ignore this evidence. Rather, the court acknowledged and considered the defendant’s behavior in reaching its custody decision. Ultimately, as was its prerogative as the trier of fact, the court did not give the evidence the weight that the plaintiff believes it deserved. An appeal does not provide this court with an opportunity to reweigh evidence or second-guess the trial court’s consideration of the credibility of witnesses.
The trial court was not required to credit all of the evidence that the plaintiff presented, and it is clear that the court did not. The court found that both parties had been “casting a lot of mud” during the custody dispute but found that “neither party has really raised concerns about the health, welfare, and safety of the child while in the care of the other party.” The court acknowledged that the defendant had unconventional religious beliefs and tried to persuade others of his beliefs but stated that it did not find that “his unconventional religious persuasion [posed] any threats or tendency towards violence.” The court had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor and temperament of all parties, including the defendant, over the course of the proceedings. Not only did the court have the opportunity to observe the defendant during his testimony and cross-examination, but, because the defendant represented himself, the court had the additional opportunity to assess his behavior more generally. The court also understood and acknowledged on the record that the custody and visitation orders it entered would not go into immediate effect while the criminal protective order remained in place. In other words, a resumption of visitation between E and the defendant was not imminent. Although the court did not explain why it chose to reject the proposed orders by the plaintiff and the GAL that would have required the defendant to undergo a psychological evaluation or other medical testing before visitation with E could resume, nothing in the court’s orders prevented the plaintiff from seeking such relief in the future if she still believed it necessary to protect E.
In short, although there certainly was evidence in the record that would have supported an order requiring the defendant to undergo a psychological evaluation had the court ordered it, we cannot conclude on the present record that the court abused its considerable discretion by choosing not to order an evaluation.
II
The plaintiff also claims that the court violated her rights to due process by vacating the March 2024 restraining order issued against the defendant in her favor because she was not provided proper notice and an opportunity to be heard; the restraining order was not a part of the custody proceedings and, thus, not properly before the court; and, contrary to the court’s assertion, she had not consented to the court’s vacatur of the restraining order. Although we are troubled by the coercive language and procedures utilized by the trial court, we do not consider whether the court’s actions amounted to reversible error because the restraining order at issue, even if not properly vacated, has expired by its terms and, therefore, the plaintiff’s claim is moot.
“Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates
[this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . The mootness doctrine is founded on the same policy interests as the doctrine of standing, namely, to assure the vigorous presentation of arguments concerning the matter at issue. . . . [T]he standing doctrine is designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. . . . Indeed, we note that courts are called upon to determine existing controversies, and thus may not be used as a vehicle to obtain advisory judicial opinions on points of law. . . .
“[A]n actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot. . . . However, under this court’s long-standing mootness jurisprudence . . . despite developments during the pendency of an appeal that would otherwise render a claim moot, the court may retain jurisdiction [if] a litigant shows that there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur. . . .
“[T]o invoke successfully the collateral consequences doctrine, the litigant must show that there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur. Accordingly, the litigant must establish these consequences by more than mere conjecture, but need not demonstrate that these consequences are more probable than not. This standard provides the necessary limitations on justiciability underlying the mootness doctrine itself. Where there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Putman v.
Kennedy, 279 Conn. 162, 168–69, 900 A.2d 1256 (2006). “Because mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction , it presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) R. G.-R. v. S. R., 226 Conn. App. 547, 556, ___ A.3d ___, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 923, 321 A.3d 1131 (2024).
In Putman v. Kennedy, supra, 279 Conn. 175, our Supreme Court held that a former husband’s appeal from two domestic violence restraining orders entered against him in favor of his former wife was not rendered moot just because, during the pendency of the appeal, the restraining orders expired by their terms. The Supreme Court reasoned that the possibility of “significant collateral consequences” meant that the expiration of the restraining order did not render the appeal moot. Id., 164−65. The court stated that “[t]he array of collateral consequences that will preclude dismissal on mootness grounds is diverse, and includes harm to a [party’s] reputation as a result of the judgment at issue.” Id., 169. With respect to a party against whom a restraining order was issued, the court concluded that “[t]he threat of reputation[al] harm is particularly significant . . . because domestic violence restraining orders [do] not issue in the absence of [a] showing of a threat of violence . . . [and] being the subject of a court order intended to prevent or stop domestic violence may well cause harm to the reputation and legal record of the [party previously subject to the order].” (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 171−72. In addition to reputational harm, the court in Putman stated that a collateral consequence also would include any future prejudicial legal ramifications that might flow from the existence of an expired domestic violence restraining order, including its use in future bail proceedings, presentence investigations, in-court impeachment and child custody determinations. Id., 173−74. “Thus, in the sensitive and often explosively litigated context of family dysfunction and dissolution, there is a reasonable possibility that a domestic violence restraining order will have prejudicial collateral legal consequences for its subject, even after its expiration. Accordingly, the subject of an improperly rendered domestic violence restraining order is likely to benefit from the vacatur of that order, and dismissal of his or her appeal as moot solely on the basis of that order’s expiration is improper.” Id., 172.
In the present case, the plaintiff acknowledges in her brief that “the March 2024 restraining order would have expired prior to the filing of [her] brief and . . . [any potential] June 2024 restraining order would have expired soon after even if entered for twelve months . . . .” Accordingly, even if the plaintiff were to prevail on her claim that the trial court acted improperly with respect to the restraining order and pending application, no practical relief could flow because, even if reinstated by virtue of our decision, any resulting restraining order and protection afforded to the plaintiff would have expired on its terms. The plaintiff nevertheless argues that the improper vacatur and/or coerced withdrawal of the restraining orders have prejudicial collateral consequences in that they will “continue to prejudice [her] in any future custody proceedings and in the event of any future restraining order application.” We are not persuaded that collateral consequences similar in significance to those recognized by the court in Putman are reasonably likely to arise.
The plaintiff first argues that, when determining the best interest of the child pursuant to § 46b-56, a trial court can consider “the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence, as defined in section 46b-1, has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child . . . .” General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) (15). The court’s vacatur of the restraining orders would not prejudice the plaintiff in possible future court proceedings because the plaintiff would not be precluded from presenting evidence of the defendant’s prior conduct that led to those restraining orders. To the extent that the vacatur of the prior restraining order might have an impact on the weight a future court affords that evidence, any such impact is speculative or at best of limited significance. Second, the plaintiff argues that, in the event it might be necessary for the plaintiff to seek a restraining order in the future on the basis of any new instances of domestic violence, the existence of prior restraining orders are a factor that a future trial court can consider. See General Statutes § 46b-15. Although vacated, there would be a record of any past restraining orders available to the trial court, or, as the plaintiff herself acknowledges, “[any future] trial court would still be aware that the restraining orders existed at one time . . . .” Although the plaintiff asserts that “the amount of weight given to them would certainly be impacted by the fact they were vacated by the trial court,” we are unconvinced that this presents the type of legal collateral consequence our courts have recognized as an exception to the mootness doctrine. The plaintiff has not cited any appellate or trial court decision suggesting the contrary. We conclude that any collateral consequences stemming from the court’s actions regarding the restraining orders in this matter are too speculative or insufficiently severe to overcome mootness. Because the plaintiff has not met her burden of demonstrating “that there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur” if we do not consider her claim; State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 208, 802 A.2d 74 (2002); we conclude that this aspect of the plaintiff’s appeal is moot.
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the plaintiff’s challenge to the trial court’s vacatur of the March 2024 restraining order; the judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.