NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0289-24
NOURELHODA ABRAHIM,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, and BDX SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Respondents. _________________________
Submitted May 7, 2026 – Decided June 12, 2026
Before Judges Marczyk and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Division of Unemployment Insurance, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 346821.
Nourelhoda Abrahim, self-represented appellant.
Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Deborah E. Wassel, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Courtney S. Babb, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Claimant Nourelhoda Abrahim appeals from the Department of Labor and
Workforce Development (DOL), Board of Review's (Board) May 21, 2025
decision finding her ineligible for unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-
5(a). Following our review of the record and the applicable principles, we
affirm.
I.
Abrahim was hired by BDX Solutions, Inc. (BDX) in April 2021 as a
cardiac analysis technician. She was initially required to report to BDX's
facilities for work. However, in December 2021, she requested to work from
home due to "extenuating circumstances" and "family problems." BDX granted
Abrahim's request and allowed her to work remotely.
In early May 2023, Abrahim's manager instructed her to return to the
office by May 15, 2023, because her performance metrics had fallen below
company standards. Abrahim asserts she informed her manager she was not
comfortable returning to the office due to prior "bullying and discrimination"
she had experienced. In addition, she told her manager she did not have
consistent, reliable transportation. BDX reiterated it wanted Abrahim to return
to the office by May 15 but advised her she would be permitted to work remotely
A-0289-24 2 again in August 2023, and it would work with her to help improve her metrics.
Abrahim never returned to the office.
In late May 2023, Abrahim filed an unemployment claim with the DOL.
In June 2023, a DOL deputy mailed Abrahim two Notice of Determination
letters. The first letter stated she was ineligible for benefits from May 28, 2023,
under N.J.S.A. 43:21-4(c)(1), because she was "not available for work." The
second letter indicated Abrahim was disqualified from benefits from May 14,
2023, under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), because she "left work voluntarily" on May
18, 2023. Abrahim thereafter appealed to the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal).
The Tribunal conducted a telephonic hearing in November 2023. The
Examiner stated the issues before the Tribunal were whether Abrahim
voluntarily left work, was available to work, and was actively seeking work.
The Tribunal determined Abrahim was disqualified from benefits from May 14,
2023, under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), for voluntarily leaving her job. It found
Abrahim's discrimination claims unpersuasive, noting she had been working
remotely since December 2021, and the more likely reason she failed to return
to work was a lack of transportation. As to Abrahim's disqualification for not
being available for work, the Tribunal stated, "[i]n view of the period of
A-0289-24 3 disqualification imposed, [May 14, 2023,] the issue of [Abrahim's subsequent]
availability" was not relevant.
Thereafter, Abrahim appealed, and the Board affirmed the Tribunal's
decision on September 12, 2024. Abrahim next appealed the Board's decision
to us. She moved to identify "[n]ewly [p]rovided [e]vidence from [BDX]"—
received in October 2024, following the Board's decision—which we treated as
a motion to supplement the record. We granted the motion, stating: "After
review of the moving papers, we conclude certain evidence unadduced in the
administrative proceedings . . . may be material to the issues on appeal."
Accordingly, we ordered the record on appeal be supplemented with the
following documents: a "[l]etter drafted [on] October 2, 2024[,] from [BDX] to
[Abrahim]"; and "[a]ttachments to [the] October 2, 2024 letter, including [an]
email thread – [four] pages." We remanded the matter to the Board "to make
additional findings of fact after review of those documents" and to "issue a
modified final administrative decision."
The Board subsequently reopened the matter, set aside its prior decision,
and remanded the matter to the Tribunal "for a hearing to address the newly
submitted documentary evidence." It further indicated, upon completion of the
A-0289-24 4 hearing, the matter would be returned to the Board "to issue its modified final
decision[,] as instructed by the [c]ourt."
The hearing before the Tribunal took place in April 2025. The Examiner
stated the purpose of the hearing was to "put the additional documentation that
[Abrahim] sent to [the Appellate Division] . . . on the record so that the Board
. . . c[ould] further review the case." The first document was a letter addressed
to Abrahim from a human resource manager at BDX, dated October 2, 2024. It
stated, "[t]his letter serves as [the] official notification" of Abrahim's
"termination" from BDX, "effective May 23[, 2023]."
The second document was comprised of an email thread from May 2023
between Abrahim and a BDX representative. In the first email, sent by Abrahim
on May 22, she discussed a workplace dispute, expressed she felt she had been
retaliated against, and requested BDX help her find a "new remote position" in
the same field "as soon as possible." The following day, May 23, Abrahim again
requested assistance in finding a new position. Later that same day, Abrahim
emailed the BDX representative again, stating, "I will be telling my interviewers
moving forward that I resigned from this role."
