NumberAI Inc. v. John Doe

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: May 14, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-09636
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 7 8 NUMBERAI INC., Case No. 25-cv-09636-PHK

9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING NUMBERAI, INC.’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR 10 v. LEAVE TO SERVE THIRD-PARTY SUBPOENAS 11 JOHN DOE, Re: Dkt. 9 12 Defendant.

13 14 Now before the Court is Plaintiff NumberAI, Inc.’s (“NumberAI”) Ex Parte Application for 15 Leave to Serve Third-Party Subpoenas Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference. [Dkt. 9]. Because 16 Defendant John Doe, subscriber assigned IP address number 199.230.10.107, (“Defendant Doe”) 17 has not been identified or served with the Complaint yet, no opposition has been filed. Having 18 reviewed Number AI’s application and all supporting documents, the Court GRANTS the ex parte 19 application. 20 BACKGROUND 21 NumberAI alleges that it has developed a “highly effective and specialized” AI agent for use 22 by car dealerships to automate handling customer calls and inquiries, which Plaintiff classifies as a 23 company trade secret. See Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 2-7. NumberAI indicates it is a Delaware corporation with 24 its headquarters in Oakland, CA. Id. at ¶ 25. 25 Defendant Doe is accused of fraudulently obtaining a “secure, protected, and private” 26 demonstration of Plaintiff’s artificial intelligence (“AI”) agent referred to as “Numa.” Id. at ¶ 1. 27 NumberAI allegedly sells this AI agent to car dealerships throughout the country to “assist in 1 time-consuming, administrative tasks.” Id. at ¶ 3. NumberAI allegedly offers a “secure, private, 2 and live demonstration” of Numa to dealerships interested in testing or purchasing the Numa 3 Service. Id. at ¶ 5. To access this demonstration, a dealership representative must provide 4 NumberAI with verification that they are an employee of a car dealership. Id. 5 NumberAI alleges that Defendant Doe contacted NumberAI using an email address ending 6 in the domain name “@northsideautogreenville.com” that appeared associated with a real car 7 dealership, “Northside Auto Greenville,” in South Carolina. Id. at ¶ 9. Defendant also allegedly 8 provided NumberAI with a phone number, (864) 528-6080, which appeared to be associated with 9 “Northside Auto Greenville.” Id. at ¶ 10. 10 Defendant Doe, allegedly identifying himself to NumberAI as “Kevin Yan,” claimed to be 11 based in South Carolina as an “Operations” employee at the dealership. Id. at ¶ 11. NumberAI 12 alleges that, based on Defendant Doe’s claimed association with the car dealership, it provided 13 Defendant Doe with a secure demonstration of Numa “on or around August 21, 2024,” and gave 14 Defendant Doe “confidential contact information of other Numa Service customers to serve as 15 references.” Id. at ¶¶ 13-15. 16 When NumberAI subsequently attempted to contact Defendant Doe after providing access 17 to Numa, NumberAI found that the email and phone number provided by Defendant Doe had been 18 abandoned. Id. at ¶ 16. Upon contacting “Northside Auto Greenville” directly, the dealership 19 allegedly informed NumberAI that no one by the name “Kevin Yan” had ever worked there and 20 confirmed that the email and phone number that Defendant provided were not associated with that 21 dealership. Id. at ¶ 17. NumberAI alleges that, upon information and belief, Defendant Doe gained 22 unauthorized access to the dealership’s information technology systems to fabricate an email 23 address domain. Id. at ¶ 18. NumberAI further alleges that, upon information and belief, Defendant 24 Doe is an employee or agent of a NumberAI competitor and used the live demonstration to gather 25 “competitive intelligence and trade secrets associated with the Numa Service.” Id. at ¶ 19. 26 Defendant Doe was named in the Complaint solely in connection with a specific Internet 27 Protocol (“IP”) address and the abandoned phone number. Id. at ¶ 1. “An IP address is a ‘unique 1 United States v. Henderson, 906 F.3d 1109, 1111 n.1 (9th Cir. 2018). An IP address is not a physical 2 address but instead is a unique identifier for every computer or server connected to the Internet. 3 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008). As is well-known, consumers 4 and households connect their home computers and other devices to the Internet by subscribing to a 5 service through a vendor called an internet service provider (“ISP”), often a cable company, 6 telecommunications company, or other similar service provider. Nat’l Cable & 7 Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005) (“The traditional 8 means by which consumers in the United States access the network of interconnected computers 9 that make up the Internet is through ‘dial-up’ connections provided over local telephone facilities. 10 Using these connections, consumers access the Internet by making calls with computer modems 11 through the telephone wires owned by local phone companies. Internet service providers (ISPs), in 12 turn, link those calls to the Internet network, not only by providing a physical connection, but also 13 by offering consumers the ability to translate raw Internet data into information they may both view 14 on their personal computers and transmit to other computers connected to the Internet.”) (citations 15 omitted). 16 When a subscriber (or consumer) signs up for Internet service, the ISP assigns an IP address 17 to that subscriber – essentially renting out the IP address to the consumer for the duration of their 18 subscription service period. Columbia Ins. Co. v. seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 575 (N.D. Cal. 19 1999) (“On the Internet, computers find each other by reference to Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, 20 which are a series of numbers that are used to specify the address of a particular machine connected 21 to the Internet. Domain names are alphanumeric strings that are associated with particular IP 22 addresses. Thus to find the computer at 129.99.135.66, a user might type in uscourts.gov, and would 23 never need to know the actual IP address.”). The consumer does not own the IP address – it is 24 controlled by the ISP and designated to subscribers as they sign up for service. UMG Recordings, 25 Inc. v. Doe, No. 08-cv-1193-SBA, 2008 WL 4104214, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008) (“[W]hen an 26 ISP is given a defendant’s IP address and the date and time of infringement, it quickly and easily 27 can identify the name and address of a Doe defendant, i.e., the ISP’s subscriber, because that 1 ISP sends monthly or regular bills to the subscriber and has the original service application 2 documents from each subscriber, and because the ISP knows which of its IP addresses were assigned 3 to which customers, it follows that an ISP’s internal records should typically include information 4 sufficient to link a customer with the account corresponding to a particular IP address. Id. 5 Here, NumberAI avers that it traced the IP address used by Defendant Doe’s device to a 6 physical address in the Northern District of California first by identifying the IP address based on 7 “software handling customer inquiries for the Numa demonstration.” [Dkt. 9-1 at ¶ 3; Dkt. 1 at 8 ¶ 22]. NumberAI also avers that Plaintiff’s unidentified “online marketing partner that processed 9 Defendant’s request for the Numa Service demo provided the IP address associated with Defendant 10 which traced to a physical address either in San Francisco or Cupertino, CA, both of which are 11 located in this District.” [Dkt. 1 at ¶ 23; Dkt. 9-2 at 7]. After identifying the IP address, NumberAI 12 avers that internet research identified an ISP, Another Corporate ISP, LLC (allegedly doing business 13 as “Monkey Brains”), as the ISP which provided ISP service to this IP address. [Dkt. 9-1 at ¶ 7]. 14 That ISP is based in San Francisco, and the identified IP address is also allegedly located in San 15 Francisco or Cupertino. [Dkt. 9-1 at ¶ 7; Dkt. 9-2]. Based on this investigation, NumberAI believes 16 that Defendant Doe is the subscriber using assigned IP address 199.230.10.107. [Dkt. 9-1 at ¶ 3, 17 Dkt. 9-2 at 3]. NumberAI seeks Court authorization to serve limited, immediate discovery on 18 Defendant’s ISP in order to seek information on Defendant’s identity, further investigate 19 Defendant’s role in the fraud, and effectuate service of the Complaint. [Dkt. 9 at 4]. 20 Additionally, NumberAI avers that internet research identified Twilio International, Inc. 21 (“Twilio”) as the telecommunications service provider for the phone number which Defendant Doe 22 provided to NumberAI. [Dkt. 9-1 at ¶ 9; Dkt. 9-3 at 2]. Because Defendant Doe provided the phone 23 number to NumberAI, NumberAI believes that Defendant Doe communicated with Twilio to set up 24 telephone service for that phone number. NumberAI seeks to serve the same, limited discovery 25 requests on Twilio because NumberAI asserts, based on its investigation, that the phone number 26 Defendant provided to Number AI is registered with Twilio. [Dkt. 9 at 4]. 27 Based on these allegations, on November 12, 2025, NumberAI filed the Complaint in this 1 as fraud under California Civil Codes §§ 1709 and 1710. See Dkt. 1 at 6-7. NumberAI seeks various 2 forms of compensatory, equitable, and injunctive relief, including compensation for “damages in 3 excess of $100,000 due to the potentially substantial monetary harm that Defendant has caused by 4 providing competitive intelligence and trade secrets to one or more of NumberAI’s competitors.” 5 Id. at ¶ 20. 6 On December 23, 2025, NumberAI filed the instant ex parte application requesting leave to 7 serve Defendant Doe’s ISP with a subpoena under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. [Dkt. 9]. NumberAI alleges 8 that Defendant Doe’s ISP has the ability to identify Defendant Doe through the IP address 9 discovered by the investigation discussed herein. Id. at 3. NumberAI seeks to serve the same 10 discovery on Twilio, based on a determination that the phone number Defendant Doe provided to 11 NumberAI is registered with Twilio. Id. at 4. NumberAI represents that the requested subpoenas 12 will be limited to seeking the name and physical address of the individual having the account 13 associated with Defendant Doe’s IP address of 199.230.10.107 and the phone number provided to 14 NumberAI. Id. 15 DISCUSSION 16 I. LEAVE TO SERVE EARLY, LIMITED SUBPOENAS ON THE THIRD-PARTIES ANOTHER CORPORATE ISP AND TWILIO. 17 Pursuant to Rule 26(d)(1), a party may not seek discovery from any source prior to the 18 parties’ conference required by Rule 26(f). However, per Rule 26(d)(1), the Court has authority to 19 allow discovery prior to the Rule 26(f) conference and thus outside this timing limitation. See also 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1993) (“Discovery can begin earlier if authorized . . 21 . by local rule, order, or stipulation. This will be appropriate in some cases[.]”). The Court may 22 authorize early discovery before the Rule 26(f) conference if the requesting party establishes “good 23 cause” for the early discovery. Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am. Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. 24 Cal. 2002). “Good cause may be found where the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of 25 the administration of justice, outweighs prejudice to the responding party.” Id. 26 As with all discovery matters, “Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor 27 discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 1 574, 598 (1998). “And the court may also set the timing and sequence of discovery.” Id. at 599 2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)). Thus, the decision whether or not to grant early discovery under Rule 3 26(d) is within the Court’s discretion. Quinn v. Anvil Corp., 620 F.3d 1005, 1015 (9th Cir. 2010) 4 (“We review district court rulings on discovery matters for abuse of discretion.”). Further, a 5 decision to deny early discovery under Rule 26(d) “will not be disturbed except upon the clearest 6 showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining 7 litigant.” Med Vets, Inc. v. VIP Petcare Holdings, Inc., 811 F. App’x 422, 424 (9th Cir. 2020) 8 (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)). 9 In evaluating a motion for expedited discovery, the District Court in Med Vets considered 10 the following factors to determine whether good cause exists to justify the requested early discovery: 11 (1) whether a preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the breadth of the discovery request; (3) the 12 purpose for requesting the expedited discovery; (4) the burden on the defendants to comply with the 13 requests; and (5) how far in advance of the typical discovery process the request was made. Med 14 Vets, Inc. v. VIP Petcare Holdings, Inc., No. 18-cv-02054-MMC, [Dkt. 45] at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15 28, 2018) (quoting Rovio Ent. Ltd. v. Royal Plush Toys, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1086, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 16 2012)). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision on the request for expedited 17 discovery in that case. Med Vets, 811 F. App’x at 424. 18 A request for early discovery, such as the instant ex parte application, may arise particularly 19 in a case involving alleged wrongful conduct in connection with use of the internet. As discussed 20 by precedent:

21 With the rise of the Internet has come the ability to commit certain tortious acts, 22 such as defamation, copyright infringement, and trademark infringement, entirely on-line. The tortfeasor can act pseudonymously or anonymously and may give 23 fictitious or incomplete identifying information. Parties who have been injured by these acts are likely to find themselves chasing the tortfeasor from Internet Service 24 Provider (ISP) to ISP, with little or no hope of actually discovering the identity of the tortfeasor. 25

26 In such cases the traditional reluctance for permitting filings against John Doe defendants or fictitious names and the traditional enforcement of strict compliance 27 with service requirements should be tempered by the need to provide injured parties with an (sic) forum in which they may seek redress for grievances. However, this online forums anonymously or pseudonymously. People are permitted to interact 1 pseudonymously and anonymously with each other so long as those acts are not in 2 violation of the law. This ability to speak one’s mind without the burden of the other party knowing all the facts about one’s identity can foster open 3 communication and robust debate. Furthermore, it permits persons to obtain information relevant to a sensitive or intimate condition without fear of 4 embarrassment. People who have committed no wrong should be able to participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass or embarrass them can file 5 a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court's order to discover their 6 identity.

7 Thus some limiting principals should apply to the determination of whether discovery to uncover the identity of a defendant is warranted. 8 9 Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 578 (footnote omitted). 10 Columbia thus identified four factors to assist in determining whether a plaintiff has 11 established good cause to conduct early discovery to identify Doe Defendants. Courts look to 12 “whether the plaintiff (1) identifies the Doe defendant with sufficient specificity that the court can 13 determine that the defendant is a real person who can be sued in federal court, (2) recounts the steps 14 taken to locate and identify the defendant, (3) demonstrates that the action can withstand a motion 15 to dismiss, and (4) proves that the discovery is likely to lead to identifying information that will 16 permit service of process.” Zoosk Inc. v. Doe 1, No. C 10-04545 LB, 2010 WL 5115670, at *2 17 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2010) (citing Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 578–80). Additionally, the Ninth 18 Circuit has relied on the first and third factors as weighing in favor of granting early discovery to 19 determine an unknown defendant’s identity. See, e.g., Young v. Transp. Deputy Sheriff I, 340 F. 20 App’x 368, 369 (9th Cir. 2009); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980); Wakefield 21 v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). 22 Applying the Columbia factors here, the Court finds that all four factors weigh in favor of 23 the requested limited early discovery. First, NumberAI sufficiently alleges enough details to enable 24 this Court to establish that Defendant Doe is more than likely an actual individual who can be legally 25 sued in federal court. “A plaintiff may show that a defendant is a real person or entity by providing 26 evidence of ‘specific acts of misconduct that could only have been perpetrated by actual people, as 27 opposed to a mechanical process.’” Distinct Media Ltd. v. Doe Defendants 1-50, No. 15-cv-03312 1 NumberAI, “[t]he process by which Defendant gained access to the Numa demonstration cannot 2 take place without human interaction.” [Dkt. 9 at 9]. NumberAI alleges that Defendant Doe 3 provided NumberAI with a “fake name, phone number, and email address carefully constructed to 4 reflect association with a genuine car dealership” that could not result from a “default or automatic 5 process.” Id. 6 Additionally, NumberAI allegedly traced Defendant Doe’s IP address to a location within 7 this Court’s jurisdiction. Id. “[A] plaintiff identifies Doe defendants with sufficient specificity by 8 providing the unique IP addresses assigned to an individual defendant . . . and by using ‘geolocation 9 technology’ to trace the IP address to a physical point of origin.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 10 16CV1916-GPC(JMA), 2016 WL 6216183, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016) (citation omitted) 11 (alteration in original). Here, NumberAI alleges to have traced Defendant Doe’s IP address to “a 12 geographic location, San Francisco, CA, which is within this Court’s personal jurisdiction.” [Dkt. 13 9 at 9]. Despite this argument, the actual evidence provided by NumberAI is somewhat equivocal 14 on whether the IP address is linked to a physical location in San Francisco or in Cupertino, CA. See 15 Dkt. 9-2 at 7. However, both San Francisco and Cupertino are within the geographic borders of the 16 Northern District of California. Accordingly, NumberAI has provided evidence that the Defendant 17 in this case is an actual person and correlated their IP address to a location within this Court’s 18 jurisdiction. These allegations strongly suggest Defendant Doe is an identifiable person, a 19 subscriber of the IP address identified by NumberAI, and thus a natural person who can be legally 20 sued in federal court. 21 Second, NumberAI provides an account of the steps taken in its attempts to locate and 22 identify Defendant Doe. See Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 16CV1908-BAS(JMA), 2016 WL 23 6216180, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016) (“Plaintiff must identify all previous steps taken to identify 24 the Doe Defendant in a good faith effort to locate and serve it.”). NumberAI alleges Defendant Doe 25 accessed Numa using a particular IP address. NumberAI attests that NumberAI obtained this IP 26 address based on “software handling customer inquiries for the Numa demonstration.” [Dkt. 9-1 at 27 ¶ 3]. NumberAI also avers that Plaintiff’s unidentified “online marketing partner that processed 1 which traced to a physical address either in San Francisco or Cupertino, CA, both of which are 2 located in this district.” [Dkt. 1 at ¶ 23; Dkt. 9-2 at 7]. After identifying the IP address, NumberAI 3 submits evidence of performing internet research to identify the ISP (“Another Corporate ISP, LLC” 4 d/b/a “Monkey Brains”) which provided ISP service to this IP address. [Dkt. 9-1 at ¶ 7; Dkt. 9-2 at 5 2]. And as discussed above, NumberAI provides evidence of its internet research to determine that 6 this IP address was traced back to locations within the Northern District of California. [Dkt. 9-2 at 7 7; Dkt. 9 at 9]. 8 NumberAI admits that knowing Defendant Doe’s IP address by itself is not enough to 9 establish Defendant Doe’s identity. [Dkt. 9-1 at ¶ 6 (“My search included looking up the IP address 10 on general search engines like ‘google.com’, ‘bing.com’, and ‘duckduckgo.com’. I also used 11 specialized IP address searching tools available on sites such as ‘NordVPN.com’, 12 ‘DNSChecker.org’, and ‘BigDataCloud.com’. None of these searches provided information as to 13 Defendant’s identity.”)]. 14 With regard to the phone number at issue, as discussed above, NumberAI presents evidence 15 of its internet research to determine that the telecommunications service provider for the phone 16 number used by Defendant Doe was Twilio. [Dkt. 9-1 at ¶ 9; Dkt. 9-3 at 2]. NumberAI’s counsel 17 avers to having used multiple methods to attempt to obtain Defendant Doe’s identity from the phone 18 number, including “looking up the phone number on general search engines,” using a “specialized 19 tool for searching phone numbers,” and reviewing “federal and state regulatory sites, publicly 20 available guides regarding IP address and phone number information, and relevant case law to 21 determine if other means of obtaining Defendant’s identity were available.” [Dkt. 9-1 at ¶¶ 8-10.]. 22 The Court finds that NumberAI’s efforts are sufficient to satisfy this factor. See Strike 3 23 Holdings LLC v. Doe, No. 18-CV-06938-WHO, 2019 WL 402358, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2019) 24 (finding plaintiff’s efforts sufficient, including web searches of the IP addresses, references to other 25 sources of authority, and a declaration from an IT expert stating that the service provider was the 26 only entity with the ability to identify the defendant). 27 Third, NumberAI’s Complaint could withstand a motion to dismiss because the Court 1 misappropriation under 18 U.S.C. § 1836. First, the complaint underlying an application for early 2 discovery must be able to withstand a motion to dismiss to “prevent abuse of this extraordinary 3 application of the discovery process and to ensure that plaintiff has standing to pursue an action 4 against defendant.” Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 579–80. Next, to survive a motion to dismiss, “a 5 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 6 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 8 Here, NumberAI alleges that it possesses a trade secret namely “Numa’s specific capabilities 9 crafted for car dealerships.” [Dkt. 9 at 6]. In its Complaint, NumberAI alleges that it “has invested 10 significant time and capital in developing, marketing, and maintaining Numa as a premiere AI tool 11 for car dealerships[.]” [Dkt. 1 at ¶ 4]. NumberAI alleges that its “secure, private, and live 12 demonstration of Numa” is not offered to any member of the public since it “contains protected, 13 sensitive information regarding Numa’s capabilities . . . that would be valuable to others seeking to 14 create a competing AI service.” Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. NumberAI alleges that Defendant Doe “[p]rovid[ed] 15 a fake name, phone number, email address, and employer information to gain secure access to 16 [Numa.]” [Dkt. 9 at 7]. Without passing judgement on the ultimate merits of this case, the Court 17 finds that at this stage NumberAI’s Complaint could withstand a motion to dismiss because it has 18 established a prima facie case of trade secret misappropriation and “contain[s] sufficient factual 19 matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. 20 Finally, NumberAI has established that the requested, limited early discovery is likely to 21 lead to identifying information which will likely reveal the identity of Defendant Doe. In order to 22 establish this factor, a Plaintiff must “provide enough concrete details about who these individuals 23 are or how they eventually could be identified, located, and served.” Biesenbach v. Does 1–3, No. 24 21-cv-08091-DMR, 2022 WL 17371156, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2022). NumberAI alleges that 25 Defendant Doe’s ISP and Twilio have information which would identify Defendant Doe. [Dkt. 9 at 26 3-4]. Defendant Doe’s ISP allegedly has in its possession the subscriber’s name and physical 27 address, since some natural person signed up for and was paying that ISP for the internet service 1 maintains records regarding who created and/or registered the now abandoned phone number that 2 Defendant provided.” Id. at 7-8. 3 NumberAI’s counsel attests that NumberAI is unable to ascertain Defendant Doe’s identity 4 by other means. [Dkt. 9-1 at ¶ 10 (“. . . I reviewed federal and state regulatory sites, publicly 5 available guides regarding IP address and phone number information, and relevant case law to 6 determine if other means of obtaining Defendant’s identity were available. I did not find alternative 7 means beyond the instant request to serve subpoenas.”)]. NumberAI claims Defendant Doe’s ISP 8 and Twilio are in a position to provide this limited information in response to the requested early 9 subpoenas, and NumberAI argues that, after receipt of such, it will be able to identify Defendant 10 Doe and ultimately serve process. [Dkt. 9 at 12]. “Even if the subscriber is not the proper defendant, 11 learning his or her identity may allow [a plaintiff] to work with the subscriber to locate that 12 individual.” Strike 3 Holdings, 2019 WL 402358, at *3. Accordingly, the Court finds that 13 NumberAI has made a sufficient showing to satisfy this factor. 