Nwosu v. American Express Company

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 25, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-1852
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ADAEZE NWOSU,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-01852 (CJN)

AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Proceeding pro se, Adaeze Nwosu sued six defendants on tort and contract claims flowing

from her underlying allegation that she was defrauded by her credit card provider. See generally

ECF No. 1 (Compl.). For the reasons below, the Court will dismiss Nwosu’s claims as to all

defendants. 1

I. Claims Against American Express

Nwosu first alleges that American Express National Bank 2 and American Express Travel

Related Services, Inc. (collectively, “American Express”) committed fraud by failing to set a credit

limit on her American Express Platinum Card, declining to authorize payments by installment,

depriving her of certain advertised benefits, and refusing to refund “frivolous” merchant charges.

1 After this case was removed to federal court, Nwosu purported to file an “interlocutory appeal” challenging the removal. See ECF No. 5. Because no final and appealable order then existed, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the appeal did not divest this Court of jurisdiction. Cf. Bombardier Corp. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2002 WL 31818924, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (only a non-frivolous appeal divests a district court of jurisdiction). 2 Nwosu erroneously sued American Express National Bank as “American Express Company.” See Compl.; ECF No. 10 (AmEx Mot.) at 1. 1 See Compl. ¶¶ 5.7–5.12. But Nwosu’s claims are word-for-word identical to ones she previously

asserted against American Express in Nwosu v. American Express Company et al., Civ. A. No. 24-

00615, an earlier case before this court. See ECF No. 11 (McClure Decl.) Ex. D (comparing the

complaints in the two actions). And “a plaintiff has no right to maintain two separate actions

involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same

defendant.” Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Court will therefore

dismiss Nwosu’s claims against American Express here as duplicative of those brought in Civ. A.

No. 24-00615. 3 See Clayton v. District of Columbia, 36 F.Supp.3d 91, 94 (D.D.C.2014)

(explaining that district courts have discretion to “dismiss a duplicative and later-filed action”);

see also Bowe-Connor v. McDonald, 2015 WL 807537, at *1 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Th[e] bar against

duplicative pleadings applies to all plaintiffs, whether they are represented by counsel or

proceeding pro se.”).

II. Claims Against District of Columbia Judges

Nwosu next claims that two judges of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Judge

Ross and Judge Lee, engaged in gross negligence by dismissing and transferring suits Nwosu

brought in that court over American Express’s alleged fraud. See Compl. ¶ 5.13.8. Specifically,

Nwosu asserts that Judge Ross acted with “reckless disregard for the law” by “deciding jurisdiction

based on the location of the plaintiff” and thereby dismissing her case. Id. And Nwosu asserts

that Judge Lee denied her right to due process by removing her case to federal court before she

filed an opposition and then denying her subsequent motion for reconsideration. Id. For these

3 American Express moved to compel Nwosu’s claims in that case to arbitration, and the court granted the motion. See Nwosu v. American Express Company et al., Civ. A. No. 24-00615, ECF No. 29. The case is currently stayed pending the completion of the arbitration. See id. 2 purported harms, Nwosu seeks compensatory and punitive damages “in excess of” one hundred

million dollars. Id. ¶ 6F.

A “district court may sua sponte dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) without notice

where it is patently obvious that the plaintiff cannot possibly prevail based on the facts alleged in

the complaint.” Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal

quotation marks omitted). That is the case here. Judges Ross and Lee “enjoy absolute judicial

immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in a [] judicial capacity,” unless those

actions were “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459,

1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Nwosu makes no claim that Judge Ross or Judge Lee lacked

jurisdiction over her D.C. Superior Court claims; by contrast, she faults the judges for failing to

adjudicate them. See Compl ¶ 5.13.8; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 n.7. And

the acts about which Nwosu complains—dismissal of her case, removal of her case, and denial of

a motion—are plainly judicial functions. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991) (per curiam).

The doctrine of judicial immunity thus poses a complete bar to Nwosu’s claims against Judge Ross

and Judge Lee.

III. Claims Against Federal Judges

Finally, Nwosu claims that two judges of this court, Judge Reyes and Judge Berman

Jackson, committed fraud in relation to two other suits that Nwosu brought here. See Compl. ¶¶

5.13.1–5.13.7, 5.13.9. Nwosu alleges that Judge Reyes engaged in “unlawful nepotism” and

“retaliation” by dismissing Nwosu v. Friedrich, Civ. A. No. 24-0878, a suit against a third judge

of this court who dismissed Nwosu’s claims against American Express. See Compl. ¶¶ 5.13.1–

5.13.7. Nwosu also alleges that Judge Reyes erred in reassigning a motion to amend filed in Nwosu

v. American Express Company et al., Civ. A. No. 24-00615 that sought to add her defendant in

3 that case, and that Judge Berman Jackson erred in accepting the random reassignment. See Compl.

¶ 5.13.9. For these alleged harms, too, Nwosu seeks relief in the form of compensatory and

punitive damages. See id. ¶ 6B–G.

Nwosu’s claims against Judges Reyes and Berman Jackson are also absolutely barred by

judicial immunity. See Sindram, 986 F.2d at 1460. Again, all of Nwosu’s allegations involve

plainly judicial functions, such as dismissing her case, recusing from her case, and ruling on her

motion to amend the complaint. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. And while Nwosu argues that Judge

Berman Jackson had “no jurisdictional capacity to review the [] amended complaint” given her

senior status, Compl. ¶ 5.13.9, the authority of senior judges to preside over regular federal cases

is expressly provided by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 371 (b)(1); cf. United States v. Am.-Foreign S. S.

Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 688–89 (1960) (holding that, for purposes of en banc review, “active circuit

judges” does not include retired circuit judges).

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that American Express’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10, is GRANTED;

ORDERED that the Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 13, is GRANTED;

and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No.1, and this case are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

This is a final and appealable Order.

SO ORDERED.

November 25, 2024 ________________________ CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge