Noyes v. Satterthwaite

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: March 22, 2007
• Docket: CUMre-05-181and182
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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MARY NOYES, et al. ". . Plaintiffs ORDER ON PLAINTIFE;S1AND DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JAMES SA'I'TEIITHWAITE, et al.

Defendants

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary

judgment on Count I, and Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment: on

Count I11 of her complaint and on all counts of Defendantsf complaint pursuant

to M.R. Civ. P. 56.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mary Noyes ("Noyes") resides on Bristol Island in Freepost,

Maine. Plaintiffs Stanley Jacks Credit Shelter Trust and Barbara W. Jacks

Revocable Trust (collectively "the Jacks Trusts") own property in the same area

in Freeport. Defendants James and Natica Satterthwaite ("the Satterthwaites")

reside in Freeport on property adjacent to Noyes's land. Defendant 'l'idebrook

Conservation Trust ("TCT") owns a portion the land. Since 1986, Noyes has

owned the Freeport property, and she has a deeded right of way ("ROW") across

the TCT and Satterthwaite property. The ROW, a private road, connects the

Noyes property to a public road in Freeport. In 1990, Noyes and the

Satterthwaites executed an easement relocation agreement, the purpose of which was to conform the legal description of the easement and ROW to its actual

placement on the property.'

In Fall 2004, Noyes began construction of a new home on her property. At

that time, she determined that the ROW needed maintenance and repair. To that

end, she hired contractors to add gravel to the road, smooth the surface, and

repair potholes. She notified the Satterthwaites each time the repairs were to

occur, and each time, Mr. Satterthwaite blocked the private road with h s vehicle.

On all but one of those occasions, the Freeport Police ordered him to move it. On

some of those occasions, contractors were unable to access Noyes's property and

Noyes was unable to travel on the road to take her children to school. Mr.

Satterthwai te explains that he obstructed the addition of gravel to the ROW

because Noyes went beyond repairing it to improperly expanding its height and

width. In December 2005, Noyes brought h s lawsuit against the Satterthwaites

for breach of contract and injunctive relief, seelung a declaratory judgment

regarding her right to use and maintain the ROW. She also alleged breach of

contract for violation of the 1990 easement relocation agreement. She later

moved to join the Jacks trusts as plaintiff parties in interest, and this Court

approved their joinder.

TCT and the Satterthwaites then filed a complaint against Noyes and the

trusts, which in its latest form alleges trespass and nuisance, and seeks a

declaratory judgment that Noyes cannot extend the height or width of the ROW,

that vehicles traveling on the ROW must not exceed 15 miles per hour, and that

'The 1990 agreement was not recorded until 2000 in the Cumberland County registry of deeds at Deed Book 15608, Page 92.

2 there are reasonable limits on the use of the ROW. By agreement of the parties,

t h s Court ordered consolidation of the two actions.

TCT and the Satterthwaites now move for summary judgment on Count I

of its complaint for trespass. Noyes and the Jacks Trusts filed a cross-motion for

summary judgment on all three counts of the Satterthwaite's complaint aind on

Count I11 of their own complaint, seelung a declaratory judgment.

DISCUSSION

1. Summarv Tudnment Standard.

Summary judgment is proper where there exist no genuine issues of

material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Coy., 2001 ME 77, ¶ 4, 770

A.2d 653,655. A genuine issue is raised "when sufficient evidence requires a

fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial." Parrish v.

Wright, 2003 ME 90, qI 8, 828 A.2d 778, 781. A material fact is a fact that has "the

potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Burdzel v. Sobtrs, 2000 ME 84, qI 6, 750

A.2d 573,575. "If material facts are disputed, the dispute must be resolved

through fact-finding." Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, q[ 7, 784 A.2d 18, 22. At this

stage, the facts are reviewed "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party." Lightfoot v. Sdz. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 2003 ME 24, ql 6, 816 A.2d 63, 65.

2. Defendants' Motion for Summarv Tudgment on Count I - Trespass.

A common law trespass action is a proper vehcle for recovery for

"wrongfully interfering with a person's possession of realty," and the analysis

focuses on "improper entry" upon another person's land. Harlow v. Pulsife~,122

Me. 472, 476, 120 A. 621, 624 (1923). Only minimal intent is required to establish that a trespass occurred; specifically, one must show that the alleged trespasser

purposefully entered the land or knew "to a substantial certainty" that her deed

would cause "her physical presence on the land." Gibsolz v. Fnrnz Fanl. Mut. Ins.

Co., 673 A.2d 1350,1353 (Me. 1996).

Maine law also provides a statutory remedy for trespass, which provides

that, absent the landowner's permission, a person cannot "[clut down, destroy,

damage or carry away any forest product, ornamental or fruit tree, agricu~ltural

product, stones, gravel, ore, goods or property of any lund from land not that

person's own." 14 M.R.S. § 7552(2)(A)(2005). One can recover whether tlhe

statutory trespass was negligent, Id. at § 7552(4)(A),or "intentional and

knowing," Id. at § 7552(4)(B). The Law Court has not permitted recovery for both

statutory and common law trespass where the relief sought is for the same

damage. See Fuschetti v. Mmrray, 2006 ME 100, ¶ 14, 903 A.2d 848, 852 (holding

that a plaintiff could not recover under both statutory and common law trespass

for tree damage). But, the Court upheld a trial court's allowance of recovery

under both theories where the statutory damages were for cutting down a tree

and the common law damages were for "bulldozing" part of the plaintiff's grass.

Morissette v. Sonzes, 2001 ME 152, qI 7, 782 A.2d 764, 766.