The matter then returned to the Board so it could issue a modified final
decision. On May 21, 2025, the Board issued its decision, again affirming the
A-0289-24 5 November 29, 2023 Tribunal decision, finding Abrahim ineligible for benefits
under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). However, the Board modified the disqualification
date from May 14, 2023, to May 21, 2023, noting Abrahim "was not separated
from her employment until May 23, 2023." The Board further stated it had
"carefully reviewed" the new evidence Abrahim submitted, but determined this
evidence "did not significantly alter the facts developed in the initial hearing."
II.
A.
On appeal, Abrahim asserts N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) disqualifies only those
who "leave work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work." She
contends the record demonstrates this was an "employer-driven separation," and
BDX "rescinded a longstanding remote [work] accommodation[ and] offered no
path forward." Abrahim insists she desired to continue working remotely, and
the Board's conclusion she "voluntarily quit" is "unsupported by substantial
credible evidence."
Abrahim also argues, "[e]ven if the separation were deemed 'voluntary,'
the evidence shows imminent termination, which constitutes good cause." In
support of this point, Abrahim asserts the Examiner, at the April 2025 hearing,
acknowledged BDX's October 2, 2024 termination letter indicated Abrahim was
A-0289-24 6 terminated on May 23, 2023. Accordingly, she concludes, "resignation in the
face of certain discharge is not a voluntary quit; it is separation for good cause
attributable to the work."
"Our review in an appeal from a final decision of an administrative agency
is limited." Newman v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 434 N.J. Super. 483, 488
(App. Div. 2014). A reviewing court "must be mindful of, and deferential to,
the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field." Allstars
Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 158 (2018)
(quoting Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J.
1, 10 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "When reviewing agency
determinations, we do not 'substitute [our] independent judgment for that of [an]
administrative' agency, . . . where there may exist a difference of opinion
concerning the evidential persuasiveness of the relevant [proofs]." Makutoff v.
Bd. of Rev. & Soc'y Gen., 427 N.J. Super. 218, 223 (App. Div. 2012) (alterations
in original) (quoting In re Certificate of Need Granted to the Harborage, 300
N.J. Super. 363, 379 (App. Div. 1997)) (additional internal quotation marks
omitted).
"An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained
unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,
A-0289-24 7 or that it lacks fair support in the record." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28
(2007). In deciding whether an agency's actions are arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, a reviewing court must examine:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law;
(2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and
(3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007)).]
In other words, "[t]he test is not whether an appellate court would come
to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather[,]
whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." Messick
v. Bd. of Rev., 420 N.J. Super. 321, 324 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Brady v. Bd.
of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997)). Therefore, "[i]f the Board's factual findings
are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept
them.'" Brady, 152 N.J. at 210 (quoting Self v. Bd. of Rev., 91 N.J. 453, 459
(1982)). "Only when the agency's findings are clearly mistaken and 'so plainly
A-0289-24 8 unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction'
should a reviewing court 'make its own findings and conclusions.'" Makutoff,
427 N.J. Super. at 224 (quoting Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 169 N.J. 579,
587-88 (2001)) (additional internal quotation marks omitted).
The burden of proof rests with the employee to establish a right to collect
unemployment benefits. Brady, 152 N.J. at 218. Under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), a
person is ineligible for unemployment benefits if they leave work voluntarily,
without good cause attributable to the work. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) defines
"good cause attributable to such work" as "a reason related directly to the
individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no
choice but to leave the employment." "The decision to leave employment must
be compelled by real, substantial[,] and reasonable circumstances[,] not
imaginary, trifling[,] and whimsical ones." Domenico v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of
Lab. & Indus., 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983). "Mere dissatisfaction
with working conditions[,] which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect
health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily." Ibid.
(quoting Medwick v. Bd. of Rev., Div. of Emp. Sec., Dep't of Lab. & Indus., 69
N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961)). A claimant who leaves work for a
A-0289-24 9 personal reason, no matter how compelling, is subject to disqualification. Self,
91 N.J. at 460.
We conclude the Board did not err in its determination Abrahim
voluntarily left her position. At the initial hearing in November 2023, Abrahim
conceded on the record that after BDX requested she return to working on -site
by May 15, 2023, she "ended up . . . voluntarily leaving after that." She stated
she told BDX she "did[ not] feel comfortable" returning to the office. Moreover,
on May 22, 2023, after the return-to-work deadline had passed and Abrahim had
not returned to work, she emailed a BDX representative, stating, "could you
please do your best to help me find a new remote position in this field as soon
as possible?" Abrahim also stated in another email to the representative, "I will
be telling my interviewers moving forward that I resigned from this role." In
addition, she stated on the record she signed a severance agreement with BDX
in or about May 2023, after she declined to return to working on-site. Abrahim
also said her official date of resignation was May 28, 2023, and she had sent
BDX correspondence indicating the same.