14 Applying the good cause factors identified by the District Court in Med Vets leads to the 15 same result. Med Vets, No. 18-cv-02054-MMC, [Dkt. 45] at *3, aff’d Med Vets, 811 F. App’x at 16 424. First, while a preliminary injunction is not pending, here the requested early discovery is 17 needed to allow the case to proceed against an unidentified defendant. See Assef v. Does 1–10, No. 18 15-cv-01960-MEJ, 2015 WL 3430241, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2015) (“Postponing disclosure of 19 information until the normal course of discovery is not an option in the instant case because, without 20 disclosure of Defendants’ names and contact information, the litigation cannot proceed to that 21 stage.”) (citation omitted); see also BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 881 22 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[O]nly the ISP can match the IP address to the subscriber’s 23 identity.”). 24 Second, NumberAI represents to the Court that the breadth of the proposed discovery 25 requests are limited and narrow: the proposed subpoenas will only seek from Defendant Doe’s ISP 26 the name and physical address of the natural person who is the subscriber for the IP address at issue 27 and from Twilio the name and physical address of the natural person who was the subscriber for the 1 2016 WL 4259116, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016) (“[T]here is no prejudice to the Doe Defendant 2 in granting the requested early discovery because it is narrowly tailored to seek only their identity.”) 3 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 4 Further, the purpose for requesting the expedited discovery is discussed above: NumberAI 5 alleges it needs the discovery to identify the natural person who is Defendant Doe and thus to allow 6 this case to go forward. NumberAI alleges that Defendant Doe’s ISP could destroy user logs 7 identifying Defendant Doe without expedited discovery. [Dkt. 9 at 8]. See UMG Recordings, Inc. 8 v. Does 1-4, No. 06-0652 SBA (EMC), 2006 WL 1343597, at *1 (“[E]xpedited discovery is 9 appropriate because ISPs typically retain user activity logs for a limited period, ranging from as 10 short as a few days to a few months, before erasing data.”). The burden on the target of the discovery 11 to comply with the requests appears cabined by NumberAI’s commitment to seek only limited 12 discovery from Defendant Doe’s ISP and Twilio, as opposed to conducting free-ranging discovery 13 to try to identify Defendant Doe. NumberAI’s request is presented at the outset of this case and thus 14 far in advance of the typical discovery process, but this is a necessity since NumberAI alleges it 15 needs to identify Defendant Doe in order to pursue the case beyond this filing stage. In sum, in light 16 of the District Court Med Vets factors, the Court finds that NumberAI has demonstrated good cause 17 warranting the requested early and limited discovery. 18 In light of the facts and evidence presented to the Court and applying these facts to the legal 19 standards for early discovery, the Court finds that NumberAI has demonstrated good cause 20 warranting the requested early limited discovery (specifically, the proposed subpoenas to Defendant 21 Doe’s ISP and Twilio for only the name and physical address of the subscriber) to determine the 22 identity of Defendant Doe. Here, in consideration of the administration of justice, the need for the 23 requested discovery (to identify the defendant and allow the case to go forward) outweighs the 24 prejudice to Defendant Doe’s ISP and Twilio (the targets of the requested discovery) in light of the 25 limited and narrow nature of the requested subpoenas. Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 276. 26 Indeed, NumberAI’s claims are supported by evidence of investigation resulting in an 27 alleged instance of trade secret misappropriation linked to the identified IP address and phone 1 in cases involving claims of infringement and unfair competition.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS 2 || leave to serve the limited proposed third-party subpoenas on Defendant Doe’s ISP and Twilio prior 3 || to the Rule 26(f) conference in this matter. 4 CONCLUSION 5 Pursuant to the discussion herein, the Court GRANTS NumberAlI’s ex parte application for 6 || leave to serve limited early third-party subpoenas to Defendant Doe’s ISP and Twilio seeking only 7 || the specific information described herein. 8 This RESOLVES Dkt. 9. 9 10 || ITISSO ORDERED. 11 Dated: May 14, 2026 g 12 PETERH.KANG 14 United States Magistrate Judge

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