Northstar Education Finance, Inc. D/B/A Total Higher Education (T.H.E.) v. Samuel L. Scroggie

Missouri Court of Appeals·Decided April 30, 2019·No. WD81582·Published

Opinion

MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT

NORTHSTAR EDUCATION )

FINANCE, INC D/B/A TOTAL ) WD81582 HIGHER EDUCATION (T.H.E.), )

) OPINION FILED:

Respondent, )

v. ) April 30, 2019 )

SAMUEL L. SCROGGIE, )

)

Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Nodaway County, Missouri Honorable Rebecca Spencer, Judge

Before Division Three: Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge, Anthony Rex Gabbert, and Edward R. Ardini, Judges

Mr. Samuel L. Scroggie appeals a Nodaway County Circuit Court judgment awarding damages to NorthStar Education Finance, Inc. (NEF) on its petition to recover the balance of defaulted 1998-2001 student loans. He challenges court rulings admitting certain evidence, NEF’s standing to bring the petition, and the court’s award of attorney fees to NEF. We affirm. 1

1 We have taken with the case NEF’s motion for attorney fees incurred in connection with this appeal. Because we grant the motion, we also remand for the company to submit its final costs and fees to the circuit court.

Mr. Scroggie took out student loans under a “T.H.E. Loan Program” while attending Thomas M. Cooley Law School from 1998 through 2001. 2 The total amount he borrowed under this program was $20,800. He made payments on the promissory notes to NEF’s loan servicer Great Lakes Educational Loan Servicing Corp. (Great Lakes) until 2014, at times under a hardship payment plan, and then defaulted. NEF d/b/a Total Higher Education (T.H.E.) Loan Program sought to collect the balance and ultimately filed a petition against Mr. Scroggie seeking $11,425.64, interest, and attorney fees. Mr. Scroggie filed a pro se answer, counter-petition, and affirmative defenses, including lack of standing, characterizing NEF as a debt collector and challenging the validity of the assignments among various entities for the rights to collect on the debt transferred. NEF filed a motion to dismiss the counter -claim, and the circuit court sustained the motion.

The case was tried in January 2018, and Mr. Scroggie made numerous objections on hearsay and foundation grounds to exhibits, challenged here, that established the debt, traced the history of the loan assignments, and accounted f or his payments. The witness through whom NEF introduced the exhibits was its current CFO Mr. Charles Osborne, who was part of the T.H.E. Loan Program’s creation and served on the board of directors of each of the NEF-related entities to which Mr. Scroggie’s loans were

2 Additional detail about the loan program and its relation to NEF appears in the legal analysis below. “We view the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and we disregard contrary evidence and inferences.” Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Bostwick, 414 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013).

assigned. 3 The court found Mr. “Osborne’s testimony credible and competent to authenticate the exhibits as business records.” According to the court, NEF demonstrated its standing to bring the petition as each transfer was proved by clear and convincing evidence; it also found that Mr. Scroggie owed the balance of the loans, as well as interest and attorney fees. It awarded NEF a total of $15,089.36. Mr. Scroggie timely filed this appeal pro se.

Legal Analysis

Four of the five points relied on challenge the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.

We review a trial court’s decisions admitting or excluding evidence for an abuse of discretion. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Bostwick, 414 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). “[A]bsent clear abuse of discretion, its action will not be grounds for reversal.” Cox v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Mo. banc 2015) (citation omitted). “A ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion when it is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.” Id. (citation omitted). While one of the points challenges the trial court’s ruling on NEF’s standing, which should be addressed at the outset, we consider the first two points in order as predicates for establishing the admissibility of the documents that Mr. Scroggie contends in point three lacked the requisites to establish standing.

3 Mr. Scroggie also objected to Mr. Charles Osborne testifying about the documents because his name had not been disclosed as a potential witness in discovery. No depositions were taken before trial, so the court indicated that it would entertain a motion for continuance for Mr. Scroggie to depose Mr. Osborne. Neither party sought a continuance as they were ready to proceed to trial, and Mr. Scroggie stated that he was asking instead that the witness not be allowed to testify. The court overruled his objection to Mr. Osborne’s testimony. Although Mr. Scroggie mentions this objection in his brief, he does not base any of his points on this issue.

In the first point, Mr. Scroggie argues that the trial court erred in admitting his loan applications/promissory notes—Exhibits 1A, 2A, and 3A—into evidence because they were hearsay and inadmissible as business records in that Mr. Osborne was not competent to testify about documents prepared by other business entities. Relying primarily on CACH, LLC v. Askew, 358 S.W.3d 58 (Mo. banc 2012), Mr. Scroggie argues that NEF could not demonstrate evidence of the debt because the “lenders” on the loans were University National Bank or PNC Bank, and Mr. Osborne lacked competence to authenticate the documents because he had neither been an officer of these banks nor had he been employed by them.

CACH involved litigation instituted by a debt collector allegedly assigned an outstanding credit card debt owed by Mr. Jon Askew. Id. at 60. The company offered exhibits during trial purporting to be evidence of Mr. Askew’s credit card account and sought to have them admitted as business records under section 490.680. 4 Id. Over objection, the court allowed a records custodian employed by CACH’s owner to testify as to documents allegedly transferring or selling the accounts in a series of transactions leading to CACH through several unrelated entities. Id. at 60-61. Finding that CACH had purchased and been assigned all rights to collect Mr.

4 Section 490.680, RSMo. (2016), addresses the competency of records as evidence, by stating the following:

A record of an act, condition or event, shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.

“Business records with adequate foundation are excepted from hearsay exclusion because we can presume the veracity of a business record when it is made in the regular course of business and contemporaneously to the event it records.” See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 414 S.W.3d at 528 (also noting that documents prepared for litigation a re not business records).

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Northstar Education Finance, Inc. D/B/A Total Higher Education (T.H.E.) v. Samuel L. Scroggie, (Mo. Ct. App. 2019).

Northstar Education Finance, Inc. D/B/A Total Higher Education (T.H.E.) v. Samuel L. Scroggie (Northstar Education Finance, Inc. D/B/A Total Higher Education (T.H.E.) v. Samuel L. Scroggie) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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