Here, the Satterthwaites contend that Noyes committed a common law

trespass by placing gravel outside the ROW, effectively widening it. Noyes,

however, argues that summary judgment should be granted in her favor on t h s

issue because there is no evidence to establish how any gravel ended up outside

the right of way, and she did not intend for her contractor to place it there. She

maintains that the gravel was placed in an 8 to 8.5-foot strip, well within the 12-

foot ROW. Viewing the facts in the light most favorably to her, she did not intend to enter the Satterthwaite's property other than within the right of way, to which

she has a deeded right of access. Even if gravel was intentionally placed outside

the right of way by her contractor, Noyes would not be liable for the contractor's

act because she did not ratify it.'

Also, the Satterthwaites contend that by damaging nearby vegetation,

Noyes violated 5 7552(2)(A),constituting statutory trespass. There is insufficient

evidence, however, from which t h s Court could conclude that there was any

damage to vegetation, even viewing t h s issue favorably to the Satterthwa.ites.

Summary judgment is therefore entered for Noyes on Count I for common law

and statutory trespass pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(c).

3. Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summarv Tudgment.

a. Nuisance.

Having reached decision on the trespass claim, t h s Court now evaluates

Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on the remainder of the

Satterthwaites' complaint. Count I1 alleges nuisance. To prevail on their

nuisance claim, the Satterthwaites would have to establish that: (1)Noyes "acted

with the intent of interfering with [their] use and enjoyment" of their property;

(2) such interference actually occurred, even if the degree of interference could

not have been predicted; (3) the resulting interference . . . and . . . physical liarm,

if any . . . proved to be substantial" such that the property value diminished

because of it; and (4) "the interference. . . was of such a nature, duration, or

605 A.2d 74, 79 (Mc. 1992) (holding that a person may only be held Set' Rorrk 71. McPl~ersor~, responsible for the acts of an independent contractor if he or she approved or later ratified the contractor's act, if it was "directed or part of a common purpose," or if the trespass "was the natural result of the work contracted to be done"). Here, Noyes only authorized placement of gravel within the right of way, and placement of gravel outside it, if it occurred, was not a natural result of the project. amount1' that it was "unreasonable." Charlton v. Town of Oxford, 2001 ME 104, ¶

36,774 A.2d 366,377.

Viewing the facts 111ostfavorably to the Satterthwaites, this claim f,alls

short of the threshold needed to establish nuisance. The evidence tends to show

that Noyes intended to repair the road; she did not intend to interfere with the

use and enjoyment of the property by the Satterthwaites. But even assuming that

Noyes intended to interfere and actually did interfere with their use and

enjoyment of their land by widening the ROW, the Satterthwaites have not

established that there was an unreasonable level of interference or that the

alterations to the ROW lowered the property's value. As a matter of law, -they

cannot prevail on the nuisance claim because they cannot prove all the essential

elements of the tort. Given h s , Noyes's cross-motion for summary judgment is

granted on Count 11 of the Satterthwaites' ~ o m p l a i n t . ~

b. Defendants' and Plaintiffs' Requests for Declaratory Judgment Regardinn Use and Maintenance of the RO\r\l.

Noyes moves for summary judgment on TCT and the Satterthwaite:~'

action for declaratory judgment, as well as on her own Count 111 seelung

declaratory judgment. Both motions will be assessed in the light most favorable

to TCT and the Satterthwaites, as they are the non-moving parties.

"An action for declaratory judgment is appropriate for the determination

of the validity . . . of a deed." Colqzthoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405, 411 (Me. 1996)

3 Noyes had argued that both the trespass and nuisance claims were barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel due to litigation in the 1970s between her predecessors in title a:nd the Satterthwaites regarding maintenance of the ROW. Although there is privity between Noyes and her predecessor, Palmer, the easement was relocated in 1990. Therefore, while the cases bear some reseinblance to each other, the issues are not technically the same and res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to bar this action. (citations omitted). This is a long-recognized method by which a person can

obtain "a binding judicial determination of [his or her] legal rights" in property.

Id. In their complaint, the Satterthwaites seek a declaratory judgment that

Noyes cannot extend the height or width of the ROW, that vehicles travel-ingon

the ROW must not exceed 15 miles per hour, and that there are reasonable limits

on the use of the ROW. In Noycs's complaint, she seeks a declaration that she is

permitted to maintain and repair the ROW, that her actions thus far to repair it

have been reasonable, that the Satterthwaites may not interfere with these

activities, and for a general declaration of the parties' rights respecting the ROW.

Viewing the facts favorably to the Satterthwaites and TCT, Noyes's

maintenance of the right of way has altered it to some degree. The parties agree

that Noyes added gravel to the ROW; the central issue here is whether that

alteration was reasonable, whch is a genuine issue of material fact that re:mains

in dispute. The Law Court has noted that reasonableness of alterations to an

easement is a question of fact. hlorissette, 2001 ME 152 10, 782 A.2d 764, 766.

Because the reasonableness of Noyes's alterations must be determined before a

declaratory judgment can be issued, and this issue must be resolved by the trier

of fact, summary judgment cannot be entered for either party on the

reasonableness of the alterations to the ROW. ?'he cross-motion for summary

judgment on both parties' claims for declaratory judgment is denied.

The entry is:

(1)Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the trespass claim is DENIED. Summary judgment on the trespass claim is GRANTED in favor of Plaintiffs. (2) Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on the nuisance claim is GRANTED. (3) plaintiffsf cross-motion for summary judgment on both claims for declaratory relief is DENIED. The clerk shall incorporate this Order into the pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).

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