Nostratis v. United States

Opinion

FILED DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM APR 10 2006 □□ MARY L.M. MORAN DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM CLERK OF COURT FERNANDO NOVELO NOSTRATIS, Criminal Case No. 99-00100 Defendant-Petitioner, Civil Case No. 04-00014 vs. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ORDER Plaintiff-Respondent.

Petitioner Fernando Novelo Nostratis (“Nostratis”) filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Motion”). ° The Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. FED.R. Civ. P. 78. After considering all the submissions, the Court finds no basis for the relief as requested and _|| DENIES Nostratis’ motion. BACKGROUND On January 25, 2000, Nostratis pled guilty to counts one and three of the Superceding Indictment which charged Conspiracy to Import Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960, and 963 and Attempt to Possess Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. On May 21, 2002, the Court sentenced Nostratis to one hundred thirty-five (135) months imprisonment as to each count to run concurrently. The judgment of conviction was entered on the docket on May 28, 2002. On the same date, Nostratis filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit. On March 11, 2003, the appellate court affirmed ——~C~CO—O—O”—— supplement pleading to include aditional grounds in ight othe case, Und Sates. Cabacoang, 382 30622, elarfed by 341 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). See, Docket No. 113. The Court will construe Nostratis’ subsequent filing as an addendum to the original. Both filings will be referred to collectively as the “motion.” ORIGINAL

1 Nostratis’ conviction. United States v. Fernando Novelo Nostratis, No. 02-10296 (9" Cir. March 2 11, 2003). Nostratis incarcerated, brought this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, requesting 3 the Court to vacate his sentence and allow him to withdraw his plea. See, Docket Nos. 111 and 4 113. 6 28 U.S.C. § 2255 allows persons in federal custody to collaterally challenge the 7 constitutionality, legality or jurisdictional basis of the sentence imposed by a court.” See, United 8 States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S, 178, 185, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2240 (1979). Since such a challenge calls 9 into questiona conviction’s finality, collateral relief is an extraordinary remedy that should only 10 }| be granted when a fundamental defect could have resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice, 11 or the rudimentary rules of fair procedure were not followed. United States vy. Timmreck, 441 12 U.S. 780, 783, 99 S. Ct. 2085, 2087 (1979). 13 Nostratis claims that he is entitled to relief for the following reasons: 1) he was deprived 14 of his rights under Article 36, of the Vienna Convention; 2) counsel at his change of plea was 15 ) ineffective due to lack of preparation for trial, failing to raise the issue regarding Nostratis rights 16 per the Vienna Convention, and for engaging in conduct which amounted to threats and coercion 17 to accept the plea agreement; 3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue 18 in one and two above on appeal; and 4) he was improperly convicted of importation as charged 19 incount one in light of United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622, clarified by 341 F.3d 905 (9th 20 Cir. 2003) (en banc). _ 21 || Procedural Bar 22 Nostratis concedes that he failed to advance the instant claims in the district court prior | 23 to judgment in the criminal case and on direct appeal. Claims not asserted previously, although 24 } available, are procedurally barred absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice. United States 25 TTT 6 > The statute states, in pertinent part: 27 ciaiming the right o be released upon the ground thatthe sentence was imposed in 28 jursdieton o impose such sentence or thatthe sentence asin exces ofthe maxima authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. .

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v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982). “Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that he is ‘actually innocent.’” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998). As noted, Nostratis did not raise the aforementioned issues before either the trial/sentencing court or appellate court. However, Nostratis alleges the reason he did not address these issues previously was due to ineffective counsel. See, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)(“Ji]neffective assistance . . . is cause for a procedural default”). Accordingly the Court will consider Nostratis’ claims in that context. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Nostratis must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A petitioner fulfills the first prong of the Strickland test by showing that “the behavior complained of falls below prevailing professional norms.” United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9 Cir. 1996). An inquiry into counsel’s conduct probes “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the ] circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” ] especially where counsel’s acts may be considered “sound trial strategy.’” Jd. at 689. Rights pursuant to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Nostratis contends that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to move for the dismissal of or object to his indictment due to the failure of law enforcement to advise him of his right to contact and seek assistance from the Philippine Consulate pursuant to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77.2 Moreover, ——______________ 3 Article 36 provides in relevant part: With a view facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the (b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending

Nostratis maintains that this failure should result in the dismissal of the indictment against him. This claim, however, fails. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has held that Article 36 confers individually enforceable rights. On the contrary, both courts have consistently concluded that remedies for Article 36 violations in criminal proceedings, such as suppression of evidence or dismissal of an indictment, are inappropriate or that procedural rules preclude courts from considering the issue. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 125 S.Ct. 2088 (2005) (dismissing writ as improvidently granted); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998) (per curiam) (noting that Article 36 “arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance ] following arrest,” yet ultimately holding that a procedural default prevented the claim from being heard); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9" Cir.2000) (en banc) (suppression). Numerous other circuits have reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (1* Cir.2000) (suppression and dismissal); United States v. De La Pava, 268 ] F.3d 157, 165 Cir.2001) (dismissal); Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d. 97, 100 (4" Cir.1997) (procedural default); United States v. Lawal, 231 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7 Cir.2000) (suppression); United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 886 (8" Cir.2002) (suppression); United States v. Minjares- Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 986 (10" Cir.2001) (suppression); United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1255- 56 (10" Cir.2000) (suppression); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1281-82 (11™ Cir.2002) (dismissal). In contrast, only two circuits have definitively held ] that, in the context of a criminal proceeding, Article 36 does not confer an individual right. United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5" Cir.2001); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 394 (6 Cir.2001). This Court is unaware of any Ninth Circuit decision holding that dismissal of the indictment would provide an appropriate remedy for a violation of the Vienna Convention. The ) Ninth Circuit has held that suppression of any wrongly obtained evidence is not the appropriate —-——-—_—___——_—— Sn i hin cm ii, al no he St the consular post by the person nested, in prison, custody 0 detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.

