Northwind v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 8, 2020
• Docket: 2:19-cv-01798
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 MONTANO N., 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C19-1798-MLP 10 v. ORDER 11 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 12 Defendant. 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff seeks review of the denial of his applications for Supplemental Security Income 15 and Disability Insurance Benefits. Plaintiff contends the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred 16 in assessing the medical evidence. (Dkt. # 10 at 1.) As discussed below, the Court AFFIRMS the 17 Commissioner’s final decision and DISMISSES the case with prejudice. 18 II. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff was born in 1974, has a high school diploma or GED, and has worked as a 20 stocker, restaurant cook and dishwasher, and pest exterminator. AR at 110, 396-406, 409. 21 Plaintiff was last gainfully employed in July 2008. Id. at 408. 22 23 1 In April 2016, Plaintiff applied for benefits, alleging disability as of May 31, 2008.1 AR 2 at 358-79. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, and Plaintiff 3 requested a hearing. Id. at 251-66, 269-84. After the ALJ conducted hearings in February, May, 4 and September 2018 (id. at 78-143), the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. Id. 5 at 15-30. As the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, the ALJ’s decision is the

6 Commissioner’s final decision. Id. at 1-6. Plaintiff appealed the final decision of the 7 Commissioner to this Court. (Dkt. # 4.) 8 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 9 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of social 10 security benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial 11 evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005). As a 12 general principle, an ALJ’s error may be deemed harmless where it is “inconsequential to the 13 ultimate nondisability determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) 14 (cited sources omitted). The Court looks to “the record as a whole to determine whether the error

15 alters the outcome of the case.” Id. 16 “Substantial evidence” is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such 17 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 18 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th 19 Cir. 1989). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 20 testimony, and resolving any other ambiguities that might exist. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 21 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). While the Court is required to examine the record as a whole, it may 22 neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Thomas v. 23

1 Plaintiff subsequently amended his alleged onset date to October 1, 2013. AR at 104. 1 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). When the evidence is susceptible to more than one 2 rational interpretation, it is the Commissioner’s conclusion that must be upheld. Id. 3 IV. DISCUSSION 4 Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s assessment of various parts of the medical record, each of 5 which the Court will address in turn.

6 A. Legal Standards 7 Where not contradicted by another doctor, a treating or examining doctor’s opinion may 8 be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 9 1996) (quoting Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991)). Where contradicted, a 10 treating or examining doctor’s opinion may not be rejected without “‘specific and legitimate 11 reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record for so doing.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 12 (quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). The ALJ may reject doctors’ 13 opinions “by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical 14 evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d

15 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751). Rather than merely stating her 16 conclusions, the ALJ “must set forth [her] own interpretations and explain why they, rather than 17 the doctors’, are correct.” Id. (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988)). 18 B. David Widlan, Ph.D. 19 Dr. Widlan examined Plaintiff twice, in 2016 and 2018. AR at 733-42, 1300-08. In both 20 opinions, Dr. Widlan indicated that Plaintiff had several marked and severe limitations in his 21 ability to perform basic cognitive and social workplace functions. Id. The ALJ summarized Dr. 22 Widlan’s opinions and explained that she discounted Dr. Widlan’s conclusions because he did 23 not review the treatment record when rendering his opinions, and because that record 1 contradicted Dr. Widlan’s conclusions. Id. at 26. Specifically, the ALJ cited evidence of 2 Plaintiff’s mental status examinations showing many normal findings, his reports of 3 improvement with medication and therapy, and his explicit denial of certain symptoms such as 4 hallucinations, paranoia, delusions, and suicidal/homicidal ideation, which Dr. Widlan 5 mentioned in his opinions. Id.

6 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Widlan’s opinions based on his lack 7 of access to the treatment record, because Dr. Widlan performed his own testing and did not state 8 that his opinions were compromised by his unfamiliarity with the record. (Dkt. # 10 at 6-7.) 9 Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to acknowledge that parts of the treatment record do 10 support Dr. Widlan’s opinions, such as his reports of problems sleeping, his social isolation, his 11 feelings of depression and anxiety, along with the opinions of non-acceptable medical sources 12 describing significant functional limitations. (Dkt. # 10 at 7-8.) 13 Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ erred in considering Dr. Widlan’s lack of familiarity 14 with the treatment record when weighing Dr. Widlan’s opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(6),

15 416.927(c)(6) (explaining that “the extent to which a medical source is familiar with the other 16 information in your case record” is a relevant factor that will be considered in weighing a medical 17 opinion). Furthermore, the ALJ identified specific ways in which Dr. Widlan’s opinions were 18 contradicted by the treatment record. AR at 26. Plaintiff has pointed to other parts of the record 19 that arguably corroborate Dr. Widlan’s opinions or other psychological opinions (dkt. # 10 at 7- 20 10), but Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ ignored that evidence. Indeed, the ALJ’s summary of 21 the medical record acknowledges Plaintiff’s reports of various symptoms (AR at 23), and also 22 discusses and weighs the opinions of non-acceptable medical sources cited by Plaintiff (id. at 25- 23 26). Plaintiff does not establish error in the ALJ’s decision by pointing to evidence that could 1 reasonably support an opposite conclusion, both because such an argument does not show that the 2 ALJ’s interpretation is unreasonable and also because the Court must review the ALJ’s stated 3 reasoning for the support of substantial evidence. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 4 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 5 interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”); Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d

6 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he key question is not whether there is substantial evidence that 7 could support a finding of disability, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the 8 Commissioner’s actual finding that claimant is not disabled.”). Because Plaintiff has not shown 9 that the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. Widlan’s opinions are not legally sufficient, he has not 10 shown error in the ALJ’s assessment of those opinions. 11 To the extent that Plaintiff also folds into his discussion of Dr. Widlan’s opinions an 12 argument that the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions of non-acceptable medical sources 13 Karen Yamashita-Uraine, M.A., and Beth Donelan, P.A., Plaintiff has failed to show that the 14 ALJ’s reasons for discounting these opinions were not germane, as required in the Ninth Circuit.

