Nuila v. Stolp

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Nuila v. Stolp

188 So. 3d 105, 2016 WL 1260840, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 5024

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 1, 2016

Docket5D15-2686

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 188 So. 3d 105 (Nuila v. Stolp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Nuila v. Stolp, 188 So. 3d 105, 2016 WL 1260840, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 5024 (Fla. Ct. App. 2016).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Victor Nuila, seeks reversal of the one-year injunction against dating violence obtained against him by his former, girlfriend, Crystal Stolp (“Appel-lee”), pursuant to section , 784.046(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2015). An injunction against dating violence would be statutorily authorized in this case if Appellee proved three elements: (1) a dating relationship within the past six months; (2) at least one occasion of dating violence; and (3) reasonable cause to believe that petitioner is in imminent danger of another act of dating violence. Id. We review the judgment for competent substantial evidence proving those three elements. Toubail v. White, 141 So.3d 649, 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citing Schutt v. Alfred, 130 So.3d 772, 772 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)).

As to the first element, both parties testified at the June 25, 2015, hearing that they had been in a dating relationship within the past six months. As to. the second element, dating violence, Appellee and Appellant gave conflicting testimony about .how Appellant twisted Appellee’s arm and gave her a black eye on June 9, 2015, when he went to Appellee’s house *107 seeking the last of his personal effects. Appellee testified that Appellant punched her, while Appellant testified that he was acting in self-defense. The trial court found Appellee’s testimony more credible. Thus, there was competent substantial evidence that Appellee was the victim of dating violence. We find there was sufficient proof of the first two of three statutory elements required for granting an injunction against dating violence.

Next, we consider what proof was offered as to the third element: reasonable cause to believe that Appellee was in imminent danger of another act of dating violence. As to this element, the trial court considered two email messages that Appellant sent before the act of. dating violence. In the emails, Appellant lamented his breakup from Appellee and indicated that once Appellee allowed him to retrieve the rest of his belongings, he would disappear from her life forever. Ap-pellee conceded that she did not,consider the messages threatening. In addition to the emails, Appellee testified that her home’s swimming pool and air conditioner were vandalized in May 2015. Although she suspected Appellant was responsible, she had no proof. The trial court did not consider the vandalism as support for the third element. There was also no evidence admitted at the hearing to establish that Appellant ever threatened Appellee with physical injury or violence. After the one incident of violence, there was no further contact, attempted contact, communication, or interaction between Appellant and Appellee.

When specifically asked what proof she had that she was in imminent danger of future dating violence, Appellee testified that she was afraid Appellant may try to hurt her again because he hurt her in the aforementioned incident. To obtain an injunction, “[i]t is not sufficient to have been the victim of one incident of- dating violence in the past.” Alderman v. Thomas, 141 So.3d 668, 669 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). We find that the third statutory element, reasonable cause to believe that she was in imminent danger of another act of dating violence, was not supported by competent substantial evidence. Therefore, the. injunction should not have been entered.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

ORFINGER, COHEN and EDWARDS JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Victor Nuila, seeks reversal of the one-year injunction against dating violence obtained against him by his former, girlfriend, Crystal Stolp (“Appel-lee”), pursuant to section , 784.046(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2015). An injunction against dating violence would be statutorily authorized in this case if Appellee proved three elements: (1) a dating relationship within the past six months; (2) at least one occasion of dating violence; and (3) reasonable cause to believe that petitioner is in imminent danger of another act of dating violence. Id. We review the judgment for competent substantial evidence proving those three elements. Toubail v. White, 141 So.3d 649, 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citing Schutt v. Alfred, 130 So.3d 772, 772 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)).

As to the first element, both parties testified at the June 25, 2015, hearing that they had been in a dating relationship within the past six months. As to. the second element, dating violence, Appellee and Appellant gave conflicting testimony about .how Appellant twisted Appellee’s arm and gave her a black eye on June 9, 2015, when he went to Appellee’s house *107 seeking the last of his personal effects. Appellee testified that Appellant punched her, while Appellant testified that he was acting in self-defense. The trial court found Appellee’s testimony more credible. Thus, there was competent substantial evidence that Appellee was the victim of dating violence. We find there was sufficient proof of the first two of three statutory elements required for granting an injunction against dating violence.

Next, we consider what proof was offered as to the third element: reasonable cause to believe that Appellee was in imminent danger of another act of dating violence. As to this element, the trial court considered two email messages that Appellant sent before the act of. dating violence. In the emails, Appellant lamented his breakup from Appellee and indicated that once Appellee allowed him to retrieve the rest of his belongings, he would disappear from her life forever. Ap-pellee conceded that she did not,consider the messages threatening. In addition to the emails, Appellee testified that her home’s swimming pool and air conditioner were vandalized in May 2015. Although she suspected Appellant was responsible, she had no proof. The trial court did not consider the vandalism as support for the third element. There was also no evidence admitted at the hearing to establish that Appellant ever threatened Appellee with physical injury or violence. After the one incident of violence, there was no further contact, attempted contact, communication, or interaction between Appellant and Appellee.

When specifically asked what proof she had that she was in imminent danger of future dating violence, Appellee testified that she was afraid Appellant may try to hurt her again because he hurt her in the aforementioned incident. To obtain an injunction, “[i]t is not sufficient to have been the victim of one incident of- dating violence in the past.” Alderman v. Thomas, 141 So.3d 668, 669 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). We find that the third statutory element, reasonable cause to believe that she was in imminent danger of another act of dating violence, was not supported by competent substantial evidence. Therefore, the. injunction should not have been entered.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

ORFINGER, COHEN and EDWARDS JJ., concur.

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188 So. 3d 105, 2016 WL 1260840, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 5024, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nuila-v-stolp-fladistctapp-2016.

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