North Carolina Lottery Commission v. Wells (In Re Wells)

431 B.R. 379, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4293, 2009 WL 5667709
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. North Carolina
DecidedDecember 23, 2009
Docket19-00409
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 431 B.R. 379 (North Carolina Lottery Commission v. Wells (In Re Wells)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
North Carolina Lottery Commission v. Wells (In Re Wells), 431 B.R. 379, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4293, 2009 WL 5667709 (N.C. 2009).

Opinion

ORDER DETERMINING THE DEBT OWED TO NORTH CAROLINA LOTTERY COMMISSION AS TO KAY F. WELLS AND LARRY W. WELLS IS DISCHARGEABLE

RANDY D. DOUB, Bankruptcy Judge.

On November 2, 2009, the Court conducted the trial in this adversary proceeding to determine whether under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), the debt owed to the North Carolina Lottery Commission • (the “NCLC”), is excepted from discharge as to both Larry W. Wells and Kay F. Wells (collectively, the “Debtors”).

The bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, and 1334, as well as, the General Order of Reference entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on August 3, 1984. This proceeding is a core proceeding that can be considered by this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).

Prior to the filing of bankruptcy, the Debtors owned and operated a Gas & Go Convenient Mart, a small convenience store, in Pikeville, North Carolina. In May 2006, the female debtor filed a retailer application seeking approval by the NCLC to sell lottery tickets. Ms. Wells’ application was approved and the “Gas & Go” regularly sold and redeemed lottery tickets. In April 2008, the Debtors closed the convenience store after they were unable to maintain the lease. At that time, certain accounts were not current, including their account with NCLC. The parties agree that NCLC is owed $38,933.43.

On November 26, 2008, NCLC filed its complaint against the Debtors seeking to determine that the debt is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). NCLC asserts that pursuant to the contractual relationship between the parties, the Debtors were acting in a fiduciary capacity as to NCLC with respect to the proceeds from lottery sales and that the Debtors failure to turn over all such proceeds constitutes defalcation within the meaning of subsection (a)(4).

The Debtors argue that Section 523(a)(4) is not applicable in this case as the contract does not require the Debtors to maintain or establish a separate trust account for the benefit of the North Carolina Education Lottery (“NCEL”). The Debtors recognize that should the court disagree with their interpretation of the contract language, the agreement itself is only signed by Kay F. Wells, the female debtor. As such, the Debtors request that if the Court finds that the agreement required a trust account, the debt should be excepted from discharge only as to Mrs. Wells, not Mr. Wells.

Section 523(a)(4) provides that a debt from fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity may not be discharged under section 1328(a)(2). The Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished decision, determined that Section 523(a)(4) requires an express or technical trust to have been *382 imposed prior to any alleged misappropriation of funds. Memo Money Order Co. v. Davis et al. (In re Davis), Adversary Proceeding No. 06-00012-8-JRL (Bankr. E.D.N.C. May 23, 2007) (citing Harrell v. Merchant’s Express Money Order Co. (In re Harrell), 1999 WL 150278, 1999 U.S. LEXIS App. 4743 (4th Cir.1999)) (emphasis added l. 1

For the debt to be nondischargeable under section 523(a)(4), a creditor must establish that the debtor acted in a fiduciary capacity. Therefore, were Mr. and Mrs. Wells, by virtue of their agreement with NCEL, acting in a fiduciary capacity?

The term “fiduciary capacity” is a question of federal law even though state law should be considered in its determination. 2-523 Collier Bankruptcy Manual, ¶ 523.09 (3rd rev.2009). Fiduciary has been narrowly defined. Id. The relevant law that creates the relationship must clearly outline the duties and identify trust property. Id. “If the applicable nonbank-ruptcy law does not clearly and expressly impose trust-like obligations on a party, the court will not assume that such duties exist and will not find that there was a fiduciary relationship.” Id. Typically, an express trust is created by written agreement and a court must ascertain whether or not “the debtor has unrestricted use of the assets in question or, instead, was required to use the assets for the benefit of the creditor.” Id. If there is no fiduciary relationship, then a debt should be discharged.

In North Carolina, a trust is a legal relationship between persons that can be expressly agreed upon in writing, words, or by definite conduct. In order to trigger the applicability of section 523(a)(4), there must be a technical or explicit trust. Keener Lumber Co., Inc. v. Perry, Adversary Proceeding No. S-02-00007-5-JRL *7 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. October 2, 2002).

Collier recognizes that “the mere fact that state law places two parties in a relationship that may have some characteristics of a fiduciary relationship does not necessarily mean that relationship is a fiduciary relationship ...” 2-523 Collier Bankruptcy Manual, ¶ 523.09 (3rd rev. 2009). Section 523(a)(4) requires the existence of an express or technical trust. Id. The technical or express trust must be created by agreement or by statute that specifically imposes a fiduciary obligation. Keener Lumber Co., Inc. v. Perry, Adversary Proceeding No. S-02-00007-5-JRL (Bankr.E.D.N.C. October 2, 2002). Without such a fiduciary obligation, a technical or express trust is not created and the Court is not bound by the holding in Kubo-ta. 2 524 F.3d 493.

*383 The Court finds that neither a technical nor express trust was created here and, therefore, neither were the fiduciary obligations required by Section 523(a)(4). Consequently, the debt owed to NCLC, on behalf of NCEL, is dischargeable.

A creditor has the burden of proof to establish that a debt is nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991). NCLC has not satisfied its burden of proof.

In support of its case, NCLC offered testimony from Michael Suggs, a collections manager who has worked with the North Carolina Education Lottery Commission (“NCEL”) since February 26, 2006. As a collections manager, he is responsible for collecting debts or referring matters to the attorney general’s office, and collection agencies.

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Bluebook (online)
431 B.R. 379, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4293, 2009 WL 5667709, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/north-carolina-lottery-commission-v-wells-in-re-wells-nceb-2009.