Nylonge Corp. v. United States

184 F. Supp. 185
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Nylonge Corp. v. United States. Read the opinion of the Court — 42 Cust. Ct. 306
United States Customs Court·Decided December 28, 1960·No. C.D. 2144; Protest No. 58/19280·Published

Opinion

OLIVER, Chief Judge.

These protests were filed pursuant to the provisions of section 516(b), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516(b), which grants to American manufacturers, producers, or wholesalers the privilege of challenging by protest the classification of, and the rate of duty imposed upon, imported merchandise of a class or kind “manufactured, produced, or sold at wholesale by him.” The merchandise in question was classified under the provision for compounds of cellulose, in blocks, sheets, or other forms, not made into finished or partly finished articles, in paragraph 31(b) (1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1001, par. 31(b) (1), as modified by T.D. 52739, supplemented by T.D. 52763, which, so far as pertinent, reads as follows:

Plaintiff, the Nylonge Corporation, coneededly an American manufacturer or producer of merchandise of the same class or kind as the imported commodity compounds of cellulose, made into fin-involved herein, claims that the proper [187]*187classification for this merchandise is as ished or partly finished sponges, under paragraph 31(b) (2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by T.D. 54108, which, so far as pertinent, reads as follows;

Counsel for the party in interest has moved for dismissal of these protests on the ground that none of them “is appropriate to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.” Two reasons are given for the motion to dismiss. One of them was presented at the pretrial conference when the party in interest moved to dismiss the protests because all of the entries covered thereby were liquidated on the same day and there was no showing which of them is “the first of such entries,” following the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury rejecting plaintiff’s complaint (93 Treas.Dec. 70, T.D. 54537). The basis for this contention is the requirement in section 516(b), as amended, which provides that “The Secretary shall direct the collector at such port to notify such complainant immediately when the first of such entries is liquidated.” In the brief of the party in interest, counsel presents the same line of argument that was offered at the time of the original motion. (R. 3.) To support this phase of the motion to dismiss, the party in interest has cited the cases of The Cronite Co., Inc. v. United States (W. E. Sellers, etc., Party In Interest), 38 Cust. Ct. 76, C.D.1847, affirmed in W. E. Sellers (Party in Interest, Doing Business as John Sellers & Sons) v. The Cronite Co., Inc., 45 CCPA 27, C.A.D. 668 (cross-appeal); Reed & Barton et al. v. United States, 63 Treas.Dec. 941, T.D. 46422; Lichtenstein v. United States, 1 Ct.Cust. App. 79, T.D. 31105; and United States v. E. H. Bailey & Co., 32 CCPA 89, C.A.D. 291. All of those cases are readily distinguishable from the present situation as the following outline of each discloses.

In The Cronite Co., Inc., case, it was held that, where liquidations were made [188]*188on two separate days, only the protest filed in time against the first liquidation could be heard, and that a second protest filed against a second, or later liquidation, is not authorized by the statute. This is not the condition before us. Here, all four liquidations were made on the same day, and, in an affidavit executed by an employee of the liquidation division in the office of the collector of customs at the port of New York, the affiant testified that “since all four of these entries were liquidated at the same time it is impossible to state whether any of these four entries was liquidated before the other three.”

In the Reed & Barton et al. case, there was a positive showing that plaintiffs did not protest the first liquidation of which they were notified. In the present case, plaintiff has complied with that condition precedent to the valid protests now before us.

The Lichtenstein and E. H. Bailey & Co. cases involved the sufficiency of protests, emphasizing particularly the requirement that the plaintiff shall state his claim “with such reasonable clearness and certainty as to acquaint the collector with the real ground of his complaint,” the Lichtenstein case, supra. No such question is involved herein.

Since there is nothing before us now, which was not considered previously in connection with this phase of the motion to dismiss, hereinabove discussed, we have no reason for changing our earlier action, denying the motion (Order of March 12, 1959).

The second reason for dismissal advanced by the party in interest is that the merchandise covered by the protests before the court fails to comply, in important respects, with the description of the imported product to which plaintiff directed its complaint in proceeding under section 516(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. The contention is without merit. While the statute, section 516(b), as amended, requires the American manufacturer or producer, in his protest, to set forth “a description of the merchandise, the classification, and rate or rates of duty he believes proper,” it cannot be concluded therefrom that the protest filed with this court shall refer specifically, and in every detail, to the description of the merchandise set forth in the complaint filed with the Secretary of the Treasury. The protests before us describe the merchandise as follows:

“The merchandise as to which this complaint is directed consists of cellulose sponges of foreign manufacture imported in block form, sheet form or in compressed sheets, and having the same chemical origin and basically the same composition as apply to the complainant’s product.”

Whatever variance there may be between the identification of the merchandise in these protests and the description given in the complaint to the Secretary of the Treasury, it did not mislead or affect the conduct or the procedure followed by the party in interest in the course of the trial, where it was stipulated between the parties that the commodity in question is a compound of cellulose and that the sole question for determination is whether the imported merchandise is made into finished or partly finished articles, i. e., sponges. That the party in interest was fully apprised of this specific issue, is reflected not only through the evidence it introduced, but also from the cross-examination of plaintiff’s witnesses by counsel. The motion to dismiss is overruled in all respects. The record shows that plaintiff complied with all the requirements necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of this court by valid protest, pursuant to the provisions of section 516(b), as amended.

As to the merits, there is no dispute concerning the processes that were followed in producing the imported merchandise. The basic materials consist of two caustic solutions of different concentrations, a soduim sulfate solution, and wood pulp sheets. One of the caustic solutions is used to mercerize the wood pulp sheets to form alkalicellulose that is pressed into a desired cellulose caustic [189]*189ratio. The alkalieellulose is processed through a shredder to give crumbs of greater surface. The crumbs of alkali-cellulose are treated with carbon bisulfide in a churn to form sodium cellulose xan-thate. With the use of the second caustic solution, the xanthate is dissolved into viscose. The sodium sulfate solution is used to acquire Glauber’s salt crystals. It is crystallized in tanks, and, after cooling, the crystals are crushed and sifted, and the metallic particles are removed by magnets. The reinforcing fibers are cut to proper length and treated so they may be dispersed into the viscose without forming harmful lumps.

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Nylonge Corp. v. United States, 184 F. Supp. 185 (cusc 1960).

184 F. Supp. 185 (Nylonge Corp. v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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