Norris v. Hafford
This text of Norris v. Hafford (Norris v. Hafford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss Ci vil Action Docket No. CV-I0-012 -'T ,;- i) f tt:-..J../ fI' T, - /' /-- () ~'C' (1) I\..t/ _~/ "'--i t.-:.,""
RALPH NORRIS,
Plaintiff ORDER ON DEFENDANT BRINK'S v. LFD MOTION TO DISMISS (M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2»
HERBERT HAFFORD and DONALD BRINK • ( .~- & '>,J. ;
{ -.. !. ! f () This matter comes before the court on defendant Donald Brink's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), and lack of personal lack of personal jurisdiction, M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Plaintiff Ralph Norris states that he owned and operated a ranch located in Big Wells, Texas. Norris argues that defendant Hafford -(a Leeds, Maine resident) and defendant Brink (a resident of Pennsylvania), either acting in concert or by agreement, destroyed his Texas property and killed valuable animals and wildlife. The five-count complaint alleges claims of conversion, trespass, negligence, negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malice/punitive damages. Defendant Brink has moved to dismiss the complaint as it pertains to him for lack of both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. As the court agrees that it does not have personal jurisdiction over defendant Brink, it must grant Brink's Motion to Dismiss and does not reach the question of subject matter jurisdiction. 1 The court has reviewed the pleadings and memoranda of counsel relative to defendant Brink's Motion to Dismiss. Oral argument on the motion is not required. The hearing scheduled for May 5th is cancelled. II. STANDARDOFREVIEW The United States Supreme Court has held that in order to satisfy due process, a person must have sufficient contacts with a state before the state can force that person to defend a suit within the jurisdiction. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.s. 310, 317, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945); Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Dworman, 2004 ME 142, <]I 11, 861 A.2d 662, 666. The Law Court has stated that Maine's long-arm statute2 "allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent authorized by the Due Process Gause of the Maine Constitution, Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A, and that of the United States Constitution." Connelly v. Doucette, 2006 ME 124, <]I 6, 909 A.2d 221, 223 (internal citations omitted). Due process is satisfied when: "(I) Maine has a legitimate interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (2) the defendant, by his or her conduct, reasonably could have anticipated litigation in Maine; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction by Maine's courts comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v Dworman, 2004 ME 142, <]I 14, 861 A.2d 662, 666. When the defendant challenges the jurisdiction of the court, "[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs based on specific facts in the record, after which the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction does not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Bickford v. Onslow Mem'l Hosp. Found., Inc., 2004 ME Ill, <]I 10, 855 A.2d 1150, 1155. Id. <]I 7, 909 A.2d at 223. 2 Maine's long-arm statute states, in pertinent part: Causes of Action. Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated in this section, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts: A. The transaction of any business within this State; B. Doing or causing a tortious act to be done, or causing the consequences of a tortious act to occur within this State; I. Maintain[ing] any other relation to the State or to persons or property which affords a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this State consistent with the Constitution of the United States. 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (2009). 2 III. DISCUSSION "Maine has a "legitimate interest" in affording a forum for its citizens to redress injuries caused by nonresidents." Connelly, 2006 ME 124, ~ 8, 909 A.2d at 223-24 (internal citations omitted) (citing 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A(1) ("as a matter of legislative determination, [] the public interest demands that the State provide its citizens with an effective means of redress against nonresident persons who, through certain significant minimal contacts with this State, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection")). This interest, however, must be beyond mere citizenry, "such as the protection of its industries, the safety of its workers, or the location of witnesses and creditors within its border." Murphy v. Keenan, 667 A.2d 591, 594 (Me. 1995); see also Me. Helicopters, Inc. v. Lance Aviation, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 2d 292, 295 (D. Me. 2008) (summarizing a number of Maine personal jurisdiction cases). Here, Maine arguably has a legitimate interest in the litigation as one of its residents, Norris, suffered economic consequences from the defendants alleged conduct. See e.g., Me. Helicopters, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 2d at 296 (citing Bickford, 2004 ME <]I II, 855 A.2d at 1155). Construing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Norris has satisfied his burden of demonstrating Maine's legitimate interest in the litigation of this controversy. However, the plaintiff has failed to establish that defendant Brink could have reasonably anticipated litigation in Maine. The second prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis demands that a defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with Maine such that it would be "reasonable ... to require the [defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought [here]." Interstate Food Processing Inc. v. Pellerito Foods Inc., 622 A.2d 1189, 1192 (Me. 1993) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.s. at 317). In order to be reasonable, the defendant must have "purposefully avail[ed] itself of 'the privilege of 3 conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'" Interstate Food, 622 A.2d at 1192 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.s. 462, 474-75 (1985)). In Maine, purposeful availment occurs when a defendant "purposefully directs his activities at Maine residents" or "creates continuing obligations between himself and the [Maine resident]." Id.; see also Dworman, 2004 ME 142, Even considering all allegations in the complaint to be true and provable, the court finds that the plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that the Defendant "purposely availed" himself of the privilege of conducting activity within Maine such that the requirement for minimum contacts was met. There is no allegation of any tortious activity in Maine, nor any evidence that the alleged invasion of the Texas ranch was planned or even discussed in Maine. See e.g., Connelly, 2006 ME 124, at 224-25.I. BEFORE THE COURT 1
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