Nowaczyk v. McLaughlin, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: December 10, 1998
• Docket: CV-98-510-B
• Status: Published

Opinion

Nowaczyk v. McLaughlin, et a l . CV-98-510-B 12/10/98 UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Steven J. Nowaczyk

v. Civil No. 98-510-B

Philip McLaughlin, et a l .

O R D E R

I .BACKGROUND

Steven Nowaczyk is serving a state prison sentence for a

previous conviction. He also faces trial in state court on

several additional charges. He argues in a petition for habeas

corpus that I should stay his upcoming state court trial because

a judge who ruled on several preliminary issues in the current

case is biased against him.

I assume for purposes of analysis: (1) that Nowaczyk is "in

custody" for purposes of his habeas corpus claim, see, e.g.

Henslev v. Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial District,

Santa Clara Countv, 411 U.S. 345, 353 (1973) (person released on

bail is "in custody"); Malenq v. Cook 490 U.S. 488, 493 (1989)

(person is "in custody" on a sentence which the person has not

yet begun to serve but which is the subject of a detainer); (2)

that he may base his habeas corpus claim on 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(4) rather than on 28 U.S.C. § 2254, see Wright & Miller §

4262 (§ 2241(c) provides basis for habeas corpus relief for a

person who is held in custody prior to trial in violation of the

Constitution); (3) that he has exhausted his state court remedies

by presenting his current argument to the New Hampshire Supreme

Court in an interlocutory motion for an emergency stay; and (4)

that his reguest for a stay of the state court proceedings is not

barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, see McFarland v. Scott, 512

U.S. 849, 857 (1994)(noting that federal courts "cannot enjoin

state-court proceedings unless the intervention is authorized

expressly by federal statute or falls under one of two other

exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act" - namely (1) to aid its

own jurisdiction, or (2) to protect or effectuate its judgments).

Notwithstanding these assumptions, I agree with the Magistrate

Judge's conclusion that this case must be dismissed.

II.DISCUSSION

In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States

Supreme Court explained that a federal court should ordinarily

decline to enjoin state court criminal proceedings. Id. at 41

(citing the "national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or

enjoin pending state [criminal] proceedings except under special circumstances"). The policies of federalism underlying the

Younger doctrine apply with equal force to federal habeas corpus

petitions in which the petitioner seeks to stay a criminal trial

in state court. See Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d 521 (8th Cir.

1981); Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1980); Kolski v.

Watkins, 544 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1977). Nowaczyk nevertheless

argues that abstention is not warranted here because the fact

that the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected his request for an

emergency stay constitutes an "unusual circumstance" that makes

abstention inappropriate. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 54

(recognizing that abstention may be inappropriate in cases

invoking "bad faith, harassment or any other unusual

circumstance. . ."). The New Hampshire Supreme Court's rejection

of his motion is significant, Nowaczyk claims, because it

establishes that his state court remedies are inadequate.

I reject Nowaczyk's argument for three reasons. First, the

New Hampshire Supreme Court's summary denial of Nowaczyk's

request for a stay does not necessarily imply that the court

rejected his claim on the merits. The New Hampshire Supreme

Court ordinarily does not accept interlocutory motions that are

filed without the consent of the trial judge. Since the New

Hampshire Supreme Court did not explain its reasons for denying Nowaczyk's motion, I can only speculate as to whether the court

rejected his challenge on the merits, or simply declined to

consider the merits of his claim prior to his trial. Because of

the absence of a showing that the New Hampshire Supreme Court

ruled on the merits of his claim, Nowaczyk has failed to

establish that it would be futile for him to present his claims

to the New Hampshire Supreme Court again were he to be convicted

at trial.

Second, even if the New Hampshire Supreme Court had

expressly rejected Nowaczyk's interlocutory appeal on the merits,

such a ruling would not warrant the conclusion that Nowaczyk's

state remedies are inadeguate, because he could still be

acguitted at trial. State court remedies cannot be considered

inadeguate while the possibility of acguittal remains viable.

See United States ex rel. Parish v. Elrod, 589 F.2d 327, 329 (7th

Cir. 1979)("[T]he possibility that resort in the future to

[state] appellate courts may be futile, does not compel us to

disrupt a pending state criminal prosecution at which the

petitioner may yet be acguitted.") (citations omitted); Neville

v. Cavanaah, 611 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1979)(same).

Finally, Nowaczyk also asserts that Younger abstention is

inappropriate in this case because the state court proceedings have been marred by bias, bad faith, and harassment. He has

failed, however, to plead any facts to support these conclusory

assertions. The trial judge who Nowaczyk claims was biased

against him is no longer presiding over the pending charges and

Nowaczyk has no basis for challenging the impartiality of the

current trial judge. Moreover, Nowaczyk has pleaded no facts

which would support a claim that the charges were brought against

him in bad faith, or for purposes of harassment. Without

providing factual support for his claims of bias, bad faith, and

harassment, Nowaczyk cannot establish that his case constitutes

an "exceptional circumstance" justifying my refusal to abstain

pursuant to the Younger doctrine. See Brooks v. New Hampshire

Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 639-40 (1st Cir. 1996)(stating that

claims of exceptional circumstance such as bad faith or judicial

bias "reguire[] more than the frenzied brandishing of a cardboard

sword. . . .").

III.CONCLUSION

Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus is dismissed without

prej udice.

- 5 - SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge December 10, 1998

cc: Steven J. Nowaczyk

- 6 -