Nuckols v. Cinbar Engineering Company

Court of Appeals of Texas

Nuckols v. Cinbar Engineering Company

439 S.W.2d 882, 1969 Tex. App. LEXIS 2341

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

DecidedMarch 27, 1969

DocketNo. 4784

StatusPublished

This text of 439 S.W.2d 882 (Nuckols v. Cinbar Engineering Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Nuckols v. Cinbar Engineering Company, 439 S.W.2d 882, 1969 Tex. App. LEXIS 2341 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969).

Pincite

Opinion

OPINION

HALL, Justice.

Appellee brought this action against appellants for possession of a tandem trailer. The record shows that appellee is the owner and holder of a note, and of a chattel mortgage on the trailer allegedly securing the note, by an assignment from the mortgagee. The mortgage was executed in November, 1963, and promptly filed with the county clerk. Appellants have possession of the trailer by an alleged purchase in good faith and for value from the mortgagor in December, 1964. Appellee based its right to possession on a foreclosure of its chattel mortgage lien. Appellants denied under oath that the lien had been foreclosed. Appellee’s motion for summary judgment for possession of the trailer was granted by the trial court.

Both parties filed affidavits, and there are admissions and answers to interrogatories in the record. The only copy of the mortgage in evidence bears an unexplained endorsement of the county clerk that it was released, in August, 1966, after the filing of this suit but before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.

There is no evidence that appellee had foreclosed its chattel mortgage lien prior to this lawsuit. A question is raised in the evidence as to whether the lien has been released. There is no basis in the record presented for the summary judgment awarding possession of the trailer to appellee.

Reversed and remanded.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

OPINION

HALL, Justice.

Appellee brought this action against appellants for possession of a tandem trailer. The record shows that appellee is the owner and holder of a note, and of a chattel mortgage on the trailer allegedly securing the note, by an assignment from the mortgagee. The mortgage was executed in November, 1963, and promptly filed with the county clerk. Appellants have possession of the trailer by an alleged purchase in good faith and for value from the mortgagor in December, 1964. Appellee based its right to possession on a foreclosure of its chattel mortgage lien. Appellants denied under oath that the lien had been foreclosed. Appellee’s motion for summary judgment for possession of the trailer was granted by the trial court.

Both parties filed affidavits, and there are admissions and answers to interrogatories in the record. The only copy of the mortgage in evidence bears an unexplained endorsement of the county clerk that it was released, in August, 1966, after the filing of this suit but before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.

There is no evidence that appellee had foreclosed its chattel mortgage lien prior to this lawsuit. A question is raised in the evidence as to whether the lien has been released. There is no basis in the record presented for the summary judgment awarding possession of the trailer to appellee.

Reversed and remanded.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

439 S.W.2d 882, 1969 Tex. App. LEXIS 2341, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nuckols-v-cinbar-engineering-company-texapp-1969.