Nyquist v. Nyquist

Opinion

No. 8 0 - 3 3 2 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF T I STATE OF MONTANA EE 1981

CARLEY D. NYQUIST, Plaintiff and ellant anti -vs- DONALD H. NYQUIST, Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, The Honorable Peter Meloy, Judge presiding.

Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Knight, Dahood, McLean & Everett, Anaconda, Montana

For Respondent: Ralph T. Randono; Great Falls,' Montana

Submitted on Briefs: May 1, 1981 Decided: July 3 0 1 1981

Piled: JUL 9 0 M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

P l a i n t i f f C a r l e y N y q u i s t a p p e a l s from t h e f i n d i n g s of

f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and o r d e r e n t e r e d i n t h e F i r s t

J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Lewis and C l a r k County. Plaintiff

p e t i t i o n e d t h e c o u r t t o h o l d d e f e n d a n t i n contempt of c o u r t

f o r f a i l i n g t o make maintenance payments. Defendant p e t i t i o n e d

t h e c o u r t t o modify t h e maintenance payments due t o p l a i n t i f f

under t h e p a r t i e s d e c r e e of d i v o r c e . The o r d e r of t h e

D i s t r i c t Court terminated defendant' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r

maintenance of t h e p l a i n t i f f .

P l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t were m a r r i e d i n September 1949,

i n Spokane, Washington. I n September 1973, a d e c r e e of

d i v o r c e was e n t e r e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F i r s t

J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , L e w i s and C l a r k County. The d e c r e e

r e q u i r e d d e f e n d a n t t o pay c h i l d s u p p o r t of $100 p e r month

f o r t h e i r minor c h i l d , Dirk Nyquist. The d e c r e e f u r t h e r

o r d e r e d d e f e n d a n t t o pay maintenance t o t h e p l a i n t i f f i n t h e

amount of $500 p e r month from October 1, 1973 u n t i l October

1, 1974, and t h e n $400 p e r month t h e r e a f t e r . Additionally,

d e f e n d a n t w a s r e q u i r e d t o pay t h e premiums n e c e s s a r y t o

m a i n t a i n h e a l t h and h o s p i t a l i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e f o r t h e

plaintiff.

When t h e d e c r e e was e n t e r e d , p l a i n t i f f was employed a s

a part-time clerk. She s u b s e q u e n t l y a t t e n d e d and was gradu-

a t e d from a b e a u t y s c h o o l . P r e s e n t l y , s h e i s employed a s a

f u l l - t i m e b e a u t i c i a n i n Anaconda, Montana. Her a v e r a g e monthly

income from t h i s employment i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y $350 t o $400

p e r month.

A t t h e t i m e of t h e d e c r e e , d e f e n d a n t was employed as a n

o f f i c i a l c o u r t r e p o r t e r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E i g h t h Judicial ~ i s t r i c t , Cascade County. Defendant i s c u r r e n t l y

employed i n t h e same c a p a c i t y and a l s o engages i n a d d i t i o n a l

private court reporting.

I n 1979, d e f e n d a n t s u f f e r e d s e r i o u s m e d i c a l problems

n e c e s s i t a t i n g a m p u t a t i o n of one l e g . Defendant was u n a b l e

t o work f o r a seven-month p e r i o d from J u n e t o December 1979.

The d e f e n d a n t r e t u r n e d t o work as a c o u r t r e p o r t e r p a r t - t i m e

i n J a n u a r y 1980. He resumed f u l l - t i m e employment i n March

1980.

D e f e n d a n t ' s s a l a r y a s a c o u r t r e p o r t e r i s $18,000 p e r

year. H i s o u t s i d e income v a r i e s from y e a r t o y e a r . Testimony

a t t h e h e a r i n g e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s n e t income f o r

1977 was $29,681. For 1978, h i s n e t income w a s $20,694. In

1979, due t o h i s m e d i c a l problems, d e f e n d a n t ' s n e t income

dropped t o $15,500. During t h e f i r s t f i v e months of 1980,

d e f e n d a n t ' s n e t income w a s $7,050. The d e f e n d a n t a l s o

t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s p r i v a t e work d e c l i n e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e

a m p u t a t i o n of h i s l e g .

Due t o h i s m e d i c a l problems, t h e d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a

p e t i t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e d e c r e e of d i v o r c e on Sep-

tember 1 3 , 1979. P l a i n t i f f subsequently f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t

i n s u p p o r t of a n o r d e r t o show c a u s e why t h e d e f e n d a n t

s h o u l d n o t be h e l d i n contempt f o r f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h

t h e d e c r e e of d i v o r c e .

These p e t i t i o n s were h e a r d on J u n e 4 , 1980, and on J u l y

28, 1980. On J u n e 4 , 1980, t h e d e f e n d a n t a p p e a r e d and

testified. N e i t h e r p l a i n t i f f nor h e r c o u n s e l a p p e a r e d a t

t h i s h e a r i n g due t o l a c k of n o t i c e . The p a r t i e s l a t e r

s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e r e c o r d c o u l d be reopened i n o r d e r t o allow t h e p l a i n t i f f t o p r e s e n t her testimony. The p l a i n t i f f

a p p e a r e d and t e s t i f i e d on J u l y 28, 1980. Proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law were

s u b m i t t e d by t h e p a r t i e s and on August 26, 1980, t h e ~ i s t r i c t

C o u r t e n t e r e d i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and

order. The c o u r t found t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s c u r r e n t i n h i s

c h i l d s u p p o r t and l i f e i n s u r a n c e payments and e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s

r e g a r d i n g t h e amount of maintenance d e f e n d a n t had p a i d t o

plaintiff. The c o u r t f u r t h e r e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s w i t h r e g a r d

t o d e f e n d a n t ' s income and d e b t s and p l a i n t i f f ' s need f o r

maintenance.

The c o u r t concluded t h a t t h e p a r t i e s economic c i r c u m s t a n c e s

had changed m a t e r i a l l y s i n c e t h e e n t r y of t h e d e c r e e of

d i v o r c e . The c o u r t t h e n e n t e r e d t h e f o l l o w i n g o r d e r :

" I T I S HEREBY ORDERED t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s no l o n g e r r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e maintenance of t h e p l a i n t i f f herein.

"FURTHER I T I S ORDERED t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t make t h e s u p p o r t payment of $100.00 a month a s and f o r s u p p o r t of t h e minor c h i l d , Dirk N y q u i s t , t o t h e d a t e t h e minor c h i l d r e a c h e s t h e a g e of 1 8 .

"FURTHER IT I S ORDERED t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s h a l l c o n t i n u e t o make t h e premium payments on t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s l i f e insurance policy."

The i s s u e s t o be d e c i d e d by t h i s C o u r t a r e :

1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o

o r d e r d e f e n d a n t t o pay d e l i n q u e n t maintenance payments?

2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n t e r m i n a t i n g

d e f e n d a n t ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o make maintenance payments?

The f i r s t i s s u e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l i s n o t p r o p e r l y

before t h i s Court. I t h a s l o n g been h e l d by t h i s C o u r t t h a t

". . . t h e r e must be a f i n a l judgment from which a n a p p e a l

may be t a k e n b e f o r e w e a r e v e s t e d w i t h j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make

a determination." S t a t e v. C i t y of Helena ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 139 Mont.

343, 350, 363 P.2d 720, 723; Rule l ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P.

I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e i s s u e of maintenance a r r e a r a g e s

was p r e s e n t e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t by t h e p l a i n t i f f . In t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t s e t f o r t h by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , t h e

f o l l o w i n g f i n d i n g was made:

"4. T h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was o r d e r e d t o pay t h e sum of $400.00 a month a s and f o r maintenance of t h e p l a i n t i f f commencing t h e 1st day of O c t o b e r , 1974. T h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t made a l l of s a i d payments a s r e q u i r e d and made a l l t h e payments t h r o u g h 1978 and i n f a c t o v e r p a i d t h e p l a i n t i f f a s follows: T h a t f o r t h e y e a r 1979 t h e d e f e n d a n t p a i d t h e sum of $1,400.00 b e f o r e becoming ill. T h a t t h r o u g h t h e y e a r s , 1974 t h r o u g h 1978, t h e d e f e n d a n t had o v e r p a i d alimony i n t h e amount of $4,153.00."

N c o n c l u s i o n of l a w i s e v e r drawn from t h i s s p e c i f i c o

finding. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o n l y c o n c l u s i o n of law r e g a r d i n g

maintenance on t h e p a r t of t h e d e f e n d a n t i s e n t i r e l y p r o s p e c t i v e .

The c o n c l u s i o n r e a d s :

"4. T h a t t h e r e a r e m a t e r i a l changes i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a b i l i t y t o pay and -- d e f e n d a n t s h a l l no l o n g e r be t h a t the r e q u i r e d - - h e maintenance - t-e p l a i n t i f f . t o pay t - to h " (Emphasis a d d e d . )

From t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e n d e r e d t h e

f o l l o w i n g o r d e r r e g a r d i n g maintenance:

" I T I S HEREBY ORDERED t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s no l o n g e r r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e maintenance of t h e p l a i n t i f f herein." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

It i s apparent from t h i s o r d e r t h a t t h e maintenance

spoken t o i s f u t u r e maintenance, n o t p a s t maintenance.

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t made no c o n c l u s i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o

a c c r u e d maintenance under t h e d e c r e e . No f i n a l judgment h a s

been r e n d e r e d . Such a d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y b e f o r e

t h i s C o u r t i s empowered t o review. As a result, this issue

must be remanded f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s and f i n a l a d j u d i -

cation.

The second i s s u e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l s t e m s from t h e

D i s t r i c t Court order t h a t ". . . t h e d e f e n d a n t i s no l o n g e r

r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e maintenance of t h e p l a i n t i f f . . ." T h i s o r d e r was based on t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n of

law t h a t ". . . m a t e r i a l changes i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e defendant's ability to pay [maintenance] . . ." existed.

This order and conclusion resulted from the District Court's following findings of fact:

"5. That the defendant became seriously ill and was hospitalized on April 12, 1979 resulting in the amputation of his leg on June 6, 1979 and continued to be disabled and out of work until January of 1980 when he returned to work part- time and full-time work in March of 1980. "6. That there are material changes in circum- stances in that the defendant testified that his income had drastically diminished. That the net income of the defendant in 1977 was $29,681.38 and in 1978 was $20,694.48 and the net income of 1979 was $15,509.80. That the net income for the defendant for the first five months of 1980 was $7,053.06. "7. That in addition thereto the defendant testified and produced evidence that his take home salary is $880.00 per month and that the defendant's living expenses are approximately $2,000.00 per month. That in addition thereto the defendant is indebted to the Internal Revenue Service in the amount of approximately $6,000.00 and the Department of Revenue in the amount of approximately $800.00 for back taxes. "8. That at the time of the divorce the plaintiff was unemployed. That since that time she has completed beautician school and is employed as a full-time beautician in Anaconda, Montana. "9. That the court finds that there are material changes in circumstances since the entrance of its decree on the 6th day of September, 1973." Modification of maintenance payments, pertinent to this case, is governed by section 40-4-208 (2)(b) (i), MCA, which provides : "(b) Whenever the decree proposed for modification contains provisions relating to maintenance . .. modification . .. may only be made:

"(i) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable . . ." In light of the findings of fact made by the District Court, it is apparent that the District Court's decision stemmed primarily from the defendant's decrease in income as a result of his medical problems and the plaintiff's full-time employment as a beautician. However, evidence adduced at the hearings only established the defendant's income from 1977 through May 1980. No evidence was presented regarding the defendant's financial position at the time of divorce decree in September 1973. Thus, although a substantial change is apparent in the

defendant's financial position between 1977 and 1980, we are not able to determine the original financial position of the defendant in 1973. Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether the defendant's ability to pay has substantially changed from the time of dissolution to the time of petition for modification. This same evidentiary deficiency exists for the plaintiff.

She testified that at the time of the divorce decree, she was working part-time as a clerk. No evidence was adduced

regarding her income from such employment. She testified

that following her graduation from beauty school she obtained employment at a beauty salon in Anaconda, and her average monthly salary was $350 to $400. From this evidence, it is impossible to determine whether her degree from the beautician school has substantially changed her ability to earn income. From this evidence, the District Court found that

". . . there are material changes in circumstances since the

entrance of its decree on the 6th day of September, 1973." No evidence depicts the situation of the parties as of September 6, 1973. With regard to modifications under section 48-4-208, MCA, the commission comment states that: ". . . the person seeking modification must show that circumstances have changed since -- the date of - original order so that the order is - the unconscionable at the time the motion is made and will continue to be unconscionable unless modified." (Emphasis added.) Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, S316. N such showing of changed c i r c u m s t a n c e s from t h e d a t e of o

o r i g i n a l d e c r e e h a s been made. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e changed

c i r c u m s t a n c e s must c o n t i n u e . Evidence p r e s e n t e d a t t h e

h e a r i n g by t h e d e f e n d a n t e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t he had w e a t h e r e d

some s e r i o u s m e d i c a l problems and w a s c u r r e n t l y back t o h i s

o f f i c i a l c o u r t r e p o r t i n g job p l u s a d d i t i o n a l p r i v a t e work.

A s noted previously, t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u r t r e p o r t e r employment

e a r n e d him income of $18,000 p e r y e a r . H i s o u t s i d e work

c o u l d o n l y i n c r e a s e t h a t amount. From t h e e v i d e n c e , i t i s

c l e a r t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e improving from

t h e low p o i n t e n c o u n t e r e d i n 1979.

The s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w a p p l i e d by t h i s C o u r t i s whether

t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t , Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P. I n l i g h t of t h e r e c o r d

p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s m a t t e r , such s u p p o r t i s l a c k i n g . Therefore,

t h e o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t must be r e v e r s e d and t h e

c a s e remanded f o r p r o c e e d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n .

Justice ' L