As to Abrahim's allegations regarding imminent termination, "[m]ere
speculation about job stability is insufficient to establish good cause."
A-0289-24 10 Fernandez v. Bd. of Rev., 304 N.J. Super. 603, 606 (App. Div. 1997). This court
has explained:
[T]he surrounding circumstances at the time of voluntarily resigning must demonstrate a lack of suitable continuing work either concurrently or at a discernible and proximate point in time, together with statements or actions of the employer showing a very strong likelihood of imminent layoff. The circumstances must be so compelling as to indicate a strong probability that fears about the employee's job security will in fact materialize, that serious impending threats to [their] job will be realized, and that the employee's belief that [their] job is imminently threatened is well founded.
[Ibid.]
In this case, Abrahim's assertion of imminent termination is nothing more
than mere speculation, which is insufficient to establish good cause. See ibid.
There was neither "a lack of suitable continuing work" nor statements or actions
by BDX "showing a very strong likelihood of imminent layoff." See ibid. In
fact, BDX's statements and actions demonstrate the opposite, as it
accommodated Abrahim several times throughout her employment.
Specifically, BDX allowed her to work remotely for approximately a year-and-
a-half and reduced her schedule from working five days per week to four days,
while maintaining her full-time status and pay. Moreover, in May 2023, when
BDX requested Abrahim return to working on-site, it indicated it "was only
A-0289-24 11 temporary" and she could return to working remotely in August 2023. Abrahim
conceded on the record that in May 2023, "[BDX] just wanted to work with [her]
to improve." She also acknowledged her reasons for leaving were due to the
revocation of her remote work privileges and her inability to comply with the
in-office schedule. These are personal reasons, not reasons attributable to work.
We are also unpersuaded the October 2, 2024 termination letter demonstrated
Abrahim was involuntarily discharged. Rather, read in context with the Board's
decision, it is more appropriately characterized as a date of separation notice.
In sum, there was ample evidence in the record to support the Board 's
determination Abrahim "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable
to such work," and the Board reasonably rejected her claim of imminent
termination. We discern no basis to disturb the Board's findings.
B.
Abrahim further contends BDX's rescission of her remote work was a
"[s]ubstantial [c]hange in [c]onditions." She argues, under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c)
and N.J.A.C. 12:17-11.5, work suitability "requires considering transportation,
health, and prior work history/accommodations," and when an employer
rescinds a "critical accommodation," such as remote work, without a workable
alternative, "the resulting position can be unsuitable." Abrahim asserts, "[a]t
A-0289-24 12 most," she should have been subjected to a temporary disqualification under
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c), rather than an indefinite denial under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
Under New Jersey's Unemployment Compensation Law, "a claimant is
disqualified for unemployment benefits if [they] do[] not accept available
suitable work." Goodman v. London Metals Exch., Inc., 86 N.J. 19, 37 (1981).
Accordingly, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c)(1) provides, in relevant part:
In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, consideration shall be given to the degree of risk involved to health, safety, and morals, the individual's physical fitness and prior training, experience and prior earnings, the individual's length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work in the individual's customary occupation, and the distance of the available work from the individual's residence.
An employee who rejects an offer for suitable work must establish "good cause"
in order to remain eligible for unemployment benefits. See N.J.A.C. 12:17-11.4.
In this context, "good cause" means "any situation over which the claimant did
not have control or which was so compelling as to prevent the claimant from
accepting work." Ibid. "In order to establish good cause, the claimant must
have made a reasonable attempt to remove the restrictions pertaining to the
refusal." Ibid.
As to an employee's issues with transportation, which Abrahim mentioned
in her brief and at the initial hearing, "[i]t is clear that when 'commuting
A-0289-24 13 problems' arise solely from the personal circumstances of the worker, unrelated
to an alteration in the terms or conditions of employment, the worker who
voluntarily quits [their] job cannot show 'good cause' qualifying [them] for
benefits." Utley v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 194 N.J. 534, 544-45 (2008); see
also Self, 91 N.J. at 460. In other words, where the employer "did nothing to
increase the commuting problems of [the] claimant[]," meaning the reason the
employee was "unable to get to work was not work-related, but personal," our
courts have concluded "the lack of transportation was not 'good cause
attributable to' their employment within the purview of the statute." Id. at 545
(quoting Self, 91 N.J. at 460). Furthermore, "[m]ere dissatisfaction with
working conditions[,] which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect
health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily." Heulitt v.
Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 300 N.J. Super. 407, 414 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting
Zielenski v. Bd. of Rev., 85 N.J. Super. 46, 54 (App. Div. 1964)).
In applying N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(c)(1)—the factors for suitable work—to this
case, the record demonstrates Abrahim was employed as a cardiac analysis
technician at BDX, which entailed analyzing patients' EKG statistics and
drafting reports reflecting her findings. She admitted she was initially hired to
work on-site and was only given the opportunity of remote work as a "privilege."
A-0289-24 14 When BDX asked Abrahim to return to the office in May 2023, her position was
to remain the same. Further, when BDX requested she return to working on-
site, it indicated it "was only temporary" and she could return to working
remotely in August 2023. Thus, BDX's rescission of Abrahim's remote work
privilege in May 2023 did not constitute a substantial change in conditions, and
therefore, the work remained suitable.
As to Abrahim's claims of transportation issues, those issues arose solely
from her personal circumstances rather than from an alteration in the terms or
conditions of her employment. This is because BDX did nothing to increase
Abrahim's commuting problems. She was initially hired to work on-site, was
granted the accommodation of remote work, and was simply asked to
temporarily return to working on-site. BDX did not alter any terms or conditions
of her employment. Further, at her initial hearing, Abrahim stated, "I did[ not]
have consistent transportation." Under New Jersey Unemployment
Compensation Law, Abrahim's lack of transportation is not good cause
attributable to her employment. See Utley, 194 N.J. at 544-45.
C.
Lastly, Abrahim contends the Examiner initially indicated her fiancé
could provide a closing statement but "then barred it." She argues "[t]his
A-0289-24 15 inconsistency, coupled with [her] concussion-related cognitive issues, denied
[her] a fair opportunity to present corroborative evidence." Abrahim asserts
N.J.A.C. 1:12-14.1 "requires fair procedures and assistance to self-represented
parties," and the Tribunal's "combination of restrictive rulings and failure to
reasonably accommodate" her undermined due process.
"[S]tate statutes providing for the payment of unemployment
compensation benefits create in the claimants for those benefits property
interests protected by due process." Rivera v. Bd. of Rev., N.J. Dep't of Lab.,
127 N.J. 578, 584 (1992) (quoting Wilkinson v. Abrams, 627 F.2d 650, 664 (3rd
Cir. 1980)); see also Garzon v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 370 N.J. Super. 1, 9
(App. Div. 2004) (noting New Jersey courts "view an analysis under fairness
principles to coincide with a procedural due process analysis"). "The basic
requirements of procedural due process are[:] (1) adequate notice; (2)
opportunity for a fair hearing[;] and (3) the availability of ultimate review."
Agresta v. Bd. of Rev., N.J. Dep't of Lab., 232 N.J. Super. 56, 63 (App. Div.
1989). "'Hearing' in this context means a hearing of evidence and argument, and
judgment thereon." In re Masiello, 25 N.J. 590, 600 (1958).
Here, Abrahim was afforded an initial hearing and a subsequent
supplemental hearing. The record shows she received Notices of Determination,
A-0289-24 16 which stated the reasons she was not eligible for unemployment benefits.
Abrahim appealed those determinations, and thereafter, she received several
written opinions from the Tribunal and the Board as to the evidence they relied
upon and their reasons for finding her ineligible for benefits.
At the initial hearing, Abrahim was given the opportunity to be heard and
to present witnesses. In fact, she planned to present her fiancé as her witness,
but he failed to appear. Nevertheless, numerous times throughout the hearing,
the Examiner informed Abrahim the hearing could be postponed so her witness
could testify at a later date. Abrahim, however, refused the offer to postpone
each time and told the Examiner she wanted to proceed.
Abrahim was also given the same opportunity at her supplemental hearing
in April 2025. At this hearing, her fiancé was in attendance and was prepared
to give a statement on her behalf. Though the purpose of this later hearing was
only to enter the supplemental documents Abrahim submitted to the court, the
Examiner told Abrahim she would allow Abrahim's fiancé to testify if she so
wished. The Examiner further stated to Abrahim, "[y]ou will be able to state
what you would like to say after I finish[] putting th[e] documentation on the
record." However, after the Examiner finished reading the evidence into the
record, Abrahim told the Examiner, "I have my own closing statement," and
A-0289-24 17 when directly asked if she wished to give her own closing statement, she
responded, "[o]h, absolutely." Abrahim then proceeded to give her closing
statement. Additionally, the DOL did not present any witnesses at either
hearing, and therefore, Abrahim's right to confront and cross-examine any
adverse witnesses was not at issue.
For these reasons, we conclude the Board's decision was not arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable.
Affirmed.
A-0289-24 18