Nunamaker v. Board of Zoning Appeals
This text of 443 N.E.2d 172 (Nunamaker v. Board of Zoning Appeals) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
R.C. 519.14(C) authorizes township boards of zoning appeals to “[gjrant conditional zoning certificates for the use of land, buildings, or other structures if such certificates for specific uses are provided for in the zoning resolutions.” Pursuant to this grant of authority, the zoning resolution for Jerusalem Township, Reno Section, Lucas County, permits the granting by appellant of “[ejxceptions”1 for a variety of uses including [117]*117“[y]acht clubs and public or private facilities for renting, docking, storage, and servicing of pleasure boats.”2 The zoning resolution is, however, as noted by the court of appeals, “inartfully drawn,” and the question presented in this cause is whether an exception for a marina is allowable pursuant to the resolution.
Both Sections l-B-5 and 10-A-2 (as conformed to ll-B-2) of the resolution refer to a showing of “practical difficulties” or “unnecessary [or “undue”] [118]*118hardships” as criteria for the granting of an exception.3 These provisions confuse variance and exception concepts:
“A variance authorizes a land owner to establish or maintain a use which is prohibited by the zoning regulations. Thus, a variance results in a deviation from the literal import of the ordinance or resolution and may be granted only upon a showing of practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship.
“A special permit, which is evidenced by a conditional zoning certificate, authorizes a use which is permitted by zoning regulations, subject to the issuance of such a permit or conditional certificate. Thus, the special permit results in the establishment or maintenance of a use in the location and under the circumstances mandated by the zoning ordinance or resolution, and such permit may be granted upon whatever terms are imposed by the zoning ordinance or resolution.” Boston v. Montville Twp. Zoning Bd. of Appeals (1972), 32 Ohio Misc. 118, 120-121 [61 O.O.2d 184].
Considerations of practical difficulties and unnecessary hardships are not, therefore, commonly relevant to the granting of an exception. Rather, the authority of appellant to grant exceptions as permitted pursuant to R.C. 519.14 is limited by standards sufficient to contain the discretion of the board of zoning appeals. 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning (2d Ed.) 371, Section 19.09; 6 Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls 44-37, Section 44.03; and 3 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning (4 Ed.) 41-35, Section 41.09. In the instant case, the discretion of appellant to grant exceptions for “[yjacht clubs and public or private facilities for renting, docking, storage, and servicing of [119]*119pleasure boats” is so severely constrained by Section ll-B-3(h), that appellant’s function is reduced to one of determining whether Fleitz’s proposed use comports with the definition of the terms used in the section. As such, the zoning resolution cannot be said to permit such discretion in appellant so as to permit it to grant exceptions in an arbitrary manner, and is, therefore, not an improper grant of legislative power.4
We find that the decision of appellant to grant an exception for Fleitz’s proposed use is supported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence and is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
443 N.E.2d 172, 2 Ohio St. 3d 115, 2 Ohio B. 664, 1982 Ohio LEXIS 772, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nunamaker-v-board-of-zoning-appeals-ohio-1982.