Numrich v. Gleason

700 F. Supp. 512, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12817, 1988 WL 123758
District Court, D. Oregon·Decided June 10, 1988·No. Civ. No. 88-140-MA·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

OPINION

MARSH, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, current and former minority public shareholders of American Network, Inc., (AmNet) bring this action alleging securities law violations, Rackeeteering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act violations (RICO) (18 U.S.C. § 1962), and state common law claims. Plaintiffs contend that since the investment of Pacific Telecom, Inc. (PTI) in AmNet in 1984, PTI and defendant Gleason, have directed and controlled AmNet for the benefit of PTI.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action was originally filed in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington in December, 1987. On January 13, 1988, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, restraining and ordering [513]*513defendants to (1) obtain an independent opinion as to the fairness of the proposed sale of AmNet to ITT; (2) correct AmNet’s financial statements; and (3) adequately disclose all litigation in any proxy statement seeking approval of any sale of Am-Net stock or assets.

On January 25, 1988, defendants responded to plaintiffs’ motion by filing a motion for a Rule 16 conference. Defendants contended that at such a conference, it would be established that a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction would be “wasteful pretrial activity” for the reasons that (1) plaintiffs can show no irreparable harm; and (2) plaintiffs complaint seeks injunctive relief only in their sixth claim for relief which fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

On February 2, 1988, this action was transferred to U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. On February 8, 1988, plaintiffs filed a supplemental motion for preliminary injunction seeking an order rescinding indemnification of AmNet and PTI officers and directors. On April 1, 1988, defendants’ motions for a Rule 16 conference were denied. Thereafter, defendants filed several motions for preliminary resolution of legal issues which are currently pending.

On May 24, 1988, plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order “temporarily restraining Defendants from holding the AmNet shareholders meeting scheduled for Wednesday, May 25, 1988.” The shareholders meeting was scheduled to consider and vote upon a proposal to approve and adopt an agreement and plan of exchange between United States Transmission Systems, Inc. (USTS), a subsidiary of ITT Corporation, and AmNet. At the oral argument of the TRO motion, plaintiffs argued that the potential irreparable harm which would incurr if the shareholders approved the plan of exchange was (1) the loss of dissenter rights; (2) loss of derivative claims in Guenther v. Pacific Telecom, Civ. No. 86-1650; (3) tax loss; (4) loss of shareholder ability to question the fairness of the proposed transaction; and (5) loss of the going concern value of AmNet. Plaintiffs also conceded that the approval of the plan of exchange would frustrate their motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order was denied from the bench.

On May 27, 1987, Defendants E.B. Galli-gan and AmNet filed a supplemental response to plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and supplemental memorandum regarding defendants’ motion for preliminary resolution of legal issues. Defendants noted in this memorandum that the special meeting of AmNet shareholders was held on May 25, 1988, and that a majority of the shareholders approved the agreement and plan of exchange between AmNet and USTS. Moreover, defendants noted that the Articles of Share Exchange were filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Oregon on that date.

It is defendants’ position that, pursuant to ORS 60.494(2), upon the filing of the Articles of Share Exchange, the share exchange took place. Accordingly, defendants contend that “because the exchange has taken place and the operations of Am-Net and USTS are already being consolidated, the relief sought in plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction cannot be granted.” Defendants conclude that plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is moot and, therefore, should be denied.

Plaintiffs argue that their motion for preliminary injunction is not moot and that “it is certaining within the Court’s power to immediately hold a hearing to prevent a consolidation of operations pending the fair valuation of the company.” Plaintiffs argue that if defendants are allowed to continue the consolidation, plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed in that they will be deprived of the opportunity to receive fair value for their AmNet shares.

STANDARDS

To obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must show either (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardship tipping in its favor. First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., [514]*514809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir.1987); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir.1985); Inglis & Sons Baking v. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 526 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir.1975). Although often discussed in the alternative, these tests represent the extremes on a single continuum. “The critical element is the relative hardship to the parties. If the balance of hardships tips decidedly toward the plaintiff, less likelihood of success on the merits is required.” Wilson v. Watt, 703 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir.1983).

Plaintiffs correctly point out that “the usual procedure for resolution of a motion for a preliminary injunction is fairly straightforward: the motion and supporting papers are filed; opposing papers are filed; a hearing is scheduled at which legal argument and evidence are presented; a decision is rendered and an injunction either does or does not issue.” Plaintiffs do not, however, contend that they have an absolute right to a hearing before this court may consider their motion.

Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 65, governing preliminary injunctions, is silent as to whether the moving party has a right to a hearing. Several courts, however, have denied in-junctive relief without a hearing when the motion shows the lack of a right to relief, rendering a hearing pointless. See e.g., SCM Corp. v. Zerox Corp., 507 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir.1974) (court did not err in refusing to conduct evidentiary hearing when plaintiff failed to make sufficient showing of irreparable harm); see also Int’l. Molders and Allied Workers v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547, 555 (9th Cir.1986) (Rule 65(a)(1) does not presume evidentiary hearing); 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2949 at 478 (1973).

DISCUSSION

Defendants have presented several issues which may affect the ability of plaintiffs to receive a preliminary injunction. First, defendants argue that the motion for preliminary injunction is moot.

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Numrich v. Gleason, 700 F. Supp. 512, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12817, 1988 WL 123758 (D. Or. 1988).

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