remedy for such a violation. See Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 885. Since suppression is not required as a remedy for Vienna Convention violations, it necessarily follows that the more serious remedy of dismissal of the indictment would not be required. The Convention itself says nothing about the appropriateness of obtaining an indictment despite a violation of its requirements, and certainly does not provide that an indictment must be dismissed if the Convention is violated. The Supreme Court has said, “it is extremely doubtful that... violation [of the Convention] should result in the overturning of a final judgment of conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect on the trial. Breard, 523 U.S. at 377. Here Nostratis has made no such showing. In short, the Court finds that Nostratis’ claims concerning violation of the Vienna Convention are without merit as is his claim of ineffective assistance of } counsel. Counsel’s Investigation of Case and Preparation for Trial, Nostratis contends that trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to further investigate several matters concerning his case and failed to adequately prepare for trial. The Ninth Circuit recognized in Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943 (9" Cir. 2004), that “[c]Jourts have generally rejected claims of ineffective assistance premised on a failure to investigate where the record demonstrates that the defendant would have pled guilty despite the i additional evidence and where the additional evidence was unlikely to change the outcome at trial. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985).” In discussing the grave finality of guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has stated: [A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has fic solemnly admited in open court that he isan fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty lea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not [competent]. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67, 93 S.Ct. 1602,(1973). Ifa defendant pled guilty knowingly and voluntarily, he cannot show actual prejudice resulted from his trial attorney's failure to more thoroughly investigate the case before he pled guilty. Jd.

Review of the record in this case reveals that the information Nostratis argues counsel did not request, was in fact turned over as part of discovery by the government in anticipation of trial. Examination of those documents reveals that much of the information is highly inculpatory. The Court is hard pressed to find exculpatory evidence that would have changed the outcome of any potential trial. Nostratis has not shown the existence of any evidence that would have been obtained which would have influenced his decision to plead guilty. The Court finds that upon review of the entire record, there is not a reasonable probability under an objective standard that, but for the evidence that would be obtained, Nostratis “would have refused to plead and would have gone to trial.” Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d at 1454 (9" 10} Cir.1995). Although Nostratis also claims counsel was not prepared for trial, he has not provided the Court with any information regarding his assertion.” The record is replete with evidence that shows counsel prepared for trial. Counsel met with Nostratis on several occassions.° Five days before the trial date, counsel informed the Court “[y]our Honor, I’m prepared to go to trial next week,” See Atty. Withdrawal Mtn. At 19. Likewise, in entering the plea, Nostratis knowingly ] and voluntarily waived his right to call witnesses or raise any potential defenses.’ ——-———_—____—- 4 The Court notes that on October 25, 1999, the Government filed approximately two hundred ten (210) pages of discovery as Jencks and potential Brady materials for possible impeachment of witnesses during trial, See Docket No. 27. These documents included Grand Jury transcripts, police reports and witness statements from Nostratis’ 1995 and 1999 cases. Further, on the same date the government also filed a witness list and exhibit list with attached photographs/descriptions of what was to be offered. See Docket Nos. 29 and 30. On January 24, 2000 both amended witness and exhibit lists were filed. See Docket Nos. 44 and 45. 3 The Court notes that trial counsel billed the Court in excess of 65 hours for her work on this case, 59 of which were reported to have been spent conducting interviews and conferences, reviewing records and investigative work. See Voucher No. 1004542. Further, counsel was always forthcoming in asking the Court for additional time concerning Nostratris’ case when it was necessary for additional preparation or investigation. In fact, counsel had done so on two separate occasions. See Docket Nos. 16, 17, 26, 27, and 34. Likewise, Attorney Flores affirmatively represented to the Court that she was prepared to proceed to trial. See Hearing on Attorney Flores’ Motion to Withdraw as Counsel Transcript (“Atty. Withdrawl Mtn.”) at 19. Docket No. 119. 5 See Atty. Withdrawal Mtn. at 4 and Testimony of Attorney Stephanie Flores, Transcript of hearing on Nostratis’ Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (“Plea Withdrawal Mtn.”) at 97-102, 106-109. Docket No. 106. 7 The relevant portion of the Change of Plea hearing (“Plea”) is as follows: Court: Tam going to advise you of your rights. Please listen closely. You have aright to plead not guilty to any offense charged against you, and to persist in that plea. That you would then have the right to