Northwest Sheet Metal Workers Organizational Trust v. Lee Fabricators Inc

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided August 26, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-01159·Unknown

Opinion

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON NORTHWEST SHEET METAL WORKERS WELFARE FUND; NORTHWEST SHEET METAL WORKERS PENSION FUND; NORTHWEST SHEET METAL WORKERS SUPPLEMENTAL PENSION TRUST; WESTERN WASHINGTON SHEET METAL TRAINING TRUST; and SHEET C24-1159 TSZ METAL WORKERS LOCAL 66, ORDER Plaintiffs, v. LEE FABRICATORS, INC.; and CLYDE PENWELL, an individual, Defendants. THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against Defendant Lee Fabricators, Inc., docket no. 16, and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment against Defendant Clyde Penwell, docket no. 18. Having reviewed all papers filed in support of the motions, the Court enters the following order. Background Plaintiffs1 are various employee benefit trust funds (collectively, the “Trusts”) and

a labor organization that represents those who are employed in the construction and sheet metal industries. See Compl. at ¶¶ 2–8 (docket no. 1). Defendant Lee Fabricators, Inc. (“Defendant Lee Fabricators”) is a sheet metal contractor and, at all relative times, was signatory to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) with plaintiff Sheet Metal Workers Local 66, both through its bargaining agent, the Western Washington Chapter Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors’ National Association, and through its own

addendum. See id. at ¶ 9; see also First Toney-Noland Decl. at ¶¶ 9–10, Exs. A–B (docket nos. 17 & 17-1).2 Under the CBA, Defendant Lee Fabricators is obligated to make monthly contributions to Plaintiffs’ Welfare, Pension, Supplemental Pension, and Training Trusts on behalf of covered employees, and to comply with the terms of the trust agreements (“Trust Agreements”). See First Toney-Noland Decl. at ¶¶ 11–15, Exs. C–F

(docket nos. 17 & 17-1). According to the Trust Agreements, delinquent employers are required to pay liquidated damages of 20% of unpaid contributions following the institution of a suit, interest at 12% per annum compounded monthly, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in collection efforts. Id. at ¶ 20, Exs. C–F.

1 Plaintiffs Northwest Sheet Metal Workers Organizational Trust and Northwest Sheet Metal Labor Management Cooperation Trust were terminated on June 17, 2025. See generally Docket. 2 Some of Plaintiffs’ exhibits attached to the declarations submitted in support of their motions are not text searchable. This has made them very difficult for the Court to review. In this district, parties are encouraged to submit filings in text-searchable format. See U.S. District Court, Western District of From January 2023 through February 2024, Defendant Lee Fabricators submitted monthly reports of hours worked by covered employees and the amounts due to the

Trusts but failed to remit any of the required contributions. Id. at ¶ 21, Ex. G. In December 2023, Defendant Lee Fabricators and Clyde Penwell (“Defendant Penwell”), the owner and governor of Defendant Lee Fabricators, entered into a Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) with Plaintiffs to resolve unpaid contributions, liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees for January through October 2023. See First Toney-Noland Decl. at ¶ 22, Ex. H (docket nos. 17 & 17-1); Compl. at ¶ 25 (docket

no. 1). The Settlement Agreement called for payment in the amount of $20,026.30, to be repaid in monthly installments of $942.71 beginning in February 2024 through January 2026 until the amount was paid in full. Id. According to the Settlement Agreement, Defendant Lee Fabricators was required to remain current on all ongoing contributions while making installment payments, and failure to do so would render the outstanding

balance, together with any other unpaid contributions, liquidated damages, and interest, immediately due and payable. See First Toney-Noland Decl. at ¶ 24, Ex. H (docket nos. 17 & 17-1). Moreover, in the Settlement Agreement, Defendant Penwell personally guaranteed the amount owed, and agreed that, in the event Plaintiffs had to bring suit to enforce the Settlement Agreement, he would be “personally liable for all outstanding

amounts, along with liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at Ex. H. According to the Second Toney-Noland Declaration, docket no. 19, filed in support of the Summary Judgment Motion, Defendant Lee Fabricators has defaulted on its payments and Defendant Penwell has not stepped in as the personal guarantor. See Second Toney- Noland Decl. at ¶¶ 26–27 (docket no. 19).

Plaintiffs filed this action on July 31, 2024, alleging violations of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) 3, violations of Sections 502 and 515 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1145, and breach of contract. See generally Compl. (docket no. 1). Defendant Lee Fabricators was served on August 28, 2024, but has failed to appear. See First Toney-Noland Decl. ¶ 31 (docket no. 17). Defendant Penwell

represented in the Joint Status Report that Defendant Lee Fabricators “does not intend to enter an appearance to contest this lawsuit.” Joint Status Report at 5 (docket no. 8). On November 12, 2024, the Clerk entered default against Defendant Lee Fabricators. See Ord. (docket no. 12). On June 20, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment (the “Default Judgment Motion”) against Defendant Lee Fabricators. See Mot. (docket no.

16). On July 11, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment (the “Summary Judgment Motion”) against Defendant Penwell. See Mot. (docket no. 18). Neither Defendants filed oppositions to the Motions. / / / / / /

/ / / 3 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs style the “Second Claim for Relief” as one arising under “§ 301 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185.” See Compl. at ¶¶ 21–23 (docket no. 1). Plaintiffs’ characterization is incorrect. Section 301 is not part of the original NLRA (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169), but rather the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. The Court therefore treats the Second Claim Discussion A. Motion for Default Judgment

i. The Eitel Factors Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), a court may enter a default judgment against a party when the Clerk, under Rule 55(a), has already entered default against that party based upon failure to plead or otherwise defend the action. A plaintiff is not entitled to default judgment as a matter of right; a court has discretion whether to enter a default judgment. Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956). As a

general rule, default judgments are ordinarily disfavored, and cases should be resolved on the merits if reasonably possible. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts in the Ninth Circuit consider the following factors, often called the “Eitel factors,” when determining whether default judgment is appropriate. Id. at 1471–72; see Philips Oral Healthcare, LLC v. Shenzhen Sincere Mold Tech. Co., 2019 WL 1572675, at

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Northwest Sheet Metal Workers Organizational Trust v. Lee Fabricators Inc, (W.D. Wash. 2025).

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