North Georgia Pain Clinic, P. C. v. Renasant Bank

Court of Appeals of Georgia

North Georgia Pain Clinic, P. C. v. Renasant Bank

DecidedFebruary 18, 2016

DocketA16A0508

StatusPublished

This text of North Georgia Pain Clinic, P. C. v. Renasant Bank (North Georgia Pain Clinic, P. C. v. Renasant Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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North Georgia Pain Clinic, P. C. v. Renasant Bank, (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).

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Opinion

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________ February 02, 2016

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16A0508. NORTH GEORGIA PAIN CLINIC, P. C. v. RENASANT BANK.

Renasant Bank (“the Bank”) is seeking, through post-judgment discovery, to obtain assets allegedly transferred by Denise Straus and Dr. Barry Straus. In so doing, the Bank sought discovery from a third party, North Georgia Pain Clinic, P. C. (“the Clinic”). The Clinic filed a motion to quash the subpoena and for a protective order. The trial court denied the motion, and the Clinic filed this direct appeal. Although the case remains pending in the trial court, the Clinic contends it is entitled to a direct appeal from a collateral order. The Bank has filed a motion to dismiss. Under the collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order may be appealed directly if it: (1) resolves an issue that is substantially separate from the basic issues to be decided at trial, (2) would result in the loss of an important right if review had to await final judgment, and (3) completely and conclusively decides the issue on appeal. Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 748 (1) (653 SE2d 713) (2007). As a general rule, discovery rulings do not constitute collateral orders. See General Motors Corp. v. Hammock, 255 Ga. App. 131 (564 SE2d 536) (2002). The Clinic contends that the order should nonetheless be considered a collateral order because it is a disinterested third party. It appears from the record, however, that both Strauses either have an ownership interest or are employed by the Clinic. Under these circumstances, the discovery sought from the Bank is not substantially separate from the Bank’s post-judgment attempts to recover money from the Strauses. See, e. g., Britt v. State, supra, 282 Ga. at 748 (1). Accordingly, the collateral order doctrine has no application. The Bank’s motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED and this appeal is DISMISSED. Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia 02/02/2016 Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________ I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

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Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________ February 02, 2016

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16A0508. NORTH GEORGIA PAIN CLINIC, P. C. v. RENASANT BANK.

Renasant Bank (“the Bank”) is seeking, through post-judgment discovery, to obtain assets allegedly transferred by Denise Straus and Dr. Barry Straus. In so doing, the Bank sought discovery from a third party, North Georgia Pain Clinic, P. C. (“the Clinic”). The Clinic filed a motion to quash the subpoena and for a protective order. The trial court denied the motion, and the Clinic filed this direct appeal. Although the case remains pending in the trial court, the Clinic contends it is entitled to a direct appeal from a collateral order. The Bank has filed a motion to dismiss. Under the collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order may be appealed directly if it: (1) resolves an issue that is substantially separate from the basic issues to be decided at trial, (2) would result in the loss of an important right if review had to await final judgment, and (3) completely and conclusively decides the issue on appeal. Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 748 (1) (653 SE2d 713) (2007). As a general rule, discovery rulings do not constitute collateral orders. See General Motors Corp. v. Hammock, 255 Ga. App. 131 (564 SE2d 536) (2002). The Clinic contends that the order should nonetheless be considered a collateral order because it is a disinterested third party. It appears from the record, however, that both Strauses either have an ownership interest or are employed by the Clinic. Under these circumstances, the discovery sought from the Bank is not substantially separate from the Bank’s post-judgment attempts to recover money from the Strauses. See, e. g., Britt v. State, supra, 282 Ga. at 748 (1). Accordingly, the collateral order doctrine has no application. The Bank’s motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED and this appeal is DISMISSED. Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia 02/02/2016 Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________ I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

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North Georgia Pain Clinic, P. C. v. Renasant Bank, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/north-georgia-pain-clinic-p-c-v-renasant-bank-gactapp-2016.

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