Nych v. Pressed Steel Car Co.

158 A. 281, 103 Pa. Super. 325, 1931 Pa. Super. LEXIS 68
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 29, 1931
DocketAppeal 128
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 158 A. 281 (Nych v. Pressed Steel Car Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nych v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 158 A. 281, 103 Pa. Super. 325, 1931 Pa. Super. LEXIS 68 (Pa. Ct. App. 1931).

Opinion

Opinion by

Cunningham, J.,

This appeal is by the non-resident, dependent widow of Andy Nych from an order of the court below dismissing her exceptions to a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Board affirming the referee’s disallowance of compensation for the death of her husband on December 25, 1928. Compensation was claimed in her behalf upon the theory that her husband died as the result of an accident which occurred in the course of his admitted employment with the Pressed Steel Car Company, one of the appellees. The case turned largely upon the testimony of medical experts: they all agreed that Andy Nych died of pneumonia; the controversy was .over its cause. Claimant asserted it was caused by an accidental injury received in the course of his employment and there was testimony that during the late afternoon of October 29, 1928, he reported to his employer’s representative he had hurt his back while handling a casting; the employer contended that whatever injury he may have then received had nothing to do with his death. The referee, after several hearings, disallowed compensation and the board affirmed his findings of fact and conclusions of *327 law; the action of the court below was, in effect, the entering of a judgment in favor of the employer.

Our inquiry, therefore, is whether there was evidence competent in law to support the findings of the compensation authorities and, if so, whether the law has been properly applied thereto: Puza v. P. & R. C. & I. Co., 98 Pa. Superior Ct. 139, 142, and cases there cited.

There was evidence, practically undisputed, that for about six years Nych had been employed under the superintendence of Chillcott, a foreman of. the employer. On October 29, 1928, he was engaged in grinding castings varying in weight froni fifty to a thousand pounds; they were brought to his place of employment by an overhead crane and piled up near the grinders and then by means of an electric hoist, operated by Nych, placed upon a grinder. Sometimes it was necessary to turn them on the floor of the shop; the particular casting upon which decedent was working at the time of the alleged injury weighed two hundred pounds. When he came to Chillcott he was holding the lower part of his back and said he had “hurt his side or back.” In accordance with the prevailing practice, a report was filled out and the employe sent to the employer’s emergency hospital. Dr. Wakefield, the physician employed by the company, testified decedent complained of soreness in the muscles of his back and of a cough; that he made a. thorough examination but found no marks of an injury a'nd that his diagnosis then was “occupational muscle soreness of the back and bronchitis.” Between October 29th and November 22nd decedent walked almost daily from his home to the emergency hospital where Dr. Wakefield baked and strapped his back. On the latter date the doctor told him he was able to go to work, but decedent did not resume his employment and on December 6th Dr. Wakefield, when called to see him at his home, found him in bed and complaining “of pains all over his head, *328 chest and back and limbs. ’ ’ An analysis of nrine disclosed “pus cells and a trace of albumen;” he “was acutely ill, delirious,” and was sent to a Pittsburgh hospital December 15th under a diagnosis of pneumonia. Dr. Berg, of the hospital staff, testified Nyeh was then developing a “terminal pneumonia” caused by “kidney infection,” which had been aggravated by his intemperate habits. Beferring to the cause of his death, which occurred ten days later, Dr. Berg said, “This man’s death was the direct result of a lung infection, secondary to a kidney infection.” A post mortem disclosed an ununited fracture of two ribs and an incomplete fracture and softening of the fifth dorsal vertebra. As to these fractures, Dr. Berg testified: “We found two ribs had been fractured and from the appearance of those ribs my opinion is that the fracture had not existed longer than one month. The soft condition which was,found in the vertebra was a beginning of a sarcoma of the 5th dorsal vertebra. There is no way I can line up the beginning of this sarcoma with the history of an accident such as I have heard here today and from the history I have received from this man’s friends and whoever came to visit him.” The controlling finding of fact of the referee reads: “We think the testimony warrants a further finding that the deceased died of pneumonia but we are unable to find from the testimony that there was any causal connection between the pneumonia and the other pathological conditions found and the alleged accident of October 29, 1928.” His conclusion of law was that the claim must be disallowed because claimant “failed to establish by competent and convincing proof any causal connection between the death of the deceased ......and the alleged accident.” The hospital records were admitted, without objection, at one of the earlier hearings, and as they contain a notation in the history of the case that the patient “was struck on back *329 by casting being carried along by an overhead crane,” it is urged on behalf of claimant that there was evidence that decedent received an injury, which would account for the broken ribs and the condition of the spine. The foreman, familiar with the work performed by decedent, testified that the only way in which he could have been struck by a casting would have been through the disarrangement of some part of the machinery and that nothing of that nature occurred. Dr. Wakefield expressed the positive opinion that decedent’s ribs were not fractured prior to November 22nd and stated that up to that time he had ’not complained of any pain in the region of the ribs or vertebra, shown by the post mortem to have been fractured. He added: “If that man had any broken ribs at the time I saw him I certainly would be able to tell it, or a’ny recent injury that would cause broken ribs or broken vertebra. The man couldn’t come to the hospital with broken vertebra and broken ribs. He would have to be carried up.” Further testimony of this witness was to the effect that he had treated decedent for muscular soreness of the back upon a previous occasion and that so far as a’ny strain or bronchitis was concerned he could have returned to work on November 22nd; but he could not say he did not have broken ribs or an injured back when he sent him to the hospital on December 15th. No details of decedent’s experiences between November 22nd and December 15th appear in the testimony; members of his family merely stated that he continued to complain of his back, was unable to work and during the latter part of that period was confined to bed.

Claimant, on the other, hand, called Dr. Landon who had never seen decedent but, after a study of the hospital records, expressed* in answer to hypothetical questions* the opinion “that the immediate cause of this man’s death was pneumonia* that this pneumonia *330 was in the nature of a terminal infection and that the primary cause of his death was the conditions found in his spine and in his ribs, ’ ’ and stated that it was his professional opinion that death “was caused by the injury to his ribs and spine.” Dr. Landon said he assumed decedent had been struck in the region of the fractured ribs and vertebra and based this assumption upon the history found in the hospital records.

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Bluebook (online)
158 A. 281, 103 Pa. Super. 325, 1931 Pa. Super. LEXIS 68, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nych-v-pressed-steel-car-co-pasuperct-1931.