Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Dunkley-Williams Co.

174 F. 121, 98 C.C.A. 95, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5156
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedOctober 5, 1909
DocketNo. 1,529
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 174 F. 121 (Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Dunkley-Williams Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Dunkley-Williams Co., 174 F. 121, 98 C.C.A. 95, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5156 (7th Cir. 1909).

Opinion

KOHRSAAT. Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). The test of liability herein is conclusively stated by the Supreme Court in the case of The Valencia, 165 U. S. 264, 17 Sup. Ct. 323, 41 L. Ed. 710, as follows, viz. :

"One furnishing supplies or making repairs on the order simply of a person or corporation acciuiring the control or possession of a vessel under such a charter party cannot acquire a maritime lien, if the circumstances attending the transaction put him on inquiry as to the existence and terms of such charier party, but he failed to make inquiry, and chose to act on a mere belief that the vessel would be liable for his claim.”

It appears that libelant delivered the coal under the impression that the vessel would be liable there for in any case. This accounts for its lack of diligence in making investigation as to the facts. The credit was not given to protect the owner’s interest in the steamer, but that of parties for the time being operating the boat. Therefore the question for the court to pass upon is whether libelant had actual knowledge, or -was chargeable with knowledge, of the charter party between appellee and the Chicago Transportation Company. The term “Chicago & Milwaukee Line” seems to have been merely descriptive of the class of traffic the Petoskey was engaged in, and did not constitute a name. This was of itself a circumstance calculated to raise inquiry. Any effort on the part of libelant to ascertain why the owner of the steamer should operate under such a phrase would have resulted in the discovery of the charter party and its terms. Nothing short of fatuous confidence in the liability of the steamer for supplies under all conditions can explain the failure to make investigation. Moreover, appellee introduces evidence to the effect that notice of the charter party was mailed to libelant. The latter denies receiving any such letter. While this may not be conclusive proof of notice as against li-belant, it relieves appellee from all suspicion of negligence in the premises, if any would otherwise attach. That no evidence is adduced as to notice to other furnishers of supplies is not persuasive, since the item of coal would be the first to be looked after. We deem it clearly [124]*124shown'that whatever negligence there was in the premises was that of libelant.

The attempt to construe the language of the charter party so as to give libelant the benefit of the clause prohibiting liens to accumulate in excess of $1,000 we deem without merit. Appellee was entitled under-the agreement to receive the Petoskey free of all liens. The $1,000 clause served its mission when it placed it within the power of appel-lee to enforce the forfeiture clause. It was evidently placed in the’ charter party for the benefit of appellee, and not for the solace of those furnishing supplies without reasonable investigation as to responsibility. It is difficult to. understand how an owner could protect himself against parties furnishing supplies without using due diligence to ascertain the facts, unless it be required that he do as appellant suggests : Paint a notice upon the vessel — a method which does not commend itself to our judgment. This opinion is not at variance with that of Judge Putnam in the case of The Surprise, 129 Fed. 873, 64 C. C. A. 309, since here we find that libelant was put upon notice of the charter party.

The finding of the District Court is affirmed.

NOTE. — The following is the opinion of Quarles, District Judge, in the court below:

QUARLES, District Judge. This is a libel of the steamer Petoskey to recover for coal furnished to said steamer by said 'libelant at Milwaukee, a foreign port, between the 6th day of August and the 10th day of October, 1906. There is no dispute that the coal was furnished and that the prices charged therefor were reasonable.
It appears that on the 21st day of April, 1900, a charter party was entered into between Dunkley-Williams Company, of Chicago, the owner and present claimant of the steamer Petoskey, and the Chicago Transportation Company, of Chicago,. Ill., whereby the latter chartered the steamer from May 1, 1906, to December 10, 1906. By the seventh section of the charter party it was provided that during the life of the charter party the charterer “shall promptly pay all of the running and operating expenses of the steamer, and shall not permit her to incur debts for amounts constituting a lien upon her for more than a thousand dollars at any one time.” It was also provided that at the end of the season the steamer should be returned to the owners free and clear of all liens, and that the owners should be saved harmless from any costs or expenses. The charterer operated the steamer, together with the steamer Peerless, under the designation “Chicago & Milwaukee Line.” This line was operated between Chicago and Milwaukee until October 9th, when the owners resumed possession of the steamer Petoskey, owing to the default of the charterer. The charter party provided for a bond of indemnity to protect the owners and the same was frequently demanded, but never given. The charterers defaulted, and the steamer was subject to $1,600 of liens when returned to the owners.
The evidence shows that the steamer Petoskey came to the dock of the libelant at Milwaukee on the 11th day of May, 1900, and applied for coal to enable her to make her regular trip to Chicago. There was no agreement for any lien on the vessel, nor any definite agreement of any kind. Mr. Graham, the city agent of libelant at Milwaukee, was notified of the request, and instructed his employes at the dock by telephone to deliver coal to her, and this was done regularly from day to day as she made her trips. The engineer usually signed the receipts for coal, but sometimes such receipts were signed by the captain; the same being charged on the books of the libelant to the steamer, care of Chicago & Milwaukee Line. On the 23d of May the following [125]*125lot,ter was received by the libelant from Mr. Barry, general manager of the Chicago & Milwaukee Line.
“X G. Keith, President. A. 0. Helm, Secretary and Treasurer.
“Miles E. Barry. Vice President X A. McOaulay, Auditor, and General Manager.
“Chicago Milwaukee Line Steamers.
“Chicago & Milwaukee Line “The ‘C. & M.’ Line.
“E. F. Daly, Gen'l Ft. and Pass. Agt.,
Milwaukee, Wis.
“W. H. Ogborn, Ass’t Gen’l Frt. and Pass. Agt.. Chicago.
“Jos. Goebel, Agent, Chicago.
“Milwaukee Office and Docks: East Water St. Bridge. Telephone South 915.
“Chicago Office and Docks: North F.nd Clark St. Bridge. Telephone Central 2586.
“Chicago, May 23, 1900.
“Northwestern Fuel Co., Milwaukee, Wis. — Gentlemen: I wish you would name me your best price on the run of pile coal for the steamers Peerless and Petoskey. We to go to your dock after the coal. Would thank you to let me hear from you by return mail.
“Yours trulv, Miles E. Barry, V. P. & G. M. “MEB/T.”

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Bluebook (online)
174 F. 121, 98 C.C.A. 95, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5156, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/northwestern-fuel-co-v-dunkley-williams-co-ca7-1909.