Northeastern Building Registered v. Commonwealth

399 A.2d 449, 41 Pa. Commw. 403, 1979 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2308
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 27, 1979
DocketAppeals, Nos. 1025 and 1026 C.D. 1972
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 399 A.2d 449 (Northeastern Building Registered v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Northeastern Building Registered v. Commonwealth, 399 A.2d 449, 41 Pa. Commw. 403, 1979 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2308 (Pa. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinion

Opinion by

Judge DiSalle,

This case involves appeals from two orders of the Board of Finance and Revenue sustaining the Department of Revenue’s imposition of the capital stock tax1 and the corporate net income tax2 on Northeastern Building Registered (Northeastern) for the 1970 cal[405]*405endar year.3 Since Northeastern was a registered partnership,4 and since the Capital Stock Tax Act (CSTA) and Corporate Net Income Tax Act (CNITA) made reference only to limited partnerships,5 Northeastern generally contends that a strict construction of the tax acts precludes imposition of the taxes. The sole question, therefore, is whether a registered partnership is to be taxed as a limited partnership or as a quasi-corporation within the meaning of the CSTA and CNITA. Given the uniformity of language in both acts, our determination of the registered partnership’s tax liability under one act will be controlling with regard to the other.

We note that, as here, appeals taken pursuant to Section 1104 of The Fiscal Code, Act of April 9, 1929, [406]*406P.L. 343, as amended, 72 P.S. §1104, shall be treated as hearings de novo. The parties dispensed with a trial by jury in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of the Act (Act) of April 22, 1874, P.L. 109, as amended, 12 P.S. §688, and thereafter entered into a stipulation of facts. While counsel for neither party has made specific request that the Court state separately findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Section 2 of the Act, 12 P.S. §689, we nevertheless adopt the parties’ stipulation of facts as our own and incorporate them herein by reference.

Our inquiry must begin with the opinion letter of the Attorney General dated October 30, 1903, 28 C.C. 582 (1903), wherein the precise question raised in this case was considered. After making a passing reference to the fact that, for purposes of the CSTA, a limited partner’s proportional interest in the assets of the limited partnership shall be deemed to be capital stock and thereby taxable, the Attorney General concluded that registered partnerships were subject to the provisions of the CSTA.6 This opinion is noteworthy not only because it was relatively contemporaneous to the passage of the Registered Partnership Act (RPA) itself, but also because it assumes, with little comment, that registered partnerships are a form of limited partnership which are subject to the CSTA.

This rather clear cut determination was somewhat clouded by the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County in Commonwealth v. Biddle & Henry, 2 Pa. D. & C. 705 (1923), wherein the court held that limited partnerships formed pursuant to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (UPLA) were not subject to the CSTA. In considering the legislative intent with reference to the phrase “limited partnership,” the [407]*407court opined that “the legislature intended to tax those partnership associations and partnerships which have the characteristics of a corporation and which have the officers and the organization to make the reports required in order to subject them to taxation.” This was so because the legislature was aware that the phrase itself was confusing and did not lend itself to ready-definition within the context of corporate taxation.

Specifically, the court reasoned that it would be anomalous to tax all the partners of a limited partnership the same since a limited partnership, by its very nature, possessed both limited and general partners. "While the taxing of a limited partner’s interest would be consistent with the legislative intent — since a limited partner’s limited liability is analogous to a corporate stockholder’s liability- — taxing a general partner’s interest would not, since a general partner’s unlimited liability is the same as would exist in a common law partnership.7 The court further reasoned that since the CSTA required the filing of various tax reports and returns, it would be necessary for limited partnerships to have the capacity under the ULPA to appoint officers and promulgate the organization otherwise necessary to the fulfillment of these perfunctory tasks. The ULPA did not provide for such officers or organizations.

Noteworthy for present purposes is the fact that the court drew a clear distinction between a limited partnership formed under the ULPA and a registered partnership formed under the RPA. While the limited partnership lacked the two key corporate characteristics of complete limited liability for all partners and corporate-type organization (he., officers), the regis[408]*408tered partnership conld have both: (1) the KPA was expressly enacted to provide a form of limited partnership where all the partners conld be limited partners, and (2) the EPA clearly provided for the creation of “official positions for the transaction of the business of the partnership.” See Sections 1 and 4 of the EPA, 59 P.S. §§241, 262. It seems, therefore, that while the court in Biddle $ Henry ultimately found that limited partnerships formed pursuant to the ULPA were not subject to the capital stock tax, it nevertheless provided strong doctrinal support for the Attorney General’s 1903 opinion that registered partnerships were subject to the tax. Indeed, we note in this regard that the court chose to cite, with apparent approval, that very opinion letter.

The following year, the Attorney General drafted another opinion letter relating to the taxation of limited partnerships formed pursuant to the ULPA under an emergency profits tax which, like the CSTA, sought to tax corporations and other business organizations including limited partnerships. See Emergency Profits Tax No. 2, 5 Pa. D. & C. 585 (1924). Eelying exclusively on Biddle S Henry, supra, and the reasons cited therein, the Attorney General opined that limited partnerships were not subject to the tax.

Relying on Biddle & Henry and the 1924 Attorney General’s letter, the Department, over the years, has not assessed the capital stock or the corporate net income tax against limited partnerships formed under the ULPA. At the same time, again in reliance on Biddle & Henry and the 1903 Attorney General opinion letter, the Department has assessed these taxes on registered partnerships.8

[409]*409Now after the passage of over half a century, this moribund issue is resurrected anew. As we understand it, Northeastern makes two specific contentions. First, the CSTA and CNITA are ambiguous or unclear as they relate to limited partnerships, and, since taxing statutes are strictly construed and taxes cannot be imposed by implication, they cannot be applied here. [410]*410Loeb Estate, 400 Pa. 368, 162 A.2d 207 (1960); Fischer v. City of Pittsburgh, 383 Pa. 138, 118 A.2d 157 (1955); 1 Pa.C.S. §1928(b) (3). Secondly, even if the tax statutes are viewed as clear and unambiguous, registered partnerships do not possess the requsite corporate characteristics to bring them within the ambit of the legislative intent.

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Bluebook (online)
399 A.2d 449, 41 Pa. Commw. 403, 1979 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2308, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/northeastern-building-registered-v-commonwealth-pacommwct-1979.