Nunn v. UMC-CCDC District of Nevada

Opinion

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TYRONE NOEL NUNN, Case No. 3:23-cv-00466-MMD-CSD

Plaintiff, ORDER v. UMC-CCDC DISTRICT OF NEVADA, et al.,

Defendants. Plaintiff Tyrone Noel Nunn initiated this case without filing a complaint, filing an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), or paying the $402 filing fee. On February 20, 2024, this Court ordered Nunn to file a complete complaint and either file an application to proceed IFP or pay the $402 filing fee in full by March 18, 2024. (ECF No. 8.) That deadline passed, and Nunn has not filed a complaint, filed an IFP application, paid the $402 filing fee, requested an extension, or otherwise responded to the Court’s February 20, 2024, order. District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Nunn’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor, the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Nunn files a complaint and either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays the $402 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter another order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The 1 circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Nunn needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. In sum, having thoroughly considered the dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal. Il. CONCLUSION It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Nunn’s failure to file a complaint and failure to file either a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee in compliance with the Court’s February 20, 2024, order. The Clerk of Court is further directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Nunn wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. DATED THIS 10" Day of June 2025. ( | ) IRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE