Northern v. United States Health and Human Services

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 6, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-2459
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHEDRICK NORTHERN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-02459 (UNA)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Plaintiff Shedrick Northern’s pro se Complaint, ECF No. 1, and

Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court grants

Northern’s IFP Application and, for the reasons explained below, dismisses his suit.

Northern, a resident of Indiana, alleges that on May 16, 2025, he sought medical care at St.

Mary Medical Center in Hobart, Indiana, but was denied care and forcibly discharged by the

Hobart Police Department. Compl. at 2. He alleges that after he filed a civil rights complaint

about this incident with the United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of

Civil Rights (“OCR”), OCR banned him from filing any additional complaints, which Northern

contends violates multiple federal laws. See id at 1–2. Northern demands damages, requests

referral to the Department of Justice for investigation, and seeks equitable relief “preventing

enforcement of the OCR ban.” Id. at 2. Northern concomitantly filed a Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order seeking similar relief. ECF No. 3.

At the outset, the Court notes that Northern is not a “federally protected whistleblower.”

Compl. at 1. Whistleblowers are generally authorized to bring qui tam actions under the False

1 Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., “an anti-fraud statute that prohibits the knowing

submission of false or fraudulent claims to the federal government.” United States ex rel. Bledsoe

v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2003). Northern brings his suit pro se, and

it “well-settled that a qui tam action may not be brought by a pro se plaintiff.” Walsh v. JPMorgan

Chase Bank, NA, 75 F. Supp. 3d 256, 263 (D.D.C. 2014).

Aside from the whistleblower hurdle, Northern’s Complaint also fails to comply with

Federal Rule 8(a), which requires such pleadings to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the

grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–79

(2009). Further, “[a] confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not

comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163,

169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Because Northern’s Complaint “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither

plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp

harangues and personal comments,” it does not satisfy Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408,

413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir.

Nov. 1, 2017). Indeed, the Complaint totals 429 pages containing numerous random exhibits that

are completely unexplained, contravening D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(e), (g). Northern has also

since filed additional submissions, containing haphazard blurbs of information and random legal

authority, ostensibly intended to amend or supplement the Complaint. See, e.g., First Motion to

Take Judicial Notice, ECF No. 4; Second Motion to Take Judicial Notice, ECF No. 6; Notice of

Constitutional Challenge, ECF No. 7. But those proposed additions fail to comply with Federal

Rule 15(a) or D.C. Local Civil Rule 7(i) or 15(i). See Whitman v. Dep’t of Army, No. 21-03163,

2 2023 WL 3844603, at *2 (D.D.C. June 5, 2023) (“Plaintiff’s [C]omplaint is not the legal equivalent

of a LEGO set, something to be recreated,” in such piecemeal fashion). In short, Northern’s

Complaint is “too unwieldy to proceed.” Spence v. U.S. Dep’t of Vet. Affairs, No. 19-cv-1947,

2022 WL 3354726, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2022), aff’d, 109 F.4th 531 (D.C. Cir. 2024), cert.

denied, 145 S. Ct. 594 (2024). 1

As far as his claims can be understood, Northern has failed to state a claim on which relief

can be granted. His contention that the OCR “banned” him from filing complaints is contradicted

by his own exhibits, which convey only that he was denied access to send direct emails to certain

agency email addresses. See ECF No. 1-1, at 19–20, 120–121, 357–58. The proper way to file a

complaint with OCR is to either submit it through the portal, by mail, or by email to

OCRComplaint@hhs.gov, see https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/filing-a-complaint/complaint-

process/index.html (last visited 10/31/2025). 2 Northern does not allege that he was barred from

contacting OCRComplaint@hhs.gov or from going through other approved avenues of

communication. See generally id.

Finally, the Court notes that venue is improper. Venue in a civil action is proper only in

(1) the district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state in which the

district is locate, (2) a district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to

1 See also Unfoldment, Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 07-cv-1717, 2007 WL 3125236, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2007) (dismissing 61-page complaint); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–671 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal without prejudice of 61-page complaint and striking of 119- page complaint); Nichols v. Holder, 828 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253–54 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing 140- page complaint because it was “prolix, redundant, [and] bloated with unnecessary detail,” falling far short of Rule 8(d)’s requirement that each allegation be “simple, concise, and direct”); Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1977) (collecting cases). 2 The Court may take judicial notice of information available on the official public websites of government agencies. See Cannon v. Dist. of Columbia, 717 F.3d 200, 205 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

3 the claim occurred (or in which a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is

situated), or (3) a district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction, if

there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Courts

must examine the issue of venue carefully “to guard against the danger that a plaintiff might

manufacture venue in the District of Columbia.” Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 256

(D.C. Cir. 1993). When “the only real connection a lawsuit has to the District of Columbia is that

a federal agency headquartered here is charged with generally regulating and overseeing” the

officials and administrative process forming the basis for a plaintiff’s claims, “venue is not

appropriate in the District of Columbia.” Aftab v. Gonzalez, 597 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D.D.C. 2009)

(quoting Al-Ahmed v. Chertoff, 564 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2008)). Northern’s suit falls

squarely into this category, as all the alleged events occurred in Indiana or Illinois. See Compl. at

1–2; Compl. Exhibits at 16, 117, 354.

For the foregoing reasons, this matter is dismissed without prejudice. Northern’s Motion

for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 3, is denied, and his First Motion to Take Judicial

Notice, ECF No. 4, Motion to Refer Case, ECF No. 5, Second Motion to Take Judicial Notice,

ECF No. 6, Motion to Expedite Ruling, ECF No. 8, and Motion for CM/ECF Password, ECF No.

9, are all denied as moot. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

DATE: November 6, 2025 CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge