Northern Pacific Railroad v. Clark

153 U.S. 252, 14 S. Ct. 809, 38 L. Ed. 706, 1894 U.S. LEXIS 2181
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedApril 30, 1894
Docket1045
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 153 U.S. 252 (Northern Pacific Railroad v. Clark) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Northern Pacific Railroad v. Clark, 153 U.S. 252, 14 S. Ct. 809, 38 L. Ed. 706, 1894 U.S. LEXIS 2181 (1894).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Jackson,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

*264 In the view we take of the case, the answer to the last question will dispose of the suit, and render it unnecessary to enter upon the consideration and determination of the other propositions of law on which instructions are asked.

By an act of the legislature of the Territory, approved March 9, 1883, c. 99, Laws of 1883, it was provided that all railroad companies, except railroads operated by horse power, owned and operated within the Territory, should pay two per centum on the gross earnings of their railroads for a period of five years, and thereafter three per centum on the gross earnings, in lieu of all other taxes upon said railroads and the capital stock and business thereof. The payment of this percentage was to be made at designated dates in each year, and penalties were imposed upon the companies failing to comply with the provisions of the law as to the making of returns of earnings and paying the percentages imposed by the act. The moneys so received and collected were to be apportioned between the Territory and the several counties through which the railroads respectively ran.

This act of 1883 left the railroad companies no choice as to whether they would pay the designated percentage on their gross earnings, or remain subject to taxation upon their property in the ordinary method. It was compulsory upon them. It is not material to the present case to consider whether this act was constitutional or not; it was repealed by the act of the legislature approved January 29, 1889. Now, it is shown by the bill that at the time the act of 1883 was repealed the appellant was in default of the payment of the percentages due upon its gross earnings for the years 1886, 1887, and 1888.

On March 7, 1889, the legislature of the Territory of Dakota passed the act, entitled “ An act providing for the levy and collection of taxes upon property of railroad companies in this Territory,” 1 which went into force and effect immediately after its passage.

*265 This act is by its terms nothing but a tax law, and while it adopted the same rule of percentages on the gross earnings as *266 is provided in the act of 1883, it differed from that act in not being compulsory upon the railroad companies, for it left to

*267 them the election as to which of two modes of taxation they should accept or submit to.- It practically gave to the rail *268 road companies the choice of having their property taxed as other property in the Territory, by assessment and levy, or of taking the benefits of the act upon the terms and conditions provided therein. It was, by section 7, made a condition of *269 the acceptance of the act that any railroad company assessed under chapter 99 of the Laws of 1883 shall, within thirty days after the passage of this act, pay into the territorial treasury the full amount of the taxes and interest due under the assessments under said laws of 1883, including taxes on both territorial and interstate earnings,” before the} can avail themselves of the provisions of this act.” It was further provided that any company failing to strictly comply with the provisions of the act within the time provided should be immediately subject to assessment and taxation upon its property in the same manner as the property of individuals was assessed and taxed.

The companies accepting the benefits of the act were not only to pay arrearages under the law of 1883, but were also to pay a percentage of gross earnings for the current year of 1889, it being provided that if such acceptance was filed on or before the 15th day of February in any year such companies should pay one-half of said amount on said 15th day of February and the balance on the 15th day of August next following. Should acceptance be filed before the 15th day of August and after the 15tb day of February in any year, then an amount equal to three per centum of such account shall be paid in full on or before the 15th day of August in each year.”

It is shown by the bill that the appellant accepted the provisions and benefits of the act within thirty days after March 7, 1889, and it thereby became liable to pay the required percentage on its gross earnings on or before the 15th day of August, 1889. It is also shown by the bill that within, thirty days after the passage of the act it paid the arrearages of percentages on its gross earnings accruing under the act of 1883, for the years 1886, 1887, and 1888; but it is not alleged that it made payment, or tender of payment, of the percentage on its gross earnings for the year 1889, or any portion thereof, although by the express provisions of the act a percentage on a portion of such gross earnings was due and payable on the 15th day of August, 1889.

The moneys to be received and collected by the territorial *270 ■treasurer under this act from the railroad companies which .accepted its provisions were to be apportioned between the Territory and the several counties, respectively, through which the railroads run, or in which the companies had lands subject to taxation, in the manner pointed out in section 6 of the act. The several counties, whose auditors are made defendants in the present case, were therefore interested in the gross earnings tax, which, the appellant was required to pay for the year 1889 in lieu of all other ordinary taxes upon its'property.

The gross earnings act remained in force until November ■2, 1889, when it was repealed by the repugnant provisions ¡contained in the constitution of the State of North Dakota, .as adopted and approved by Congress, and the claim is now made by the appellant that this repeal relieves it from liability to pay any percentage on its gross earnings for the year 1889, or any part thereof, because the same was not payable •until after 1890; and that it was not liable to assessment and taxation on its property because it had accepted the provisions •of the gross earnings act of 1889.

This contention, if correct, would relieve the appellant from .any burden in the way of taxation for the year 1889, but such .a claim as this cannot possibly be sustained. The act of March 7, 1889, clearly intended that the gross earnings tax, therein provided for, as to all companies which would accept its provisions, should supply revenue for the Territory and ¡the counties for the year 1889. It is equally clear from the whole act, as a tax law, that the railroad company had to pay the required percentage on its gross earnings for that year, and that such percentage was payable in part on the 15th •day of August in that year.

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Bluebook (online)
153 U.S. 252, 14 S. Ct. 809, 38 L. Ed. 706, 1894 U.S. LEXIS 2181, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/northern-pacific-railroad-v-clark-scotus-1894.