Norton v. Overcash

70 Misc. 2d 386, 333 N.Y.S.2d 873, 1972 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1997
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedApril 14, 1972
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 70 Misc. 2d 386 (Norton v. Overcash) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Norton v. Overcash, 70 Misc. 2d 386, 333 N.Y.S.2d 873, 1972 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1997 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1972).

Opinion

Anthony J. Cerbato, J.

Petitioner herein seeks an order of this court directing the respondent to pay to her three assistance checks allegedly due to her.

The basis of petitioner’s claim is that since she had been receiving benefits from the respondent, the said benefits cannot be discontinued, suspended or reduced except in conformity with the provisions of 18 NYCRR 351.26.

The purpose of this section is to insure welfare recipients being accorded due process of law and was enacted in conformity with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly (397 U. S. 254). The aforesaid section requires the Department of Social Services to notify a person, in writing, of its intention to discontinue, suspend or reduce a grant of public assistance. In addition, the department is required to inform the person that he has the right to request a hearing on the matter and that at the hearing he shall have the opportunity to offer evidence on his behalf. This section further provides: ‘ ‘ Assistance shall not be discontinued, suspended or reduced prior to the date such notice of decision is sent to the recipient * * * or prior to the proposed effective date of discontinuance, suspension or reduction, whichever occurs later.”

[387]*387The respondent herein contends that it has not discontinued, suspended or reduced the petitioner’s grant and is therefore not in violation of 18 NYCRR 351.26. Respondent argues that one of the checks (Nov., 1971) was sent to the petitioner but that the petitioner claimed said check was “ lost or stolen ”. Yet, the check in question was cashed and respondent alleges that the signature is “ strikingly similar ” to that of petitioner, that the check bore the motorist identification number of petitioner, and her telephone number (it being unlisted). As a result, the matter is being investigated by the department and pending such investigation, it has not reissued a check to petitioner.

In regard to the November, 1971 check this court finds the actions of the respondent completely reasonable and not in violation of any existing statute or mandate. Accordingly, the instant motion is denied with respect to the November, 1971 check.

Petitioner’s claim concerning the checks for February and March, 1972 does, however, appear to be valid and insofar as the motion seeks an order compelling the respondent to deliver checks to her for these months, the same is granted.

The respondent contends that the petitioner has violated certain rules and regulations concerning disclosure of a change in resources (18 NYCRR 351.1 [b] [2] ii and iii; see, also, Social Services Law, §§ 20 and 34)

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Related

Accurso v. Berger
87 Misc. 2d 520 (New York Supreme Court, 1976)
Norton v. Lavine
74 Misc. 2d 590 (New York Supreme Court, 1973)

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Bluebook (online)
70 Misc. 2d 386, 333 N.Y.S.2d 873, 1972 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1997, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/norton-v-overcash-nysupct-1972.