Nunn v. Department of Corrections

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedFebruary 27, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-01877
StatusUnknown

This text of Nunn v. Department of Corrections (Nunn v. Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nunn v. Department of Corrections, (D. Nev. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * * 7 8 TYRONE NOEL NUNN, Case No. 2:24-cv-01877-RFB-DJA

9 Plaintiff, ORDER

10 v.

11 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

12 Defendants. 13 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 Plaintiff Tyrone Nunn brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress 16 constitutional violations that he allegedly suffered while incarcerated at Ely State Prison. ECF 17 No. 1-1. On November 25, 2024, this Court ordered Nunn to either pay the full $405 filing fee or 18 file a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis by December 26, 2024. ECF No. 5. But 19 that deadline expired without payment of the filing fee, a complete in forma pauperis application, 20 or other response from Nunn. 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 23 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 24 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may 25 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 26 Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 27 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal 28 Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In 1 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 2 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 3 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on 4 their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 5 Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 7 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Nunn’s claims. The third 8 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 9 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 10 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 11 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 12 the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 14 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 15 v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 16 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 17 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every 18 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and 19 meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because 20 this Court cannot operate without collecting reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without 21 Nunn’s compliance with the Court’s orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting 22 another deadline. But repeating an ignored order often only delays the inevitable and further 23 squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will 24 be an exception. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 25 circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 26 III. CONCLUSION 27 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 28 favor of dismissal. 1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 2 Nunn’s failure to address the matter of the filing fee in compliance with this Court’s November 3 25, 2024, Order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may move to reopen this case and vacate the 5 judgment by filing a motion for reconsideration of this Order. In this motion, the Plaintiff is 6 required to explain what circumstances delayed him from paying the filing fee or filing the 7 application to proceed in forma pauperis and a complaint in compliance with LSR 2-1. If the Court 8 finds there to be good cause or a reasonable explanation therein, the Court will reopen the case 9 and vacate the judgment. 10 11 DATED: February 27, 2025 12 __________________________________ 13 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Patricia Scott Anderson v. Air West, Incorporated
542 F.2d 522 (Ninth Circuit, 1976)
Gregory Carey v. John E. King
856 F.2d 1439 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)
Henderson v. Duncan
779 F.2d 1421 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Nunn v. Department of Corrections, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nunn-v-department-of-corrections-nvd-2025.