Norwood v. Harrison

382 F. Supp. 921, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7637
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Mississippi
DecidedJuly 12, 1974
DocketWC 70-53-K
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 382 F. Supp. 921 (Norwood v. Harrison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Norwood v. Harrison, 382 F. Supp. 921, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7637 (N.D. Miss. 1974).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

READY, Chief Judge.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 *924 (1973), wherein the prior decision of this court 1 was vacated and the cause remanded for further proceeding to establish a certification procedure, subject to judicial review, to determine the eligibility vel non of private schools in Mississippi to receive and use state-owned textbooks, the three-judge district court originally constituted in this cause was dissolved by order dated July 9, 1973.

Thereafter, by subsequent order dated July 25, 1973, the district court, through the managing judge, permanently enjoined defendants from making available state-owned textbooks “to any private school in Mississippi which engages in discrimination of any kind or character based on race, creed, color, or national origin.” The court ordered the establishment of a certification procedure approving a “Certification and Background Information” form which defendants were directed to require each private school to complete and file with the State Textbook Purchasing Board (Board). As a concomitant part of the certification procedure, the Board was directed to promptly determine the eligibility of private schools applying for state-owned textbooks during the 1973-74 school year. Additionally, consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in Norwood, the July 25 order provided for judicial review by which a party aggrieved by the Board's final administrative decision might bring the issue of a school’s eligibility for an adversary hearing before this federal district court.

Upon the completion of the state certification procedure, the Board approved 24 schools to which plaintiffs initially filed objections. Of that number, only 7 schools now remain before the court for determination of their state-owned textbook eligibility. 2

Evidentiary hearings have been conducted for' each of the private schools at issue, and the court is obliged to make a school-by-school determination of whether they must be found to be racially discriminatory and not entitled to textbook assistance or whether they qualify for such aid under Norwood’s rationale.

The ultimate issue for resolution is, of course, whether a particular private school has a racially discriminatory admissions policy, bearing in mind that Norwood refused to imply “a finding that all private schools alleged to be receiving textbooks aid are in fact practicing restrictive admission policies.” 413 U.S. at 471, 93 S.Ct. at 2813, 37 L.Ed.2d at 734-735. In these proceedings on remand, we are surely not called upon to issue a “blanket condemnation” of- all private schools requesting textbook aid. Implicit in this approach is a requirement that plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing at least a prima facie case against each challenged school, in which event the whole evidence must be evaluated to reach correct determinations.

The quantum of proof required to make out a prima facie case, which is of critical importance, is to be considered within the context of each case. However, for those private academies serving elementary and secondary grades, or both, which were established during the wake of massive desegregation orders of federal courts, we believe that a prima facie case of racial discrimination arises from proof (a) that the school’s existence began close upon the heels of the massive desegregation of *925 public schools within its locale, and (b) that no blacks are or have been in attendance as students and none is or has ever been employed as teacher or administrator at the private school. We do not, of course, intimate that plaintiffs’ initial burden cannot be carried by additional buttressing proof for those schools not established to provide a segregated alternative to public school desegregation. But, the critical time of a private school’s formation or unusual enlargement must be a significant factor, though one not necessarily decisive, in determining whether it is racially discriminatory. Graham and United States v. Evangeline Parish School Board, 5 Cir., 484 F.2d 649, rehearing en banc denied 485 F.2d 687; McNeal v. Tate County Board of Education, 460 F.2d 568 (5 Cir. 1971); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 473 F.2d 832 (5 Cir. 1973), cert. granted 414 U.S. 907, 94 S. Ct. 215, 38 L.Ed.2d 145 (1973). We judicially know from the records and files of the federal district courts of Mississippi that prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968), which rejected “freedom-of-choice” as a workable means of desegregating public schools, few blacks were enrolled in the former “white” schools of the state, and also few nonpublic grade schools existed in Mississippi. 3 Between the time interval (one school year) of Green, which was decided May 27, 1968, and Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 90 S.Ct. 29, 24 L.Ed.2d 19, decided October 29, 1969, ordering mid-year massive desegregation for a number of Mississippi school districts, the growth of nonpublic schools throughout the state was unprecedented, a phenomenon noted in Norwood. 4 Newly formed schools designed to serve students withdrawing from the desegregated public schools may be legitimately considered as a factor in presuming that such schools had a racially restrictive admission policy.

The second factor needed to support the inference, i. e., the total absence of blacks as students, teachers or administrators, is but an application of the familiar principle that courts are required to pay heed to statistics which convey a message of putative discrimination. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5 Cir. 1971), cert. denied 406 U.S. 906, 92 S.Ct. 1607, 31 L. Ed.2d 815 (1972); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5 Cir. 1971), aff’d en banc 461 F.2d 1171 (1972); Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service, 372 F.Supp. 126 (N.D.Miss.1974).

Once plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of racially discriminatory admission policies as to a particular academy, the burden shifts to the school’s officials or representatives to rebut an inference of racial disparity.

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Bluebook (online)
382 F. Supp. 921, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7637, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/norwood-v-harrison-msnd-1974.