15 See Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993) (“If the ALJ wishes to discount the 16 testimony of the lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each witness.”). The 17 ALJ summarized the opinions of these providers (AR at 1277-83) and found their conclusions to 18 be inconsistent with Plaintiff’s activities, namely his abilities to care for his three children as a 19 single father, manage his own care, perform household chores, shop in stores, and drive. Id. at 20 25-26. Indeed, such activities are reasonably inconsistent with the limitations described by Ms. 21 Yamashita-Uraine and Ms. Donelan, such as a complete inability to sustain an ordinary routine 22 without special supervision or ask questions or request assistance. See id. at 1277-78, 1281-82. 23 Although Plaintiff again posits that he could have completed those activities in a manner 1 consistent with the opinions of Ms. Yamashita-Uraine and Ms. Donelan (dkt. # 10 at 9), he has 2 not shown that the ALJ’s interpretation was unreasonable. Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ’s 3 reason to discount these opinions is germane. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164 (holding that 4 inconsistency with a claimant’s activities is a germane reason to discount a lay witness’s 5 statement).

6 Plaintiff offers his own interpretation of the evidence to contend that the opinions of Ms. 7 Yamashita-Uraine and Ms. Donelan should have been afforded more weight (dkt. # 10 at 7-10), 8 but has not shown error in the ALJ’s stated reasoning. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to 9 establish error in the ALJ’s assessment of those opinions. 10 C. Azar Sadeghalvad, M.D. 11 Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Sadeghalvad, completed a DSHS form opinion in May 12 2016 describing Plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations, and indicating that Plaintiff was unable to 13 perform even sedentary work. AR at 855-57. The ALJ explained that she gave limited weight to 14 this opinion because it was inconsistent with physical examinations showing normal motor and

15 sensory testing, no active synovitis, normal gait, and negative straight leg raising. Id. at 24. The 16 ALJ also found Dr. Sadeghalvad’s opinion to be inconsistent with imaging results showing at 17 most mild to moderate findings. Id. Lastly, the ALJ cited evidence of Plaintiff’s improvement 18 with conservative treatment, to the point where recent records indicated that Plaintiff had “no 19 current active symptoms of reactive arthritis.” Id. 20 Plaintiff raises several challenges to the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Sadeghalvad’s opinion. 21 First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to account for Plaintiff’s limitations due to 22 pain. (Dkt. # 10 at 11 n.3 (citing AR at 964-65).) But such limitations are based on Plaintiff’s 23 subjective reporting (AR at 964-65), which the ALJ discounted (id. at 22-23) and Plaintiff has 1 not challenged that finding. Plaintiff does not show error in the ALJ’s decision by pointing to 2 discounted reports, without showing that the ALJ erred in discounting those reports. 3 Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to address his pain syndrome 4 diagnosis. (Dkt. # 10 at 11.) But Dr. Sadeghalvad did not list pain syndrome in the opinion at 5 question: he did list chronic pain but did not identify any activities that were impacted by

6 Plaintiff’s chronic pain. AR at 856. Some of the treatment notes describe Plaintiff’s pain as well 7 controlled by medication and suggest that the medication allowed Plaintiff to complete his daily 8 activities. See, e.g., id. at 847, 854, 880, 1188. To the extent that Plaintiff points to various 9 objective findings related to pain syndrome, lumbar disc disease, arthritis, and Reiter’s syndrome 10 (dkt. # 10 at 12-13), none of those findings shows that Plaintiff was more functionally limited 11 than found by the ALJ, and thus does not establish error in the ALJ’s decision. 12 D. State Agency Opinions 13 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to address the 2016 State agency opinions 14 evaluating Plaintiff’s mental impairments. (Dkt. # 10 at 13 (citing AR at 189-91, 244-46).)

15 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in crediting the State agency opinions regarding 16 Plaintiff’s physical impairments because the State agency consultants did not have access to the 17 entire medical record when rendering their opinions. 18 Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ ignored the 2016 State agency psychological 19 opinions. On the contrary, the ALJ summarized the conclusions found in those opinions, and 20 cited evidence from the record as a whole that was consistent with those conclusions. AR at 25. 21 In light of that explicit discussion, the Court does not find that the ALJ ignored the State agency 22 psychological opinions. 23 1 The Court also finds Plaintiff’s argument regarding the State agency physical opinions to 2 be unpersuasive, because the ALJ explicitly considered the opinions in the context of the entire 3 record, which addresses Plaintiff’s concern regarding the timing of the opinions vis-à-vis the 4 entire record. AR at 23-24. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in crediting opinions 5 that were written before many relevant records were generated (dkt. # 10 at 14), but the ALJ

6 considered the record as a whole and cited evidence from the entire period as support for the 7 State agency’s conclusions. See AR at 23-24. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established error in 8 the ALJ’s assessment of the State agency opinions. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 9 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that “the report of a nonexamining, nontreating physician need not be 10 discounted when it ‘is not contradicted by all other evidence in the record’” (quoting 11 Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752 (emphasis in original))). 12 V. CONCLUSION 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED and this 14 case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

15 Dated this 7th day of April, 2020. 16 A 17 MICHELLE L. PETERSON United States Magistrate Judge 18

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