Northgate at Alden Place Com'y Ass'n v. Turner, H.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 12, 2026
• Docket: 605 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: McLaughlin

Opinion

J-A28018-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

NORTHGATE AT ALDEN PLACE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : HARVEY TURNER : : No. 605 MDA 2025 Appellant :

Appeal from the Order Entered April 24, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Civil Division at No(s): 2024-CV-0508

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: MARCH 12, 2026

Harvey Turner appeals from the order modifying a preliminary injunction

in favor of Northgate at Alden Place Community Association (“Northgate”).

Turner challenges the issuance of the preliminary injunction before Northgate

posted a bond, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the elements of a

preliminary injunction, and the amount of the bond. We affirm.

This appeal is related to the appeal at No. 464 MDA 2025. Northgate is

an age-55-and-over retirement community located at 1002 Northgate Drive,

Lebanon, Pennsylvania, 17042. Turner owns property at 1012 Alden Way,

Lebanon, Pennsylvania. Northgate’s and Turner’s properties are subject to an

easement agreement (“Easement Agreement”), which was executed by prior

owners of the properties on January 30, 2006. The Easement Agreement sets

forth certain restrictions as to Turner’s “use” of the property. It provides: J-A28018-25

(b) The use of [Turner’s] Property shall be restricted to only those uses currently permitted in the Planned Development Zoning District of Cornwall Borough, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania as are enumerated on Exhibit E hereof. Any use not enumerated on Exhibit E shall be deemed prohibited unless [Turner] obtains the written consent of [Northgate] to such use.

Easement Agreement at ¶5 B. Exhibit E lists 21 permitted uses of the property.

Turner sought to use his property as a wedding venue. The parties agree that

“wedding venue” is not an enumerated use in Exhibit E of the Easement

Agreement.

In March 2024, Northgate filed an action for declaratory and injunctive

relief against Turner. It alleged that Turner was required to seek approval

from Northgate before making any improvements to the easement. Northgate

further alleged that since Exhibit E of the Easement Agreement does not

enumerate “wedding venue” as a permitted use, Turner cannot use his

property as a wedding venue.

Northgate sought a preliminary injunction and, after a hearing, the trial

court granted the request (“Original Injunction”). The order stated, “Turner is

hereby enjoined from using the mansion property as a wedding venue, and in

addition, Turner is enjoined from advertising the potential use of the mansion

property as a wedding venue pending the resolution of the underlying

[d]eclaratory [j]udgment [a]ction.” Original Injunction, 3/27/25, at 1. The

order further stated that Northgate “shall post bond in the amount of

$5,000.00 with the Prothonotary of Lebanon County to be held in accordance

with the conditions set forth at Pa.R.C.P. 1531(b).” Id. The order did not set

-2- J-A28018-25

forth a deadline in which to post the bond. Turner filed an appeal of that order,

which is before this Court at Docket No. 464 MDA 2025.

On April 16, 2025, Turner filed in the trial court an Emergency Motion

to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal, or in the Alternative, to Modify

Preliminary Injunction (the “Emergency Motion”). The Emergency Motion

requested, among other things, dissolution of the Original Injunction due to

Northgate’s failure to post the required bond. Turner also asserted that the

bond in the amount of $5,000 was inadequate to compensate him for any

losses he would suffer as a result of the Original Injunction. The Emergency

Motion also indicated that Turner had booked a wedding reception on the

property to be held on May 24, 2025.

On April 24, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the Emergency

Motion. After the hearing, the court issued the following order (“Modified

Injunction”):

AND NOW, to wit, this 24th day of April, 2025, after a hearing, and in consideration of the testimony produced, [Turner’s] Motion to Stay the [Original] Injunction issued on March 26, 2025, is denied. [Turner’s] Motion to Modify the Preliminary Injunction is granted as follows:

1. [Turner] is permitted to use the property located at 1012 Alden Way, Lebanon, Pennsylvania, as a wedding venue for a single wedding on May 24, 2025, in keeping with the provisions of the rental agreement admitted as Exhibit No. 1.

2. Ingress and egress to the location is permitted only by the Hometown right-of-way access off Route 419 onto Alden Way.

-3- J-A28018-25

3. [Turner’s] Motion to Dissolve the Injunction for failure of [Northgate] to file a bond is denied. [Northgate] must file a bond in the amount of $15,000 no later than May 15th, 2025, or the [Original] Injunction shall dissolve.

4. In all other respects, the Injunction issued on March 26, 2025, shall continue in full force and effect pending a resolution of the underlying declaratory judgment action.

Modified Injunction at 1-2.

Northgate posted the $15,000 bond within the deadline set forth in the

court’s order. Turner filed the instant timely appeal from the court’s April 24,

2025 Modified Injunction.1

Turner raises the following issues:

A. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by entering two preliminary injunction orders that purported to take effect before a bond was posted, and by continuing the Original Injunction in the form of the Modified Injunction after [Northgate] failed to post the required bond?

B. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by entering a preliminary injunction despite [Northgate’s] failure to establish the six essential prerequisites to obtain a preliminary injunction?

C. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by setting a bond amount that does not provide a reasonable measure of protection for [Turner]?

Turner’s Br. at 3-4.

Turner argues that both the Original Injunction and Modified Injunction

should be vacated. As to the Original Injunction, Turner argues that “[t]he

____________________________________________

1 An order that grants an injunction is immediately appealable as of right. See

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4); Ansell v. Charah Sols., Inc., 327 A.3d 626, 629 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2024).

-4- J-A28018-25

trial court erred by issuing, and later continuing, a preliminary injunction that

purported to be immediately effective but did not require the

contemporaneous posting of security.” Id. at 24-25. Quoting Walter v.

Stacy, 837 A.2d 1205, 1208 (Pa.Super. 2003), Turner argues that “[t]he bond

requirement is mandatory and an appellate court must invalidate a preliminary

injunction if a bond is not filed by the plaintiff.” Id. at 25 (citation removed,

emphasis removed). Turner asserts that the Original Injunction is a “legal

nullity” because of the lack of security. Id. at 22. Turner maintains that “[t]he

trial court abused its discretion because the Original Injunction purported to

take effect even before the required bond was posted.” Id. Quoting Mamula

v. United Steelworkers of America, 185 A.2d 595, 597 (Pa. 1962), Turner

argues that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has long “emphasize[d] both to

the Bench and Bar the necessity of filing a bond contemporaneously with the

issuance of an injunction.” Id. at 25-26 (emphasis removed).

Turner argues that both injunctions were defective for the following

reasons. First, Turner claims that the preliminary injunction must be vacated

because “the Original Injunction purported to take effect immediately, rather

than upon posting of security by Northgate.” Id. at 31. Second, citing

Goodies Olde Fashion Fudge Co. v. Kuiros, 597 A.2d 141, 144 (Pa.Super.

1991), Turner argues that “even if the Original Injunction could take effect

immediately, it was error to issue the injunction without setting a deadline for

Northgate to post the bond.” Id. Third, Turner maintains that under Rose

Uniforms, Inc. v. Lobel, 184 A.2d 261, 262 (Pa. 1962), the court was

-5- J-A28018-25

required to dissolve the Original Injunction because after Turner appealed, the

court was without jurisdiction to grant the Modified Injunction. Id. 31-32.

Fourth, Turner argues that the court erred when it stated in the Modified

Injunction that the Original Injunction “shall continue in full force and effect”

because the Original Injunction was legal nullity ab initio. Id. at 32. Lastly,

Turner maintains that the Modified Injunction was a legal nullity because it

purported to take effect immediately but afforded Northgate an additional

three weeks to post the bond. Id. In Turner’s view, “the trial court entered,

and then continued, the [p]reliminary [i]njunction without requiring the

simultaneous posting of security,” which was “an abuse of discretion, as was

the trial court’s attempt to cure the defects in the Original Injunction through

the Modified Injunction.” Id. at 33-34.

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1531(b), an order granting

a preliminary injunction must require the petitioner to file a bond with the

prothonotary. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1531(b); Berger By and Through Berger v. W.

Jefferson Hill Sch. Dist., 669 A.2d 1084, 1086 (Pa.Commw. 1995). “The

bond requirement is mandatory and an appellate court must invalidate a

preliminary injunction if a bond is not filed by the plaintiff.” Walter, 837 A.2d

at 1208 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, and emphasis

removed). However, “the error may be cured by the re-issuance of the

preliminary injunction if the order includes the requirement of a bond.” Id.;

see also Downs v. Smythe, 701 A.2d 591, 594 (Pa.Super. 1997) (stating

the failure to include an amount for bond in a preliminary injunction order can

-6- J-A28018-25

be cured by reissuing the preliminary injunction with a requirement that bond

be posted in accordance with Rule 1531(b)).

Here, a review of the Original Injunction shows that it complied with

Rule 1531(b) as it expressly conditioned the effectiveness of the relief upon

Northgate’s posting of a bond in the amount of $5,000.00. See Original

Injunction, 3/27/2024. Less than one month later, after the hearing on

Turner’s Emergency Motion to Modify the Preliminary Injunction, the court

entered an order increasing the bond from $5,000 to $15,000 and setting a

deadline for Northgate to post bond. Northgate posted the bond within the

deadline. Although a trial court’s failure to require a plaintiff seeking a

preliminary injunction to file bond renders the injunction null, the error may

be cured by re-issuance of the preliminary injunction if the order includes the

requirement of a bond. Walter, 837 A.2d at 1208. Therefore, any defect in

the Original Injunction was cured by the Modified Injunction.

Further, “[it] is well-settled in Pennsylvania that a trial court has the

inherent, common-law authority to correct ‘clear clerical errors’ in its orders.”

Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d 466, 471 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc).

“A trial court maintains this authority even after the expiration of the 30[-]day

time limitation set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 for the modification of orders.”

Id. Additionally, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(h) provides:

“Further proceedings in lower court. Rule 1701(a) [(effect of appeal

generally)] shall not be applicable to a matter in which an interlocutory order

is appealed under subdivision[ ] . . . (a)(4) of this rule.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(h).

-7- J-A28018-25

Here, Turner appealed under Rule 311(a)(4). The trial court thus was not

divested of jurisdiction upon appeal of the Original Injunction. Accordingly,

the trial court was permitted to modify the Original Injunction to include a

date when the bond was due even though Turner had filed a notice of appeal.

Turner’s reliance of Goodies is misplaced. There, this Court vacated an

order granting a preliminary injunction based on a fudge company’s (Goodies’)

failure to post a bond. 597 A.2d at 144. We noted that “[a]t no time in the

intervening nine and one-half months [since the grant of the preliminary

injunction] has Goodies filed the bond.” Id. We found since that since Goodies

never posted a bond in accordance with the trial court’s order, the order

granting the preliminary injunction had to be vacated. Id. Here, unlike the

appellee in Goodies, Northgate filed the bond within the deadline imposed in

the Modified Injunction. We thus decline Turner’s request to vacate the

preliminary injunction.

Turner’s second issue on appeal is that Northgate failed to satisfy the

six essential elements required to obtain a preliminary injunction. This issue

was thoroughly addressed in the related appeal at No. 464 MDA 2025. For the

reasons set forth in our memorandum at No. 464 MDA 2025, this claim is

without merit.

Turner’s final argument on appeal is that the amount of the bond does

not provide a reasonable measure of protection for Turner. Turner’s Br. at 66.

He notes that at the time of the April hearing, the value of wedding bookings

at his property was $28,000 and he expects additional bookings of at least

-8- J-A28018-25

$400,000 per year. Id. at 68. Turner argues that his “undisputed testimony

shows that the [p]reliminary [i]njunction could cause losses in the hundreds

of thousands of dollars” and “[g]iven the potential losses, neither the original

bond amount of $5,000, nor the modified bond amount of $15,000, provides

a reasonable measure of protection for Turner in the event the [p]reliminary

[i]njunction is dissolved as having been improperly granted.” Id. at 68-69.

“The question of the proper amount of a bond for a preliminary

injunction is within the discretion of the hearing court.” Broad and Locust

Assocs. v. Locust-Broad Realty Co., 464 A.2d 506, 509 (Pa.Super. 1983).

“[T]he bond amount is not set to cover ‘all damages’ but only those that are

reasonably foreseeable.” Christo v. Tuscany, Inc., 533 A.2d 461, 467

(Pa.Super. 1987). “The trial court must determine the amount after balancing

the equities involved on a case[-]by[-]case basis.” Id.; see also Greene Cty.

Citizens United by Cumpston v. Greene Cty. Solid Waste Auth., 636

A.2d 1278, 1281 (Pa.Commw. 1994) (stating, “[t]o determine the proper

amount of bond, courts should balance the equities involved” and “require a

bond which would cover damages that are reasonably foreseeable”). Further,

“plaintiffs may be unable to provide sufficient security where damages could

be great, or where [a] plaintiff is impecunious, yet the court may determine,

based upon the balance of the equities, that the injunction should nevertheless

issue. Consequently, a relatively low bond in light of possible damages may

be set.” Christo, 533 A.2d at 467; see also, e.g., Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Williams, 345 A.2d 664, 671 (Pa. 1975) (finding no abuse of discretion in

-9- J-A28018-25

setting bond at $10,000 despite appellant’s contention “that the probable loss

to the company as a result of the injunction could amount to $2,400,000.00”);

Broad and Locust Assocs., 464 A.2d at 509 (finding no abuse of discretion

by court setting bond at $5,000 even though preliminary injunction

“involve[d] property worth millions of dollars”).

Here, the trial court, after balancing the equities, was within its

discretion in setting the bond in the amount of $15,000. We find no error.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 3/12/2026

- 10 -