Northside Independent School v. Texas Education Agency

410 F. Supp. 365, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17355
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Northside Independent School v. Texas Education Agency. Read the opinion of the Court — 410 F. Supp. 360
District Court, W.D. Texas·Decided January 5, 1976·No. Civ. A. No. SA75CA235·Published

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING PERMANENT INJUNCTION

SPEARS, Chief Judge.

On this the 5th day of January, 1976, came on for consideration plaintiffs’ application for a permanent injunction; and the Court having again fully considered the pleadings, evidence, arguments and briefs submitted prior to and during the consolidated hearing held on October 31, 1975 and November 3, 1975, as well as the briefs of the parties and amici curiae filed subsequent to said hearing, is of the opinion, and so finds; that:

(1) Although amici curiae has alleged in general terms certain areas in which they claim that the Texas Education Agency has failed to adequately defend the issue of segregatory intent on the part of local school officials, they have at no time during the course of this litigation, from the date the lawsuit was filed on September 19, 1975 until the present time, stated with any degree of specificity what evidence they could produce to support their assertions. Nevertheless, despite the failure of amici curiae to demonstrate a legal right to intervene, but believing that their counsel were acting in a good faith effort to assist in maintaining and preserving the due administration of justice, this Court entered an order on December 16, 1975 reopening the case “for the limited purpose of allowing further discovery by amici curiae and/or the parties hereto with respect to the ultimate issue of segregatory intent”. To afford amici curiae an opportunity to prove their allegations of inadequate representation by the Texas Education Agency, they were authorized by said order, for a period of sixty (60) days from January 1, 1976, “to conduct discovery procedures as either of the parties is permitted to do under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including, but not limited to, the calling of witnesses, whether they have previously testified or not, for questioning by oral deposition or written interrogatories.” Clearly, therefore, in conducting such discovery procedures amici curiae had the imprimatur of this Court, and it is implicit in the authority granted that the Court could not only have taxed as costs the expenses incurred incident to the authority granted, but it could also have given them compensation for services rendered. By the same token, it would be illogical to assume that a Court granting such powers to amici curiae would be so callous as to deny to them the right of appeal from an adverse decision, in the unlikely event that an appeal was not taken by one of the parties. However, instead of informing the Court and counsel not later than December 31, 1975 “concerning the areas of discovery they expected to pursue, and identifying to the fullest extent possible, the witnesses they expected to depose, and any further evidence they proposed to develop”, as they were directed to do by the Court, amici curiae chose to refuse to make the slightest effort to comply with the Court’s order. On the contrary, their response, in letter form, promised “an outline of the areas which would form the formal action of a .complete discovery of this case”, only in return for the right to participate “as parties in the litigation”, a position vastly different from that reasonably to be expected from those who had offered their services as “friends of the Court”. Their conduct, therefore, justifies the conclu[367]*367sion, reluctantly reached, that they knew full well that they could neither satisfy the legal requirements for intervening as parties to the lawsuit, nor support with competent evidence the allegations of incompetency and inadequacy repeatedly made by them, which, under the circumstances, could serve no purpose other than to raise the specter of suspicion, thereby casting doubt upon the validity of the record made in this case.

(2) In view of the lapse of fifteen (15) weeks, during which time there has been no evidence of any nature produced to refute the showing made by the North-side Independent School District to the effect that no segregatory intent on its part caused or contributed to the racial imbalance of the schools in question, this Court is left with the distinct and inescapable feeling that there is not now, nor has there ever been, any such evidence in existence, the importunities of amici curiae to the contrary notwithstanding. In this connection, the failure and refusal of counsel for amici curiae to exhibit basic good faith in fulfilling their obligations and responsibilities to this Court, combined with their unfortunate attempt to force an unwarranted ruling with respect to their motion to intervene, are completely indefensible, and wholly unacceptable to this Court, and constitute a forfeiture of any further right or privilege on their part to participate in - this lawsuit in any capacity whatsoever, and the Clerk of this Court is directed to act accordingly.

(3) Since no useful purpose can be served by holding any further hearing, none will be held.

(4) There being no evidence of segregatory intent on the part of the Plaintiff School District, or the members of its Board of Trustees, or its administrative staff which has. caused or contributed to the racial imbalance of the schools in question, it is, therefore,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendants, Texas Education Agency and Marlin L. Brockette, Commissioner of Education of the State of Texas, their respective officials, agents and representatives, be and they are hereby permanently enjoined from suspending the accreditation of the Northside Independent School District of Bexar, Medina and Bandera Counties, Texas, and from suspending payments to the said Northside Independent School District of any State funds granted to said School District under the Minimum Foundation. Program.

(5) Plaintiffs’ motion for a determination that this cause may be prosecuted as a class action is hereby granted, and a separate order to that effect is entered coincident herewith.

(6) All costs herein are assessed against the defendants.

(7) All relief requested which is not granted in whole or in part by this final judgment is hereby denied.

(8) The Court reserves the right to later file a written opinion more fully stating its views herein.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

An order permanently enjoining the defendants from suspending the accreditation of the Northside Independent School District, and from suspending payments of state funds granted to said school district under the Minimum Foundation Program, was entered on the 5th day of January, 1976. This opinion, containing findings of fact and conclusions of law in support thereof, is filed pursuant to Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ.P.

The record herein reflects that on July 17, 1975, the Texas Education Agency (TEA) wrote a letter addressed to the Board of School Trustees of Northside Independent School District (Northside ISD) to the effect that in the opinion of the TEA the Esparza and Forest Hills Elementary Schools, the Linton Kindergarten and the Sul Ross Middle School, each with an enrollment of more than sixty-six (66%) per cent minority students, constituted for that reason a violation of the modified court order of the United States District Court, Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division, in Civil Action No. 5281, pending in said Court, [368]*368particularly with reference to subsection 3 of Section F of said order.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Northside Independent School v. Texas Education Agency, 410 F. Supp. 365, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17355 (W.D. Tex. 1976).

410 F. Supp. 365 (Northside Independent School v. Texas Education Agency) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related