Novo Liquidating Trust v. Forval (In Re AxisTel Communications, Inc.)

312 B.R. 258, 59 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 157, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1076, 43 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 106, 2004 WL 1719453
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware
DecidedJuly 26, 2004
Docket17-12665
StatusPublished

This text of 312 B.R. 258 (Novo Liquidating Trust v. Forval (In Re AxisTel Communications, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Novo Liquidating Trust v. Forval (In Re AxisTel Communications, Inc.), 312 B.R. 258, 59 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 157, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1076, 43 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 106, 2004 WL 1719453 (Del. 2004).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

PAUL B. LINDSEY, Bankruptcy Judge.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, successor to various rights and duties of Debtors under their confirmed Chapter 11 Plan, 1 brought this adversary proceeding by filing its complaint on June 27, 2003, seeking to avoid and recover certain transfers of property and prepeti *260 tion setoffs pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 553 and 550. 2 Defendant filed its answer, essentially denying the allegations of the complaint and asserting certain affirmative defenses. After court-ordered mediation was unsuccessful, a pre-trial conference was held and a scheduling order was entered to govern further pre-trial proceedings.

On April 22, 2004, Plaintiff filed its motion for leave to amend its complaint. On May 12, 2004, Defendant filed its response, objecting to the relief sought by Plaintiff.

A hearing was held before this Court on July 15, 2004, at the conclusion of which the Court took the contested matter of Plaintiffs motion and Defendant’s response under advisement.

THE ISSUES

In its original complaint Plaintiffs sought: (i) to avoid an alleged preferential transfer in the amount of $24,714.15; (ii) to avoid four (4) allegedly preferential setoffs in the total amount of $477,286.63; and (iii) to recover the amount of the avoided transfer and setoffs, a total of $502,000.78.

In its proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff retains the original allegations with regard to the transfer, setoffs and the recovery thereof. Plaintiff seeks to add to the complaint two additional counts seeking alternative relief. First, Plaintiff seeks the turnover of amounts due and owing under outstanding pre-petition invoices issued by Debtors to Defendant in the total amount of $137,375.96. In a separate count, Plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to a post-petition letter agreement purporting to resolve pre-petition business transactions between the parties that was not approved by the Bankruptcy Court, a transfer of property of the bankruptcy estate was effected in the amount of “around $128,000.” 3 It is asserted that such transfer was in violation of the automatic stay provisions of § 362, that the transfer was void, and that Plaintiff is entitled to avoid and recover the value of such transfer pursuant to §§ 362 and 549. Finally, Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint by seeking judgment against Defendant in the amount of “$628,000 as near as can presently be determined,” with pre-judgment interest and costs.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Plaintiff seeks to amend its complaint under the authority of Rule 15, Fed. R.Civ.P., made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Rule 7015, Fed. R. Bankr.P. Under Rule 15, leave to amend pleadings “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a).

Plaintiff asserts that there is a general presumption in favor of allowing amendment, citing Boileau v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 730 F.2d 929, 938 (3d Cir.1984). It is also urged that the standard to be applied in ruling on a Rule 15(a) motion to amend has been set out by the Supreme Court and routinely applied in the Third Circuit and in this court, as follows:

In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously ai- *261 lowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc. — the leave sought, should, as the rules require, be “freely given.”

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Heyl & Patterson Intern., Inc. v. F.D. Rich Housing, 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018, 102 S.Ct. 1714, 72 L.Ed.2d 136 (1982); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 405, 408 (D.Del.1987).

Plaintiff contends that none of the bases for denial of a motion to amend is present here and that leave to amend should be granted in order to “allow all claims against [Defendant] to be heard on the merits.”(Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, ¶ 21)

Defendant objects to Plaintiffs motion, primarily asserting undue delay. Defendant recites numerous attempts to obtain documentation from Plaintiff concerning the offsets described in the complaint and notes that a copy of the February 25, 2002 letter agreement referred to above was provided to Plaintiff in a letter dated October 1, 2003. Defendant contends that the filing of the motion for leave to amend more than ten months after the filing of the complaint, six months after the February 25, 2002 letter agreement was first provided to Plaintiff, two months after the unsuccessful conclusion of mediation, and after the commencement of discovery, constituted undue delay. Alternatively, Defendant asserts that amendment of the complaint to avoid transfers pursuant to § 549 should not be allowed because such an amendment would be futile as the statute of limitations for filing an action under § 549 has expired. 4

Plaintiff requests that the amendment to the complaint relate back to the date of the original filing of the complaint, 5 effectively avoiding the application of the § 549(d) statute of limitations. Plaintiff contends that Rule 15(c)(2) is applicable. It is clear, however, that the outstanding, unpaid pre-petition invoices of Debtors to Defendant and the February 25, 2002 letter agreement were entirely separate from the single specific transfer and the four specified setoff transactions described in the original complaint. Thus, relation back under Rule 15(c)(2) is not appropriate.

At the hearing on the motion, Plaintiff contended, and Defendant appeared to concede, that as to Plaintiffs proposed § 362 claim, no statute of limitations is applicable, and that Plaintiff therefore could simply file a separate adversary proceeding to assert that claim if it is not permitted to amend its complaint herein.

It is this Court’s view that the delay in this case in seeking leave to amend has not been “undue” and that no bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of Plaintiff has been established. Furthermore, the Defendant has not established that it will be unduly prejudiced by the allowance of the amendment. In fact, the only prejudice asserted by Defendant was the possible need for additional discovery.

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Related

Foman v. Davis
371 U.S. 178 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Boileau v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
730 F.2d 929 (Third Circuit, 1984)
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc.
125 F.R.D. 405 (D. Delaware, 1987)

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Bluebook (online)
312 B.R. 258, 59 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 157, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1076, 43 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 106, 2004 WL 1719453, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/novo-liquidating-trust-v-forval-in-re-axistel-communications-inc-deb-2004.