Nyerere Howell v. Department of Veterans Affairs
Opinion
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
NYERERE HOWELL, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0752-24-0775-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: May 26, 2026 AFFAIRS, Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Raymond Mitchell , Columbia, South Carolina, for the appellant.
Tsopei Robinson , Esquire, West Palm Beach, Florida, for the agency.
BEFORE
Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff, II, Member
FINAL ORDER
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained the agency’s chapter 75 removal action. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s conclusion that the agency proved its charge of sexual harassment. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. We have considered all of the appellant’s assertions in this regard but find them unpersuasive. For example, the appellant makes several allegations regarding witnesses who testified against him, and he avers that these witnesses were not credible; however, we find that the appellant’s unsupported assertions do not provide a basis to disturb the administrative judge’s explained findings, which were based, in part, on credibility determinations. Id. at 5-7; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 24, Initial Decision (ID) at 3-10; see Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that the Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing); see also Tines v. Department of the Air Force , 56 M.S.P.R. 90, 92 (1992) (stating that a petition for review must contain sufficient specificity to enable the Board to ascertain whether there is a serious evidentiary challenge).
The appellant asserts that he worked for the agency for over 20 years and had no prior conduct issues. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. To the extent he is arguing that the penalty of removal was unreasonable under the circumstances, we find his argument unpersuasive. Id. Here, the administrative judge applied the proper
legal standard and reasonably concluded that the agency’s selected penalty of removal was not unwarranted under the circumstances and was within the tolerable bounds of reasonableness. ID at 12-13; see Payne v. U.S. Postal Service, 72 M.S.P.R. 646, 650 (1996) (explaining that when the agency’s charge is sustained but not all of the underlying specifications are sustained, the agency’s penalty is entitled to deference and should only be reviewed to determine whether it is within the parameters of reasonableness). Thus, we discern no basis to disturb the initial decision. 2 The appellant argues that both the proposing official and the deciding official engaged in sexual harassment and/or misconduct but were not disciplined. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. He avers that the deciding official was charged with sexual harassment twice but was not disciplined. Id. at 6. These unsupported assertions, however, do not warrant a different outcome. See Tines, 56 M.S.P.R. at 92. The appellant more specifically alleges that, at the hearing, he attempted to ask the deciding official “if he was ever charged” with sexual misconduct, but the administrative judge “refused to want to hear his answer.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. The hearing recording reflects that the administrative judge implicitly sustained an objection based on relevance after the appellant’s representative asked the deciding official if he had ever been accused of, not charged with, sexual harassment. IAF, Tab 21-1, Hearing Recording (testimony of the deciding official). The appellant’s representative thereafter asked the deciding official if he had “ever been proposed allegations [sic] of sexual harassment.” to which the deciding official responded, “The answer is no.” Id. The appellant’s
2 To the extent that the appellant asserts that the agency improperly relied on a prior 14-day suspension that was later reversed, we are unpersuaded. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. Indeed, the appellant does not provide a basis to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that he presented no evidence to support his claim that his prior suspensions had been rescinded. ID at 13; see Tines, 56 M.S.P.R. at 92; see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a)(2). In any event, even assuming that the appellant had no prior discipline, we nonetheless find the penalty of removal appropriate for the sustained misconduct. See Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981).
representative thereafter changed the line of questioning. Id. Thus, the appellant’s assertions regarding the hearing testimony are inaccurate. In any event, the appellant did not object to the administrative judge’s rulings in this regard. See Whitehurst v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 43 M.S.P.R. 486, 491 (1990) (explaining that a party is obligated to preserve for review its objections and cannot wait until after the adjudication is complete to object for the first time to an administrative judge’s hearing-related rulings). Thus, a different outcome is not warranted.
The appellant avers that the agency retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity and/or for his union activities. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. We decline to consider these claims. Here, the administrative judge issued an order indicating that the sole affirmative defense raised by the appellant was harmful procedural error. IAF, Tab 8 at 1. The administrative judge explained that, to the extent the appellant sought to raise any additional affirmative defenses, he must identify such claims with specificity in response to the order. Id. at 1 n.1. The appellant’s response did not discernably identify any additional affirmative defenses. IAF, Tab 11. Thereafter, the administrative judge issued an order summarizing the parties’ prehearing conference again indicating that the only affirmative defense at issue was harmful procedural error. IAF, Tab 18 at 1. The appellant did not object to this order despite being provided an opportunity to do so. Id. at 3. Accordingly, to the extent that the appellant attempts or has attempted to raise any additional affirmative defenses in this matter, we decline to consider the same. See Thurman v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 21, ¶¶ 17-18 (setting forth a list of nonexhaustive factors for consideration in determining whether an appellant will be deemed to have waived an affirmative defense).
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